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Determinants and Effect of Firm-level Adjustment on Productivity 
By 
Oladipupo A Daramola 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the motivations for and impacts of different channels of adjustment on firm-level 
productivity. It specifically focuses on how firms systematically choose between different paths of 
adjustment and the impact of these choices on firm-level productivity. 
The first empirical chapter of this thesis examines the determinants of firms’ choice of adjustment. 
Using a multinomial logit model, it considers the role of the following 4 characteristics: firm size, 
adjustment size, firm-level variables (R&D, age, multi-plant and foreign ownership) and other factors. 
The chapter shows that large firms tend to rely more on external forms of adjustment – greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisition for expanding firms and; plant closure and plant sale for 
contracting firms - than small firms. It also shows that firms tend to rely more (less) on external forms of 
expansion (contraction) when the desired size of adjustment is large. With regards to the firm-level 
variables considered, this chapter shows that R&D is negatively related to greenfield investment with 
no/negligible effect on mergers and acquisition, plant closure and plant sale. Age has a negative (no) 
impact on greenfield investment (mergers and acquisition) and plant closure (plant sale). Multi-plant 
firms tend to rely more on external forms of adjustment. Lastly, we find that foreign-owned firms are 
more likely to acquire and close existing plants.  
The second empirical chapter studies the impact of alternative forms of adjustment on firm-level 
productivity. This chapter uses the system GMM approach to tackle two sources of bias: simultaneity of 
adjustment paths-productivity relationship and endogeneity of factor inputs (and self-selection of firms 
in and out of an industry) in the production function. This chapter shows that there is no statistical 
relationship between adjustment paths and the long-run productivity of firms. However, given our 
choice of appropriate control groups and the fact that we use the system GMM approach to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns, we view our finding of no long-run adjustment effect as novel. 
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1 Introduction and Motivation 
1.1 Introduction 
Productivity growth is central to the process of economic growth. Through decompositions, economic 
researchers have found that the major contributor to productivity growth is reallocations of resources 
between firms/plants. More specifically, previous analyses show that the opening/closure of 
firms/plants is the largest contributor to TFP growth (over 50 per cent in Disney et al., 2003; and Harris 
and Moffat, 2013a). However, relatively little is known about the factors that explain the investment 
decisions firms make in order to expand or contract and whether the choice of the method used has an 
impact on subsequent performance. Most theoretical and empirical models of firm restructuring focus 
on the overall changes in the output of firms; but give little attention to how these changes are achieved 
and their effect on the firm’s ex-post performance (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; and Hopenhayn, 1992). 
Figure 1-1: Channels of Adjustment 
 
Changes in firm-level output1 can be achieved in 3 principal ways. Firms seeking to increase output may 
do so at existing plants, create new plants or acquire existing plants from other firms. We refer to these 
options as internal expansion, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions respectively in Figure 
1.1. On the other hand, firms can reduce output at existing plants or by closing or selling plants. These 
 
1 We make a reasonable assumption that changes in employment translates into changes in output.  
Expansion     
(Contraction)
Internal Expansion 
(Internal Contraction)
Greenfield Investment 
(Plant Closure)
Mergers and acquisition 
(Plant Sale)
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options are shown in Figure 1.1 as internal contraction, plant closure and plant sale respectively2. Each 
option can have different implications for productivity. For instance, mergers and acquisition could result 
in higher productivity than internal expansion if the change in corporate ownership that often follows the 
former is used as a mechanism to keep good firm-employees match and discard bad matches. Thus, 
understanding the motivations for and impacts of the different adjustment channels is crucial for policy 
makers if they are to develop policies likely to raise economic growth. This thesis aims to contribute 
towards providing such an understanding. 
This chapter introduces the thesis and is structured as follow: the next section provides a motivation for 
the thesis. In section three, we briefly explain our key research questions, contribution, data and 
methodology. Section four describes the content of each chapter in the thesis. The fifth section 
concludes. 
1.2 Research Motivation and Contribution 
The contribution of corporate restructuring (or firm’s adjustment or firm’s expansion and contraction) to 
productivity growth is important for policy. For instance, evidence that mergers and acquisition reduce 
competition and thus, productivity, provides the UK government with a rationale for investigating 
potential mergers on competition grounds (Competition and Markets Authority, 2014). Mergers and 
acquisition are often linked to reduced competition which in turn, leads to reduced quality of goods and 
services and/or increase in the prices of goods and services and; a reduction in consumer surplus. This 
has led to increased regulation and a more restrictive competition policy for potential mergers in the 
UK. However, anti-competitive laws that prevents firms from merging may remove an important 
contribution of mergers and acquisition on UK productivity growth as various researchers have shown 
(e.g., the so-called ‘resource reallocation’ from low to high productivity firms – see Disney et al., 2003; 
and Harris and Moffat, 2013a). This also extends to other forms of firm’s adjustment such as internal 
expansion, greenfield investment, plant closures etc. For instance, policies aimed at reducing the 
number of plant closure in the UK particularly, after the 2008 financial crisis, may create zombie firms - 
firms that would have closed in normal economic circumstances due to low productivity - and have a 
detrimental effect on productivity growth (Caballero et al., 2008, Harris and Moffat, 2016). 
 
2 There are also inter-dependencies between the different expansion and contraction channels. For instance, a firm 
may acquire plants from another firm and sell some of its existing plants not required for future production. The 
full list of options available to firms are shown in Chapter 3 (in particular, table 3.3 and 3.5) of this thesis. 
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To have a better understanding of these policy issues requires information on the determinants of 
productivity and, in particular, whether different forms of firm’s adjustment have varying consequences 
on productivity. Various researchers have analysed the effect of different path of adjustment on firm 
performance (or productivity), however, there is little systematic analysis on the effect firms’ choice of 
adjustment (as shown in Figure 1-1), on productivity. Researchers such as Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001) and Schoar (2002) have studied the effects of mergers and acquisition on productivity but these 
effects are not compared to alternative forms of expansion such as internal expansion or greenfield 
investment. More recently, Breinlich et al. (2012) analysed the role of firm-level adjustments in 
explaining aggregate productivity growth. However, to our knowledge, none of these studies have 
systematically compared the effect of different forms of adjustment on firm-level productivity. In other 
words, it is expected that choosing one particular path of adjustment over another would have different 
consequences for productivity and failing to separate firms’ choices could lead to biased estimates. For 
instance, a firm that chooses greenfield investment over mergers and acquisition may see an increase in 
productivity due to improved technology embedded in new plants. 
The focus of this thesis is therefore, to cover a comprehensive set of determinants of productivity, and is 
centrally concerned with examining the impact of the aforementioned channels of adjustment on 
productivity. In other words, the thesis aims to investigate the productivity impact of choosing a 
particular path of expansion or contraction over another. First, we hypothesize in chapter two, using 
different theoretical models that firms’ chosen path would have different impacts on productivity. The 
main sources of such variation in productivity impact are motivated by input quality differences that 
standard input measures do not capture. For instance, if the capital (or plant) vintage from greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisition differ in how much technological progress they embody, the 
capital (in a production function) would embody different levels of productivity depending on whether it 
is new (i.e., greenfield) or old (i.e., acquired). 
Another strand of related literature seeks to understand the determinants of firm’s adjustment 
(particularly the factors determining why firms choose a particular channel of adjustment over another); 
nonetheless, there are only a limited number of studies as to what leads firms to choose a particular 
path of adjustment, despite its evident importance for economic growth policies. While it is important 
to consider the productivity impacts of different paths of adjustment, one must also understand how 
firms choose between the different channels of adjustments as differences in productivity across firms 
are likely to be influenced by their non-random choices of adjustment path. The expectation is that firms 
14 
 
choose the path of expansion and/or contraction that maximizes profit, given the different revenue 
streams and more importantly different costs associated with each path of expansion (e.g., greenfield 
investment involves large sunk costs while mergers and acquisition involves substantial transaction 
costs). In other words, we expect that a firms’ decision to use a particular path of expansion and/or 
contraction is dependent on a minimum productivity/profitability threshold that is required to secure 
non-negative profits, as well as its market environment (e.g., new technological possibilities, increased 
competition and policy-induced uncertainty such as Brexit)3. Thus, The second part of this thesis 
attempts to provide a comprehensive treatment of firm’s expansion and contraction options, whereas 
previous studies have tended to focus only on a subset of these options, for instance, on the choice 
between mergers and acquisition and greenfield investment (i.e., Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) or on 
the determinants of plant sale (i.e., Yang, 2008). The thesis also uses a comprehensive set of 
determinants of firms’ choice of expansion and contraction which serves as another departure from the 
standard industrial economics literature. The inclusion of variables such as ownership-type and age are 
necessary to avoid an omitted variables problem. 
Thus, the scope of this thesis is to understand the motivations for and the productivity impacts of 
different channels of firm’s adjustment. This thesis utilises the Annual Business Survey (ABS, formerly, 
Annual Respondents Database) to consider these important policy issues. First, and as shown in greater 
detail in chapter three of this thesis, we find that all 6 modes of expansion and contraction – internal 
expansion, greenfield investment, mergers and acquisition, internal contraction, plant closure and plant 
sale – are empirically important. In our UK data, which spans from 1997 to 2012, we found that all 6 
forms of adjustment account for a large proportion of employment expansion and contraction.  Second, 
we observe in our data that the choice of adjustment mode varies with firm-level characteristics such as 
firm size and ownership type. For instance, we observe that mergers and acquisition is increasingly used 
as firm size increases. The importance of firm size concerning the choice between mergers and 
acquisition versus greenfield investment has also been confirmed by recent empirical studies, notably 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and Warusawitharana (2008). Based on these facts, we applied the 
appropriate econometrics techniques to analyse i) the way in which firms systematically choose 
 
3 Our hypothesis is built in more detail in chapter two. Please refer to chapter 2.2.1 to see how we used different 
theoretical models to show how firms systematically choose between the different paths of expansion and 
contraction. 
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between different forms of expansion and contraction and ii) the impact of these choices on 
productivity. 
1.3 Key Research Questions, Data and Methodology 
Following the findings of Disney et al. (2003), a body of research that not only addresses the 
characteristics of entering, exiting and surviving firms, but also examines the relationship between 
reallocating productive capacity between firms/plants and productivity growth, has emerged. However, 
and as stated in sections 1.1 and 1.2 above, one dimension that remains underexplored is the methods 
firms choose to increase/decrease their output (see, for instance, figures 1.1) and whether the methods 
chosen have an impact on subsequent performance. This leads us to 2, broad, interrelated research 
questions.  
1. What determines firms’ choice of adjustment when changing their productive capacity? 
2. What are the impacts of firms’ choice of adjustment on productivity? 
The first research question is concerned with whether profit-maximizing firms systematically choose 
between different paths of adjustment given that each path is characterized by different revenue 
streams and, more importantly, different costs. In the theoretical literature on firm expansion, models 
of firm organizational capability have shown that the existence of fixed and inframarginal costs 
associated with adding plants means that firms must be more productive to overcome such costs before 
they can realise higher profits from additional plants. However, these models do not distinguish 
greenfield investment from mergers and acquisitions, implicitly treating them as equivalent. Capital 
reallocation models which separate greenfield investment from mergers and acquisitions have shown 
that the substantial transaction and conversion costs associated with mergers and acquisitions must be 
weighed against the advantages of mergers and acquisition over greenfield investment. In particular, 
mergers and acquisition may bring new revenue streams through additional product variety that may 
come with acquired plants. In sum, these models predict that high-productivity firms are more likely to 
expand via external forms of expansion but the relationship between the method of external expansion 
- greenfield investment or mergers and acquisition - and productivity level is ambiguous and must be 
empirically tested. In a similar vein, the theory of firm organizational capability and capital reallocation 
suggest that high-productivity firms are more likely use external forms of contraction, when contracting. 
However, the relationship between a particular method of external contraction – plant sale or plant 
closure - and productivity level is unclear and should be empirically tested. 
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Turning to the impact of firms’ choice of expansion on productivity, we use the matching and vintage 
capital theory to provide predictions. Matching theory suggests that there are substantial reshuffling 
costs associated with the hiring and firing process of internal expansion that involves finding a good 
firm-employee match. Mergers and acquisition, on the other hand, provide firms with the opportunity 
to avoid such reshuffling costs by upgrading the skills of existing workers; sorting and matching of 
workers across plants and discarding a bad match. However, matching theory fails to account for the 
productivity difference between greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition. Vintage capital 
theory has shown that, following a technological shock that allows ‘existing’ plants to be used more 
efficiently, mergers and acquisition would be preferred over greenfield investment, which should in turn 
lead to higher ex-post productivity levels. However, if the technological shock is associated with new 
technology that is embedded in greenfield plants, firms are more likely to use greenfield investment that 
should result in greater firm-level productivity. These models therefore, predict that mergers and 
acquisition should result in higher productivity than internal expansion due to the former resulting in a 
good worker-firm match without much costly reshuffling process. However, there is no clear-cut 
prediction as to whether choosing mergers and acquisition would result in higher productivity 
performance than greenfield investment or vice versa (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 
1987; Homes and Schmitz, 1990; Van Biesebroeck, 2003; Han and Rousseau, 2009). 
Regarding the impact on productivity of firms’ choice of contraction paths, we use the theoretical ideas 
from uncertainty during organization decline and firm boundary under comparative advantage to offer 
predictions. The theory of uncertainty during organization decline uses the notion of ‘job insecurity’ to 
show that employees may react negatively to the uncertainty caused by the weeding process of internal 
contraction. In comparison, plant closure can be used to set clear goals with high certainty of job loss 
outcome that involves a notice period and negotiations with workforce. Plant closure thus, removes the 
uncertainty of job loss and creates a better environment for employees to improve and innovate. 
However, this theoretical idea cannot be used to account for any productivity difference between plant 
closure and plant sale (both external contraction). To do so, we use the theory of firm boundary under 
comparative advantage. This theory has shown that plants sold are more efficient than closed plants 
because the former command a higher market price than the latter. As a result, selling plants should 
result in lower ex-post productivity than closing plants since the former are more efficient that the 
latter. However, this may fail to hold if potential plant sellers are not willing to sell plants with recent 
vintage to their competitors. Overall, these models predict that firm’s ex-post productivity performance 
from plant closure should be higher than that of internal expansion, but there is no clear-cut prediction 
17 
 
as to whether a particular path of external contraction would lead to a better or worse productivity 
impact. 
The aforementioned theoretical predictions (see chapter two for detailed discussion) are subsequently 
tested for their empirical validity in chapters four and five. This thesis tests such predictions using data 
from the Annual Business Survey (ABS, formerly, Annual Respondents Database)4; Business Enterprise 
Research and Development (BERD) database and Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI). 
All these data are collected by the Office for National Statistics in the UK. First, a firm- and plant-level 
panel dataset on manufacturing and marketable services was constructed using the ABS database. This 
dataset was them linked with other panel data covering business research and development (BERD data) 
and information on foreign direct investment (AFDI data). These data sources are accessible via the UK 
Data Service by a certified secure lab user.  
The most important objective of this thesis is to help fill the gap in the literature by using a combination 
of relevant econometric techniques to test the validity of theoretical predictions on a detailed panel 
dataset on a large sample of UK firms. First, the thesis investigates if heterogeneity in productivity levels 
(and firm-level characteristics) causes firms to differ in the methods chosen to change output. Multinomial 
logit is used to model the unordered multiple-choice variable of whether to increase output at “own” 
existing plant (internal expansion), open “new” plant (greenfield investment), or acquire existing plant 
from “other” firms (mergers and acquisition) based on firm characteristics. For contracting firms, the 
choice is whether to reduce output at “own” existing plant (internal contraction), close “existing” plant 
(plant closure), or sell “existing” plant (plant sale). Secondly, using the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) approach, the thesis examines the productivity impact of alternative forms of adjustment.  
Previous empirical studies have used different models such as least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
model, within-group fixed effects (WG) least squares models and so on, to estimate productivity via a log-
linear production function. However, these models often fail to control for endogeneity and selection bias 
in the production function specification (see, Battese and Coelli, 1995). As earlier discussed, firms’ decision 
to adjust via external forms of adjustment will be taken on the basis of an assessment of the benefit that 
will accrue to the firm and this benefit will itself be a function of the characteristics of the firm. In other 
words, firms may possess certain characteristics such that they achieve better performance (in terms of 
higher productivity) vis-à-vis internal expanders and/or ‘no adjusters’ even when they do not adjust via 
 
4 See chapter three for detailed description of the ARD and how our dataset is constructed. 
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external forms of adjustment. These characteristics may include better managerial capabilities, 
organisational skills etc. that are associated with achieving higher productivity and the decision to self-
select into external forms of adjustment. To address such self-selection issue, we use system GMM 
estimator to estimate TFP via a log-linear production function. By allowing for fixed effects, and by using 
lagged values (in levels and first difference) of the explanatory variables as instruments, system GMM 
deals with the problem of selection bias and endogeneity of other explanatory variables in our model. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
In addition to this introduction, this thesis consists of 5 chapters. The next chapter provides a theoretical 
and empirical underpinning for firms’ choice of adjustment and its effect on productivity. Chapter two is 
therefore made up of 2 parts. The first part uses firm organizational capability and capital reallocation 
theory to motivate why firms might choose a particular part of adjustment over another. It also uses 
matching theory, vintage capital theory, the theory of uncertainty during organization decline and the 
theory of firm boundary under comparative advantage to offer predictions on the productivity impact of 
alternative forms of adjustment. The second part of chapter two provides a review of extant empirical 
literature that has attempted to address the determinants of firm’s choice of adjustment. Like the 
theoretical literature, most empirical papers are limited in the way they are largely unsystematic. For 
instance, there is a large literature in corporate finance that have considered the determinants of 
mergers and acquisition and asset sales without comparing them to alternative forms of adjustment 
such as greenfield investment or plant closures (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Yang, 2008; Schoar, 
2002). As a result, this part is organized into measures that have been frequently used in empirical 
literature to proxy for productivity and sunk cost of adjustment and to examine the relationship 
between firm-level productivity and different paths of adjustment. Lastly, in chapter two, we review 
empirical papers that have analysed the role of firm-level adjustment in explaining productivity levels.  
Chapter three begins by describing the key database – the Annual Business Survey (ABS, formerly, 
Annual Respondents Database) - used for our empirical analyses of chapters four and five. First, a firm- 
and plant-level panel dataset on manufacturing and marketable services firms/plants was constructed 
using the ABS database. This dataset was then linked with other panel data covering business research 
and development (BERD data) and information on foreign direct investment (AFDI data). This chapter 
then proceeds to explaining how firms are classified into different categories of adjustment. The process 
involves using local unit and enterprise unit (plant and firm respectively) unique identifiers in the ARD to 
capture demographic events. A description of each path of adjustment was then provided. Finally, this 
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chapter provides some comparison between firm-level characteristics such as firm size and ownership 
structure and different channels of adjustment. This showed that firms that rely on external forms of 
adjustment - greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition for expansion and, plant closure and 
plant sales for contraction – tend to be larger and UK-owned. 
Chapter four addresses the question of whether profit-maximizing firms systematically choose between 
different paths of adjustment. In particular, this chapter examines the relationship between firms’ 
choice of adjustment and their characteristics that serve as proxies for productivity. The chapter starts 
by setting out the appropriate econometrics model in which the probability of firms choosing a 
particular path of adjustment is explained by a set of proxy variables for sunk cost and productivity. 
Because the dependent variable takes the value 0, 1 and 2 depending on whether a firm expands 
internally (contracts internally), creates a new plant (closes an existing plant) or acquires an existing 
plant (sell an existing plant) respectively, the multinomial logit model is employed in this chapter. Our 
result indicates that large firms tend to rely more on external forms of adjustment than small firms. We 
also find that firms tend to rely more (less) on external forms of expansion (contraction) when the 
desired size of adjustment is large. With regards to the firm-level variables used, we find that age, multi-
plant ownership and foreign ownership are positively associated with external forms of expansion while 
R&D is negatively related to the same forms of expansion. For contraction, we find a negative 
relationship between the probability of using external forms of contraction and firm’s age and single-
plant ownership. Finally, we find that foreign ownership is positively associated with plant closure while 
the impact of foreign ownership on probability of plant sale is close to zero. 
Chapter five examines the productivity impact of alternative forms of adjustment. We apply the system 
GMM estimator to overcome 2 sources of bias: the first arises due to the simultaneity of adjustment 
paths-productivity relationship and the second arises due to the endogeneity of factor inputs (and self-
selection of firms in and out of an industry) in the production function. To further strengthen our 
empirical argument, we use OLS, fixed-effects and Levinsohn-Petrin estimators to highlight the 
aforementioned simultaneity and endogeneity concerns. We find that these estimators produce 
unreasonably low capital coefficients, suggesting that the estimators fail to control for simultaneity and 
endogeneity problems. The result from our preferred system GMM estimator reveals that there is no 
statistical relationship between adjustment paths and the long-run productivity of firms operating in 
different sectors (except for plant closure in the high-tech KI service sector). Given our choice of 
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appropriate control groups and the fact that we use the system GMM approach to alleviate endogeneity 
concerns, we view our finding of no long-run adjustment effect as novel. 
Chapter six is the last chapter of the thesis and it provides a summary of the whole study together with 
some policy recommendation. The chapter begins by setting out the contribution to literature made by 
this thesis. It then summarises the results from the empirical analyses of chapters four and five. Based 
on these findings, some policy recommendations are made. Lastly, this chapter offers some suggestions 
for future research. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced and provided a motivation for this thesis on the grounds of understanding 
the role firm-level adjustment plays in explaining productivity differences. Question was also raised on 
how firms choose between different forms of adjustment. The thesis uses theoretical studies to justify 
why one might expect firms to systematically choose between different forms of adjustment and for 
varying impacts of those choices on productivity. Recent developments such as the greater availability of 
firm- and plant-level datasets and advances in econometric methods facilitate research in this area. 
Using annual survey data from the UK, this thesis therefore seeks to address a gap in the literature by 
analysing i) the way in which firms systematically choose between the different channels of adjustment, 
and ii) the impact of the choice of adjustment channel on firm’s productivity. The thesis use insights 
from key theoretical models and employ econometric techniques such as multinomial logit and system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) to test theoretical predictions. The last section of this chapter 
gave an outline of the subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of firms 
restructuring and its impact on productivity in order to build expectations of what will be found in our 
empirical analyses of chapters four and five. Thus, this chapter is made up of 2 parts. The first part 
discusses theoretical papers and uses the ideas from these papers to generate hypotheses. In other 
words, we set out what the theoretical literature suggests may be expected from the empirical analyses 
of chapters four and five. Chapter four tests the microeconomic decisions concerning firms’ choice of 
adjustment. A handful of theoretical models have been developed that provide predictions as to how 
firms choose between different channels of adjustment, but none has modelled the full set of 
adjustment paths that are available to firms – i.e., the choice between internal expansion, greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisition for expanding firms. As a result, we use insights from key 
theoretical literatures to provide predictions for our empirical analysis of chapter four. In chapter five, 
we examine the productivity impact of choosing alternative forms of adjustment. The first part of this 
chapter also draws on different theoretical literatures to generate hypotheses regarding the impact of 
different paths on adjustment on productivity.  
The second part of this chapter focuses on reviewing empirical literature. Empirical papers that have 
attempted to address how firms choose between alternative forms of adjustment have also been less 
systematic, often considering firm’s choice of adjustment as dichotomous i.e., firms’ choice between 
greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition. However, empirical literature has found firm-level 
variables such as size and ownership structure to be associated with their chosen path of adjustment. As 
such, the second part of this chapter surveys firm-level variables that have been frequently documented 
in literature to play a role in determining firms’ choice of adjustment. This will help to provide lessons on 
how to empirically estimate the determinants of firm’s adjustment in chapter four and point us to 
variables that are likely to proxy for productivity and sunk costs (i.e., the factors that theory predicts 
drives firms’ chosen path of adjustment). The second part of this chapter also review empirical papers 
that have studied the impact on productivity of alternative forms of adjustment. The final part of this 
chapter concludes. 
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2.2 Theoretical Review and Hypotheses 
This section will begin by reviewing theoretically papers that suggest how firms might systematically 
choose between different forms of adjustment. This will provide guidance on how to empirically 
estimate firms’ choice of expansion and contraction paths in chapter four. It will then turn to 
theoretically motivating the impact on productivity of choosing alternative forms of adjustment. This will 
be useful in giving a priori expectation for chapter five which investigates the productivity impacts of 
choosing different paths of adjustment. 
2.2.1 Theoretical Motivation for Choice of Expansion and Contraction Channels  
Firms facing increased demand or a fall in production cost may obtain additional revenue from increased 
production and incur additional cost as a result of the expansion process (Baumol, 1962)5. The amount 
of additional revenue and cost from expansion depends, in turn, on the path of expansion chosen. 
Internal (or workforce) expansion increases revenues from expanding outputs of the firm (assuming 
output prices are fixed) but raises labour cost (wages multiplied by labour quantity) especially for large 
expanding outputs due to diminishing marginal product of labour from fixed capital and increasing 
labour quantity. Firms can, on average, reduce labour cost through new greenfield technology, but 
greenfield investment that achieves average labour cost reduction is costly i.e., the large sunk set-up 
cost of building new plants. So, the sunk set-up cost of greenfield investment mitigates the increased 
profit resulting from labour cost reduction. Similarly, the substantial restructuring such as workforce 
reduction (i.e., Shleiffer and Summers, 1988) and divestitures (i.e., Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992), that 
often follows mergers and acquisitions can be used to reduce average labour cost and thus increase 
profit.  However, profit is reduced by the large transaction costs associated with searching and paying 
for suitable plants and conversion costs to overcome the lack of fit between the 2 organisations. If new 
product varieties are attached to acquired plants, mergers and acquisitions may bring additional 
revenue through product variety. Both greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition may lead to 
efficiency loss associated with dedicating a firm’s (fixed) organizational capital such as managerial 
resources on too many plants. There are similar adjustment costs and revenue when firms need to 
contract. Ultimately, the decision that the firm faces is to choose the path of adjustment that maximizes 
 
5 An alternative view posits that firm’s expansion decisions are driven by opportunistic agents (usually salaried 
managers), who attempt to distort the profit-maximization motive for their personal needs and ambition (See, 
Baumol, 1959; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Jensen, 1986).  However, the personal ambition and profit-
maximization motive may become equivalent if salaried managers can successfully retain and reinvest profits in 
the firm. In these settings, the successful expansion of the firm from reinvested profits satisfies managerial 
personal needs for higher salaries, power and prestige (Penrose, 1959). 
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profit, given the different revenue streams (e.g., additional revenue from mergers and acquisitions) and 
more importantly different costs associated with each path of adjustment (e.g., greenfield investment 
involves large sunk costs while mergers and acquisition involves substantial transaction costs).  
A handful of theoretical models (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Breinlich and Niemann, 2011a) 
have been set out to explain the determinant of firms’ expansion and contraction path, but none in one 
integrated setting. Broadly speaking, these theoretical models can be categorized into 2 distinct strands 
in the corporate finance literature – the theory of organizational capability and capital reallocation 
theory – with neither theory accommodating all 3 forms of expansion and contraction paths. Despite 
their difference in details, we use insights from each theoretical study to make predictions on how firms 
systematically choose between different forms of expansion and contraction. 
2.2.1.1 Theory of Firm Organizational Capability 
The theory of firm organizational capability (as proposed by Breinlich and Niemann, 2011a) seeks to 
explain how firms partition a given expansion size between internal and external expansion and how 
such partition varies across firms with different productivity levels. They do so using a model in which 
firms must incur a fixed cost of opening/buying plant and they differ in both organizational capital and 
efficiency but not across the individual plants belonging to a given firm (i.e., productivity heterogeneity 
across firms but not across plants within the firm). There are 2 premises of this model. The first is that 
firms must incur a sizeable fixed cost for each plant added to its operation and that these costs must be 
paid up front. Hence, firms must experience a substantial and persistent increase in demand or fall in 
costs to be willing to pay for such setup sunk costs6. The second premise is that firms must commit some 
of their fixed organizational capital (e.g., managerial time) on managing additional plant. As they 
dedicate this organizational capital on managing more plants, the less good they become at managing 
each of their plants e.g., because of scarce managerial resources (see, Lucas, 1978 and; Schoar, 2002 for 
theoretical and empirical motivations respectively). However, this inframarginal cost effect (as referred 
to by Nocke and Yeaple, 2008, 2014) from additional plants increases less quickly for high efficiency 
firms7. Therefore, the impact of adding plants to firm’s operation consists of additional revenue from 
 
6Clark and Wrigley (1997) argue that the existence of uncertainty over the stability of market prices and perhaps 
the time it will take to recover the sunk setup cost deters potential acquirers/greenfield investors from immediate 
acquisition/construction even when an opportunity to make profit is identified. As a result, the perceived 
opportunity to make profit and cover the sunk set up cost has to be viable over a predetermined time horizon. 
7 Here, organizational efficiency determines the rate at which firms become less productive at managing each plant 
as they add more plants to their operation, thus reflecting firm-level productivity. 
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increased production and additional cost from fixed and inframarginal cost of production. As such, there 
is a trade-off between firm scope and profitability at firm’s individual plants.  
As demand increases or operation cost falls such that external expansion becomes profitable (i.e., the 
additional revenue exceeds the fixed and inframarginal cost of adding plants), firms are more likely to 
increase their number of plants. However, firms that were previously more efficient take better 
advantage of the increased demand or fall in cost by adding more plants because the inframarginal cost 
from adding plants rises less quickly for these firms. It follows therefore that more efficient (high-
productivity) firms increase their number of plants more strongly in response to a substantial and 
persistent increase in demand or fall in cost than less efficient (low-productivity) firms. The same firms 
also shed more plants when cost rises, or there is a substantial fall in demand.  This is because the 
inframarginal benefit – benefit from managing fewer plants due to scarce managerial resources - from 
shedding plants rises less quickly for high-productivity firm. 
The major problem with firms’ organizational capability theory is motivated by an empirical observation. 
In planning an expansion, firms consider 3 principal channels of expansion – internal expansion, 
greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions (as shown in figure 1.1 of Chapter 1). Each one of 
these expansion paths provides firms with different revenue streams and different costs. However, the 
theory discussed above fails to accommodate all 3 forms of expansion, implicitly treating greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisition as equivalent8. This theory therefore fails to account for all 3 
expansion paths available to firms wishing to expand their productive capacity. There are similar 
limitations with using this theory to motivate all 3 channels of contraction – internal contraction, plant 
closure and plant sale. As a result, we incorporate ideas from another theory - capital reallocation 
theory – to motivate how firms systematically choose between the 3 forms of expansion and 
contraction. 
2.2.1.2 Capital Reallocation Theory 
There has been a long tradition in corporate investment of examining firms’ choice between different 
modes of expansion. This literature generally does not distinguish between internal expansion and 
greenfield investment, referring to them as new capital (or new investment or asset). Similar to the 
firms’ organizational capability theory, capital reallocation theory generally assumes that firms differ in 
 
8 While greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition both represent expansion in firm’s scope, the latter 
form of expansion often provide firms with an established variety but also requires a substantial transaction cost 
that must be paid upfront (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002; and Spearot, 2012).  
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their organizational capital and organizational efficiency. Capital (or plant) is required as new 
technologies emerge with the potential to reduce labour cost and increase profit. There are substantial 
transaction costs (i.e., negotiation, brokerage, legal, etc.) associated with acquiring capital through 
mergers and acquisitions as well as further conversion cost; assuming capital is reallocated from less 
efficient to more efficient firms. However, firms must weigh these costs against the advantages of 
mergers and acquisition over greenfield investment. The first advantage stems from the assumption 
that existing plants are less costly than new plants, perhaps due to depreciation. Secondly, it usually 
takes several periods for new machinery and structures to become productive, while acquisition of 
another firm’s plant can be achieved in a relatively short time. Thirdly, mergers and acquisition may 
provide firms with access to established variety and established market assuming these come with 
acquired plant9. As a result, purchasing existing plants from other firms for use in a new technological 
climate and/or to serve new markets can be less costly, less time consuming and/or more profitable 
than building a new plant. However, firms must pay the aforementioned transaction and conversion 
costs upfront before they can enjoy additional benefit from mergers and acquisitions. 
The pioneering work of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) was the first to theoretically model this idea. 
They extend Hayashi (1982) Q-model of investment to accommodate mergers and acquisitions and 
analyse the effect of technological changes on firms’ decision to seek new or existing capital. Jovanovic 
and Rousseau (2002) allow firms to differ in their organizational capital and technological adaptability 
choosing different levels of capital stock when there is a change in technological possibilities. Changes in 
technological climate lead firms to expand and contract as their profitability changes. Firms with low 
organizational capital and organizational efficiency i.e., low-profitability firms can improve their average 
productivity of capital by selling plants. However, in response to improved profitability, firms with high 
organizational capital and organizational efficiency have the option of expanding through greenfield 
investment or mergers and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisition involves a substantial transaction cost 
but the relative price of acquired plants is cheaper than newly built plants. Therefore, firms with 
improved profitability must weigh the additional transaction costs of mergers and acquisition against 
the cost savings from purchasing cheaper plants. Firms with the highest improved profitability seek 
proportionate increase in their capital stocks that are large enough to overcome the transactions costs 
associated with mergers and acquisition. When this happens, these high-profitability firms, being the 
 
9 These advantages reflects the difference in prices (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002; and Warusawitharana, 2008), 
timing (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; and Koeva, 2000) and product attribute (Sweeting, 2010; and Spearot, 2012)  
in different forms of capital investment. 
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ones with the best organizational capital and organizational efficiency, can pass down their 
management skills and technological adaptability to their target’s plant; thereby facilitating their 
transition back to the technology frontier. 
Warusawitharana (2008) extends Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) idea to show that firm size, in addition 
to profitability is a key determinant to asset purchases and sales. The author assumed that transaction 
costs associated with mergers and acquisitions vary with the size of the capital purchased from other 
firms. As firms purchase a larger amount of capital (plants) from other firms, the unit transaction cost 
declines (i.e., a transaction cost function that displays economies of scale). The concave transaction cost 
and the relative price of purchasing plants from other firms impact the optimal choice of capital. 
Following a positive demand shock, firms with low improved profitability will seek low levels of 
investment and build plants because for low levels of investment, the concave transaction costs 
associated with mergers and acquisitions exceeds the cost savings from purchasing existing plants. For 
firms with high improved profitability seeking to make high levels of investment can do so by purchasing 
existing plants from other firms, as the cost savings from purchasing such plants exceeds the transaction 
costs involved. Thus, high-profitability firms are more likely to purchase existing plants from other firms. 
However, large firms take better advantage of increased demand and profitability by acquiring more 
existing assets since they are better at integrating existing assets than small firm (this is similar to the 
assumption that inframarginal cost effect from additional plants increases less quickly for high efficiency 
firms in Breinlich and Niemann, 2011a, model). 
Spearot (2012) also reached a similar conclusion by allowing firms to differ in productivity levels as they 
operate at different demand elasticity and assuming that firms can invest in both process innovation – 
the reduction of marginal cost on existing varieties – and product innovation – the addition of new 
varieties. In these settings, firms are recognized as brands and varieties within a brand are closer 
substitutes than varieties across brands i.e., MacBook laptop is a closer substitute for MacBook Pro than 
for Sony Vaio. This implies that expansion within the firm cannibalizes demand for existing products 
while expansion in another variety mitigates such cannibalization allowing firms to make additional 
profit from added variety. Additional established variety attached to plants acquired from other firms 
reduces the cannibalization effect, implying that profit from mergers and acquisition exceeds profit from 
greenfield investment. However, the profit differential is heightened for high productivity firms because 
they operate on the less elastic portion of the demand curve by making varieties that are imperfectly 
substitutable within the firm.  
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By contrast, Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) build a model that predicts that the most efficient firms are 
more likely to use greenfield investment over mergers and acquisition. There are 2 premises in their 
model. The first is that ‘acquired’ capital in relatively more profitable in the mergers and acquisition 
market than ‘new’ capital because existing output is attached to the former while new capital contains 
no output. As a result, purchasing existing capital from a mergers and acquisition market is more 
profitable than capital from greenfield investment, as the former comes with additional output. The 
second premise is that, in a mergers and acquisition market, an acquiring firm must incur a capital 
conversion cost of converting inferior technology in acquired capital into technology that is in line with 
its existing capital10.  An expanding firm must therefore, weigh the additional output from acquired 
capital against the cost of converting inferior technology in such capital11. Following a positive shock that 
increases profit-maximizing output level, firms are more likely to acquire capital (or plant) if the revenue 
from additional output in acquired plant exceeds the cost of converting its technology. However, the 
new profit maximizing output level differs between firms with different efficiency level with less efficient 
firms requiring more plants to reach the new profit-maximizing output level.  Therefore, less efficient 
firms will seek more plants from the mergers and acquisition market since plants in this market are 
cheaper (or possess additional output) than greenfield plant. Furthermore, less efficient firms seeking to 
acquire plants in the mergers and acquisition market operate plants with closer technological frontier to 
target’s plants such that these less efficient acquirers need to spend less on conversion cost. It follows, 
therefore, from Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) model that less efficient firms are more likely to acquire 
plants. 
The capital reallocation theory of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and Warusawitharana (2008) also 
predict that less-efficient firms are more likely to engage in plant sales than more-efficient firms. Indeed, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) predict that in response to reduced profitability, least profitable (i.e., 
low-productivity) firms would seek proportionate reduction in their capital stock and engage more 
strongly in plant sales because, for large capital sales, the proceeds from such sales exceeds the 
transaction cost associated with searching for and negotiating with suitable buyers. Warusawitharana 
(2008) also reached a similar conclusion, however, the author also showed that, following such negative 
 
10 This stems from the assumption that acquirer’s capitals are superior to targets capital. 
11 Their model also assumes that a firm cannot expand and contract simultaneously. Instead, firms receive 
different shocks that separate them into expanding and contracting firms with each category faced with the 
decision of whether to participate in a merger and acquisition market or expand (contract) via greenfield 
investment (plant closure) 
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demand shock, large firms are more likely to find themselves with too many plants than optimal and are 
therefore, more likely to engage in plant sales than small firms. 
The existence of capital conversion cost may induce potential acquirers in the mergers and acquisition 
to seek plants that are of recent vintage; making it difficult for low-productivity firms to sell their plants. 
For instance, Han and Rousseau (2009) argue that there are conversion costs associated with adding 
plants to firm’s operation which reduces the gains from additional plants (i.e., from added variety) to a 
point where an acquisition is forgone when there is a large difference between an acquirer’s technology 
and its potential target. As a result, an acquiring firm may only seek to buy plants that have vintage 
technology and are closer to their technological frontier in order to avoid the substantial cost of 
converting plants with inferior technology into one that is in line with their operated plants. Indeed, 
Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) show that acquirers are always seeking plants with closer technology 
frontier to their own, such that they would need to spend less on integrating technology in acquired 
plant. An implication of such prediction is that it is the more productive firms with vintage plants that 
potential acquirers are looking to buy, that are more likely to sell plants in the mergers and acquisition 
market. 
2.2.1.3  Summary and Hypothesis  
In this section, we review the firm organizational capability and capital reallocation theory to generate 
testable hypotheses on how firms choose between the different paths of adjustment. Firms must 
choose the path of adjustment with the best overall profit subject to different adjustment paths 
characterized with different revenue streams and most importantly, different costs. According to the 
firms’ organizational capability theory, there are fixed and inframarginal costs associated with adding 
and shedding plants, which implies that unless firms experience a substantial and persistent 
increase/reduction in demand or fall/increase in costs, internal adjustment will remain a preferred 
mode of adjustment. Thus, only ample productivity and/or demand shocks that make external 
adjustment profitable would see a firm increase/reduce its number of plants. When this occurs, firms 
that were previously more efficient take better advantage of the increased (reduced) demand or fall 
(increase) in cost by adding (shedding) more plants because for these firms, inframarginal cost (benefit) 
from adding (shedding) plants rises less quickly. In the event of weighing further transaction and/or 
conversion costs associated with acquired plants in the mergers and acquisition market against the 
additional output (proceeds) in acquired (sold) plant, the relationship between firms’ choice of external 
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adjustment and their productivity levels may be ambiguous. These costs and productivity implication 
lead us to our first 2 hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: More efficient firms are more likely to expand through greenfield investment and mergers 
and acquisition – the 2 forms of external expansion. However, it is difficult to predict, a priori, whether 
the most efficient firms are more/less likely to choose greenfield investment over mergers and 
acquisition or vice versa. 
Hypothesis 2: More efficient firms are more likely to contract through plant closure and plant sale – the 
2 forms of external contraction. However, it is difficult to predict, a priori, whether the most efficient 
firms are more/less likely to choose plant closure over plant sale or vice versa. 
Crucial to the theoretical models reviewed above is the assumption of productivity heterogeneity across 
firms but not across the plants belonging to a firm. When heterogeneity occurs across firms and plants, 
there is no simple productivity-based rule for predicting expansion and contraction paths (e.g., 
Whinston, 1988; Gibson and Harris, 1996). For instance, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) build a model in 
which productivity heterogeneity exists across firms as well as across the plants belonging to a firm. In 
their model, firms differ in both organizational capital and efficiency and, plants that are operated in a 
firm’s core business are more productive than plants that are operated in its peripheral division. A 
profit-maximizing firm optimizes size by choosing to operate number of plants at the point where the 
marginal product of operating the marginal plant is equal to the opportunity cost of selling and/or 
closing the plant. A positive industry shock has 2 effects on a firm. First, it increases the productivity of 
each plant in the industry. Second, it increases the opportunity cost of running marginal plant for less 
efficient firms because plants can be redeployed elsewhere more profitably. Therefore, following a 
positive industry shock that makes firms’ marginal plant productivity to exceed their opportunity cost, 
firms must acquire/build plants until their optimal size is established.  
However, the same industry shock has a greater effect on the plant productivity (opportunity cost) of 
firms who are initially more (less) productive. As a result, the more productive firms will add a larger 
proportion of plants to their core business because the increase in the productivity of plants that 
operate in their core business is higher relatively to less efficient firms operating plants in the same 
industry. Furthermore, firms that are less efficient in operating marginal plants have less incentive to 
increase their number of plants because plants are better utilized elsewhere. By contrast, if the positive 
industry shock occurs in the industry where the more productive firm is operating plants in its peripheral 
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division – i.e., it is less efficient at managing a larger number of plants in this division even though it is 
overall, more productive - the more productive firm will add a smaller proportion of plants to its 
operation. This implies that more efficient firms are more (less) likely to increase their number of plants 
in their core (peripheral) business than less efficient firms. Such prediction (alongside the ones above) 
become more complicated if, in addition to firm heterogeneity, we allow plant heterogeneity that 
extends beyond the classification of core and peripheral division.  
2.2.2 Theoretical Motivation for the Impact of Expansion Channels on Productivity 
Sections 2.2.1 offered a number of different theoretical explanations as to why firms choose different 
forms of expansion. It shows that firms’ decision to choose a path of expansion that maximizes profit is 
based the different revenue streams and costs associated with each path of expansion as well as firm 
productivity levels. This section turns to the consequences of choosing different expansion paths on 
productivity. We argue that the endogenous sorting of firms across different paths of expansion is a 
major determinant of productivity.  
The ability of firms to expand to rising demand or falling cost is an important factor that affects their 
organizational efficiency (or productivity)12. The gain or loss in organizational efficiency in turn, depends 
on the path (or mix) of expansion chosen. Internal (or workforce) expansion raises productivity from 
higher labour quality (assuming productive workers are hired and the standard labour input in the 
production function specification does not capture this). However, the existence of information 
asymmetry between firms and workers may lead to continuous reshuffling before productive workers 
are found. Such reshuffling is likely to involve significant costs, not least because of the potential 
stringent labour laws that may prevent employers from terminating and/or negotiating labour contracts 
with employees. Mergers and acquisition, on the other hand, can be used to redraw boundaries by 
discarding unproductive workers to reduce cost, upgrading skills of existing workers and hiring new 
worker whose skills better suit the new organization. Similarly, a greenfield plant that requires the 
implementation of new production process would likely increase firm’s demand for educated workers, 
because highly-educated workers are likely to have a comparative advantage in helping the firm adapt 
new technology. When this happens, the newly adapted technology in greenfield plants should lead to 
an increase in firm-level productivity. Ultimately, the overall contribution of expansion to the changes in 
 
12 The most basic producer theory says that profit maximizing firms minimizes their costs of producing their chosen 
quantity. 
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firm-level productivity depends on the path of expansion chosen, given the different efficiency gains and 
costs associated with each path of expansion. 
Although in no integrated setting, there are theoretical models that offer explanation to the varying 
consequences of expansion choice on productivity. Broadly speaking, these explanations can be 
categorized into 2 distinct strands – the “matching” theory and “vintage capital” theory. The matching 
theory literature uses the notion of ‘fit’ to argue that differences in labour quality and thus, productivity, 
between internal and external expansion is due to the existence of incomplete information in labour 
market. This theory is therefore concerned with offering explanation for the disparity in productivity 
performance between internal and external expansion, whereby the latter refers to greenfield 
investment and/or mergers and acquisition. The vintage capital theory, on the other hand, distinguishes 
the productivity performance of greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition. However, vintage 
capital theory often ignores the productivity impact of internal expansion. Consequently, neither the 
matching theory nor vintage capital theory accommodates all 3 forms of expansion in one integrated 
setting. Despite their difference in details, we use insights from each theoretical study to provide lessons 
on how to empirically estimate the impact of expansion channels on productivity.  
2.2.2.1 Matching Theory 
There has been a long tradition in labour economics of examining the impact of worker-firm match on 
worker turnover. Early theoretical works were particularly concerned with how job matching was 
related to labour productivity, and thus wages and career potentials. According to this view, workers are 
well suited to a certain job or firm and if they are matched to jobs that best suit their skills, they receive 
higher wages and are less likely to quit their jobs. This idea was first theoretically modelled by Jovanovic 
(1979). Jovanovic (1979) assumed worker-firm match as an experienced good, whose characteristics are 
initially uncertain and are gradually revealed over time by output performance. The model hinges on 3 
main assumptions. The first is that each worker performs different jobs with different productivities. The 
same is true for employer – for each task that the employer needs to assign, different workers have 
different productivities. The second assumption is that employers and workers can bargain over wage 
contract on an individual basis, with employers that are satisfied with their match willing to pay a 
worker relatively more than employers that are unsatisfied. This creates a reward structure that 
provides signal for the attainment of optimal matches. The third assumption is that both employers and 
workers have imperfect information about the exact location of the most productive match. As 
employers and/or workers continuously observe the output performance of a particular match, they 
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incorporate this information into wages, and reassess it against alternative opportunities offered by the 
market. Thus, the model predicts that if a worker is employed in the right job or organization, a good 
match will result with positive consequences for both the organization and the worker’s career. 
Taking this approach further, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) outlined a matching theory of ownership 
change that focuses on how the quality of the fit between heterogeneous plant sellers and acquirers is 
reflected in the productivity of the acquirer. Similar to the Jovanovic (1979) model, acquirers have 
incomplete information about the true levels of efficiency of heterogeneous plants before acquisition 
with more precise information about the quality of the plant developing as the acquirer operates the 
plant. As acquirers continuously observe the true productivity of a given plant, they incorporate this 
information to determine whether to maintain or abandon the ownership of the plant. In other words, if 
a plant is matched with the right acquirer, a good match will result with improvement in the acquirer’s 
productivity. In a modified framework, Homes and Schmitz (1990) included a human capital dimension 
that is related to the quality of the manager to show how high-quality managers acquire firms that 
would implement high quality projects based on new ideas. 
None of these studies explicitly consider the impact of choosing external expansion – greenfield 
investment and/or mergers and acquisition - over internal expansion, on productivity. However, we can 
extend the logic of this theory to generate a testable hypothesis. Consider a firm facing increased 
demand or fall in cost with the overall aim of expanding its workforce and improving efficiency. Internal 
expansion may be used to employ new productive workers as well as layoff unproductive ones, thereby 
increasing the firm’s overall workforce and improve efficiency level. However, an implication of the 
matching theory is that firms have incomplete information about potential employees’ productivities 
which could result in continuous reshuffling before the right match is found. Such reshuffling is likely to 
involve significant costs, not least because of the potential stringent labour laws that may prevent 
employers from terminating and/or negotiating labour contracts with employees.  On the other hand, 
external expansion such as mergers and acquisition presents an opportunity for acquirers to improve 
the sorting and matching of existing workers across plants. The change in corporate ownership that 
often follows merger and acquisition can be used as a mechanism to upgrade skills of existing workers, 
match those skills with appropriate plants and discard unproductive workers. Mergers and acquisition 
therefore, constitutes an opportunity to avoid the hiring and retrenchment costs associated with 
internal expansion because it matches existing employees to jobs that best suit their skills. This 
discussion suggests that external expansion, in particular, mergers and acquisition should result in 
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higher productivity than internal expansion, due to the former resulting to a less costly worker-firm 
match.  
2.2.2.2 Theory of Vintage Capital 
In the previous section, we used the existence of incomplete information in labour market to motivate 
the disparity in productivity performance between internal expansion and mergers and acquisition. In 
this section, we turn to capital vintage theory for an explanation for disparity in the productivity 
performance between greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition. While greenfield investment 
may also involve significant reshuffling cost associated with the process of matching workers into 
greenfield plant, we draw instead, on the possible variation in capital vintages to separate the 
productivity performance between greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition. 
To make predictions about the relative productivity levels of greenfield investment and mergers and 
acquisition, it is helpful to consider the motive of the firm when undertaking such investments. Firms 
have 2 options – greenfield investment or mergers and acquisition – when seeking to expand externally. 
As shown extensively in section 2.2.1.2, firms’ choice of external expansion depends on the relative 
costs and revenues of both expansion paths and firm-level productivity. Specifically, we use the capital 
reallocation theory of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Warusawitharana (2008), Spearot (2012) to show 
that more efficient firms are more likely to acquire existing plants than build a new one when there is a 
technological shock that allows plant to be used more efficiently. However, these firms will acquire 
plants with superior productivity levels and technological characteristics that are closer to their own. 
Otherwise, they face excessive costs in modifying and adapting technology in acquired plants that are 
far more inferior to the plants they operate. As such, plants acquired through mergers and acquisition 
will be a self-selected group of the population of plants. When this happens, these high productivity 
firms, being the ones with the best organizational capital and efficiency, can pass down their 
management skills and technological adaptability to acquired plants; thereby facilitating their transition 
back to the technology frontier. This implies that mergers and acquisition may well lead to higher 
productivity levels than greenfield investment. 
 If, however, the technologies in existing plants are far too inferior to the plants operated by potential 
acquirers, they may seek greenfield plants with better technology that are closer to their operated 
plants (e.g., Breinlich and Niemann, 2011a; Han and Rousseau, 2009). Similarly, a technological shock 
that is associated with new technology that increases capital use and is embedded in greenfield plants, 
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may induce firms to choose greenfield investment over mergers and acquisition (e.g., Van Biesebroeck 
2003)13. This implies that greenfield plants may well have higher productivity than acquired plants 
because the former increases capital use and capital-biased technical change.  
2.2.2.3 Summary and Hypothesis 
In this section, we review the matching theory and vintage capital theory to generate a testable 
hypothesis on the consequences of choosing different paths of expansion on productivity. Beginning 
with the overall aim of expanding capacity and improving efficiency, firms must choose the path of 
expansion that increases efficiency with the lowest possible cost. There is organizational efficiency 
associated with higher labour quality (assuming productive workers are hired and the standard labour 
input in the production function specification does not capture this) from using internal expansion. 
However, according to the matching theory, there are significant costs associated with the matching 
process of internal expansion because it involves the continuous reshuffling of workers before an 
appropriate match can be found. Mergers and acquisition, on the other hand, can be used to avoid the 
substantial reshuffling cost associated with internal expansion by matching existing employees to plants 
that best suit their skills. Firms may acquire plants for different reasons to those that motivate 
greenfield investment (in terms of whether a technological shock is associated with new technology that 
is embedded in greenfield plant or if there is a technological shock that allows existing plants to be used 
more efficiently). These differences in motives are likely to play an important role in determining firm-
level productivity. For instance, a technological shock that allows existing plants to be used more 
efficiently is likely to lead to a mergers and acquisition, which in turn increases firm-level productivity. 
On the other hand, if a technological shock is associated with new technology that is embedded in 
greenfield plants, firms are more likely to use greenfield investment, which should result in higher firm-
level productivity. This leads us to our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The productivity performance from external expansion, in particular, mergers and 
acquisition should be higher than that of internal expansion. However, it is difficult, to predict, a priori, if 
a particular path of external expansion leads to a better or worse productivity impact.  
 
13 Van Biesebroeck (2003) showed that new capital will be preferred when firms seek to shift to ‘lean’ technologies 
that uses capital more intensively and is characterized by easier substitution between capital and labour i.e. it has 
a larger elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. This coincides with the notion that, in the automobile 
industry, lean technology is more flexible and relies less on standardization. 
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2.2.3 Theoretical Motivation for Impact of Contraction Channels on Productivity 
The previous section theoretically motivates the consequences of choosing different expansion paths on 
productivity. This section turns to the productivity impact of alternative forms of contraction. It draws 
on a number of literatures on downsizing and plant closure to provide predictions on the productivity 
impact of choosing a particular path of contraction over another. 
The ability of firms to contract to falling demand or rising cost is an important factor that affects their 
organizational efficiency (or productivity). The gain or loss in organizational efficiency in turn, depends 
on the path of contraction chosen. Internal (or workforce) contraction will lead to loss of output. 
However, if the loss of labour input falls faster than the loss of output, then (labour) productivity will 
increase. Internal contraction that involves the elimination of unproductive workers and unnecessary 
levels of management (delayering) and leads to loss no useful output will result in productivity increase. 
However, the threat of job loss during the weeding process of who should remain and who should leave 
may have an adverse effect on workers’ behaviour and attitude. If employees feel that their future 
employment is insecure, they may react by reducing job involvement commitment and effort, all of 
which reduces organizational efficiency (e.g., Rosenblatt and Ruvio, 1996; McFarlane Shore and Tetrick, 
1991; Littler et al., 2003a). Internal contraction could also reduce firm efficiency due to low morale and 
commitment from employees that remain in the organization after the process of downsizing – survivor 
syndrome (cf. Brockner 1988, 1992). Plant closure, on the other hand, can be used to set clear goals that 
are defined by a closedown process which involves a notice period and a countdown period. This 
removes the uncertainty associated with firms’ downsizing decisions and creates an environment that is 
more conducive to the cognitive process of forming new goals. Similarly, a plant sale that involves a deal 
announcement would likely reduce any prolonged uncertainty about job loss. When this happens, 
workers can operate in an environment that is free of uncertainty which in turn, allows them to increase 
commitment and effort. Ultimately, the overall contribution of contraction to the changes in firm-level 
productivity depends on the path of contraction chosen, given the different efficiency gains and costs 
associated with each path of contraction. 
A handful of theoretical ideas have been set out to explain the varying consequences of contraction 
choice on productivity, but none in an integrated setting. Broadly speaking, these theoretical ideas can 
be categorized into 2 separate strands – the theory of uncertainty during organization decline and the 
theory of firm boundary under comparative advantage. From the theory of uncertainty during 
organization decline, this thesis uses the notion of ‘uncertainty’ to argue that differences in productivity 
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impact between internal and external contraction is due to the certainty of job loss that is associated 
with plant closure and/or plant sale which contrasts with the uncertainty of job loss that internal 
contraction imprints. This theory is therefore, used to offer explanation for the disparity in productivity 
performance between internal and external contraction, whereby the latter often refers to plant 
closure. On the other hand, the theory of firm boundary under comparative advantage is used to offer 
explanation for the productivity difference between plant closure and plant sale (both external 
contraction). However, this theoretical idea ignores the productivity impact of internal contraction. 
Consequently, neither the theory of uncertainty during organization decline nor the theory of firm 
boundary under comparative advantage accommodates all 3 forms of contraction in one integrated 
setting. In spite of their difference in details, we use insights from both theoretical ideas to provide 
lessons on how to empirically estimate the impact of contraction channels on productivity. 
2.2.3.1 Uncertainty During Organizational Decline 
In a standard organization decline literature, the impact of an organizational downsizing on their post-
restructuring performance depends upon workers reactions to employment conditions during and after 
the organizational change. Early researchers were particularly concerned with how workers react to 
threats of losing their jobs. According to this view, workers react to the threat of job insecurity following 
firms’ downsizing decisions and their reactions have consequences for organizational efficiency. This 
idea was motivated by Sverke et al. (2002). Although, less formalized into a theoretical model, Sverke et 
al. (2002) assume that employees perceive certainty of job loss differently to the uncertainty of job 
insecurity which influences employees’ reactions and behaviour towards the organization. Their theory 
hinges on the assumption that unlike job insecurity, actual job loss is immediate and it relieves workers 
from the major stress of uncertainty. In other words, uncertainty separates job insecurity from actual 
job loss. Employees who feel that their future employment is insecure during corporate downsizing, 
reduce job involvement (e.g., Rosenblatt and Ruvio, 1996; Grunberg et al., 1998) and organizational 
commitment and efforts (e.g., McFarlane Shore and Tetrick, 1991; Armstrong-Stassen, 1993; Littler et 
al., 2003a) which in turn, has a negative effect on organizational performance. Even workers, who retain 
their jobs following corporate downsizing, are not spared as such activity may increase their workload 
thereby reducing morale, commitment and job satisfaction (cf. Brockner 1988, 1992). Thus, this 
theoretical idea predicts that there are negative corporate performances associated with employees’ 
perception of job insecurity that involves prolonged uncertainty about the future. There are similar 
negative performance outcome among survivors due to a variety of psychological states and behaviour 
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(i.e., guilt, anger and relief) exhibited by workers who remain in the firm after the process of downsizing 
– survivor syndrome. 
Although, the theoretical idea discussed above does not explicitly consider the impact on productivity, 
of choosing external contraction – plant closure and/or plant sale - over internal contraction, we use the 
details to generate a testable hypothesis. Consider a firm facing reduced demand and/or rise in cost 
with the overall aim of contracting its workforce and improving efficiency. Internal contraction may be 
used to deploy unproductive workers as well as eliminate unnecessary levels of management 
(delayering) such that overall workforce is reduced and efficiency level improves. However, an 
implication of the theory of uncertainty under organizational decline is that employees react negatively 
to the uncertainty caused by the weeding process of who should remain and who should leave. Such 
uncertainty associated with employees’ perception of job insecurity often leads to lower performance 
following the process of internal contraction (e.g., Sverke et al., 2002). Internal contraction can lead to 
further negative performance outcome due to low morale and commitment exhibited by employees 
who remain in the organization after the process of downsizing – survivor syndrome (e.g., Cameron et 
al., 1993; Littler et al., 2003b; Littler and Innes, 2004). In comparison, external contraction such as plant 
closure often constitute clear goals that are defined by a closedown process which involves a notice 
period and a countdown period. During the closedown process, negotiation occurs in which the 
workforce seeks to achieve redundancy and other benefits with high certainty of job loss outcome which 
may create an environment that is more conducive to the cognitive process of creating new goals.  
Researchers have also pointed to the diminished management control during a closedown period as a 
main driver for performance improvement. During the process of plant closure, managers become busy 
in running negotiations with labour unions, government, and the municipality etc., therefore, reducing 
control over daily operations. Such diminished management control in the day-to-day operation of the 
firm increases operative space for workers which in turn, allows worker to go beyond previously 
established routines and procedures (cf. Hansson, 2008, 2011). Central to this argument is that reduced 
management control that gives employees unrestricted autonomy allows employees to practise their 
innovative skills and improve their work methods. Productivity, therefore, increases as a result of 
enhanced worker innovativeness and efforts. These ideas thus, suggests that external contraction, in 
particular, plant closure should result in higher productivity than internal contraction, due to the 
negotiations that follow the certainty of job loss thereby, creating a better environment for employees 
to improve and innovate. 
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2.2.3.2 Theory of Firm Boundary Under Comparative Advantage 
The previous section explains the existence of disparities in productivity performance between internal 
and external contraction. It shows that the productivity impact of external contraction should be higher 
than internal contraction because the former creates a perception of job insecurity among employees 
which reduces employees’ morale and commitment. Although, the uncertainty of job loss during 
organizational decline can be used to provide support for the disparity in productivity performance 
between internal and external contraction, it cannot be used to account for any productivity difference 
between plant closure and plant sale (both external contraction). To argue for a disparity in the 
productivity performance between plant closure and plant sale, this section uses the theory of firm 
boundary under comparative advantage. 
The theory of firm boundary under comparative advantage as proposed by Maksimovic et al. (2011) 
states that, firms retain plants in which they have a comparative advantage in operating and sell or close 
other plants after a merger. The main reason for this boundary resetting is that mergers and acquisitions 
requires the acquisition of ‘bundled’ plants each with varying degrees of fit with the acquirers’ core 
competence – a variety in which the marginal cost of production is lowest. Thus, firms must acquire 
‘bundled’ plants even if they are ex-ante interested in a subset of plants acquired. After the acquisition 
of ‘bundled’ plants, firms can then disassemble plants and decide whether to retain, sell or close 
acquired plants. Firms will work down the pecking order by first retaining plants that operate in its core 
business as these plants are the ones with the lowest marginal cost and thus highest expected profit. 
Then the firm will move on to selling plants that operate in its peripheral divisions –plants with high 
marginal cost of production - but have high market price or are worth more as part of another 
organization than as part of the owned organization (e.g., John and Ofek, 1995). Finally, the firm will 
close plants that are peripheral to its operations and command no market price. This theory therefore, 
predicts that following a merger and acquisitions, firms dispose plants that operate in its peripheral 
divisions. However, among the cohort of plants that are disposed, firms sell plants that command a 
market price and close those without a market value or where their market value is below the search 
and transaction cost of selling them. 
Although the theory discussed above was considered in the context of post-merger restructuring, we 
extend the idea to make predictions about disparity in the productivity performance between plant 
closure and plant sale. Consider a firm facing a substantial fall in demand and/or rise in cost such that it 
needs to carry out a large disinvestment by disposing plants with reduced profitability i.e., plants that 
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operate in its peripheral division14. An implication of the theory of firm boundary under comparative 
advantage is that firms will dispose of plants by selling those that command a market price and closing 
those without a market value or where the cost of searching and transacting with potential buyers 
exceeds the market value. This theory thus, suggest that when a firm is looking to dispose some of its 
plants due to low profitability, it works down the pecking order by selling plants with low profitability 
but high market price and closing plants with low profitability and low/no market price. According to 
this theory, one would expect plants sold to be more efficient than plants closed since the former has a 
higher market value than the latter. Therefore, selling plants should result in lower productivity than 
closing plants since plants sold are more efficient than plants closed. However, this may fail to hold if 
potential sellers are not willing to hand their rivals a competitive advantage by selling plants with recent 
vintage to their competitors. Even when a plant has a high market value, a firm may choose to close the 
plant if there is no secondary market for the plant (i.e., Clark and Wrigley, 1997). 
2.2.3.3 Summary and Hypothesis 
In this section, we review 2 theoretical ideas – the theory of uncertainty under organizational decline 
and the theory of firm boundary under comparative advantage - to generate a testable hypothesis on 
the effect on productivity, of choosing different paths of contraction. We Begin with the overall aim of 
contracting capacity and improving efficiency, firms must choose the path of contraction that increases 
efficiency with the lowest possible cost. Internal contraction can be used to eliminate unproductive 
workers and unnecessary levels of management (delayering) such that overall workforce is reduced and 
efficiency level increases. However, an implication of the theory of uncertainty under organizational 
decline is that employees react negatively to the uncertainty caused by the weeding process of who 
should remain and who should leave. 
Plant closure, on the other hand, often constitutes clear goals that are defined by a closedown process 
which involves a notice period and a countdown period. During the closedown process, negotiation 
occurs in which the workforce seeks to achieve redundancy and other benefits with high certainty of job 
loss outcome. When this happens, a new working environment that allows cognitive process of creating 
new goals and for employees to improve is created. This suggests that external contraction, in 
particular, plant closure, should result in higher productivity than internal contraction due to the 
 
14 This is equivalent to the post-merger restructuring of Maksimovic et al. (2011) where firms suddenly find 
themselves operating more plants than they require after a merger and they have to redraw their boundaries by 
selling and/or closing some plants.  
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negotiations that follow the certainty of job loss during a closedown process, which in turn, creates a 
better environment for employees to improve and innovate. Assuming there is a negative demand 
and/or supply shock that requires a firm to dispose some plants with reduced profitability. The firm will 
do so by selling plants with low profitability but high market price and close plants with low profitability 
and low/no market price. This implies that plants sold, being the ones with higher efficiency level and 
therefore, higher market price, will lead to lower ex-post productivity of the firm than plants closed. If, 
however, firms do not find a secondary market for their less profitable but efficient plants, they may 
decide to close plants with high market value and efficiency. This leads to our fourth and final 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The productivity performance from external contraction, in particular, plant closure 
should be higher than that of internal contraction. However, it is difficult to predict, a priori, if a 
particular path of external contraction leads to a better or worse productivity impact.  
2.3 Empirical Literature Review 
This section will survey previous empirical literature that has attempted to address the determinants of 
firms’ choice of adjustment and their impact on productivity. It is therefore, divided into 2 main parts. 
The first part will discuss key factors that are frequently documented in the literature to determine 
firms’ choice of adjustment. The second part will discuss the impact on productivity of each path of 
adjustment that has been documented in literature. 
2.3.1 Major Determinants of Adjustment Paths in Literature 
According to Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Breinlich and Niemann (2011) and Warusawitharana 
(2008), firms chosen path of adjustment are determined completely by a combination of adjustments 
(fixed and variable) costs and firm-level productivity. In empirical counterparts to this, a set of firm-level 
characteristics such as size and ownership structure have been used to examine firm’s choice of 
adjustment. These firm-level variables can act as proxies for productivity and the various thresholds 
required for a firm to have positive discounted expected profits from using a particular path of 
adjustment. These variables could also be close associated with firms’ choice of adjustment. While there 
are differences in the exact path of adjustment considered in literature (i.e., whether firms’ choice is 
between greenfield investment or mergers and acquisition or between plant closure and plant sale) 
results are for most part robust. Firm-level variables are often related to their chosen path of 
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adjustment. Of these firm-level variables, this section focuses on the most frequently documented in the 
literature: firm size, adjustment size, age, R&D, ownership and other factors. 
2.3.1.1 Firm Size 
Firm size has long been recognised to exert a strong influence on their chosen path of expansion. There 
are several reasons for this. The first explanation lies with firms’ growth life cycle. If, as Penrose (1959) 
assumes, there is a maximum rate at which a firm can hire and train managers, then the opportunities 
for internal growth will become limited or at least, less profitable for firms as they grow further along 
their life cycle and become large. Therefore, large firms that might have exhausted their managerial 
resources and thus, internal growth opportunities may prefer to expand through mergers and 
acquisition, since acquired firms/plants come with their cadre of managers. As Penrose (1959:126) 
pointed out “acquisition can be a means of obtaining the productive services and knowledge that are 
necessary for a firm to establish itself in a new field”. Thus, by the time a firm begins to expand 
externally particularly, through mergers and acquisition, it has already grown to a large firm status by 
virtue of exhausting its internal managerial resources and capturing a large market share that requires 
an external expansion. A second reason for a relationship between firm size and their choices of 
expansion lies with firms’ ability to integrate acquired plants. Managers of large firms are more likely to 
possess the appropriate managerial resources required to integrate acquired units into their business. 
This idea that larger firms integrate new units more easily than smaller firms has been recently 
formalized into theoretically models by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Warusawitharana (2008) and 
Breinlich and Niemann (2011a). 
Despite the widespread appeal of Penrose (1959) argument that larger firms are more likely to grow 
through mergers and acquisition, little empirical work has been undertaken to explicitly test her ideas. 
Instead, much attention has been focused on her unintentional contribution to resource based view 
rather than her firm growth theory. The only paper that has empirically examined the relationship 
between firm size and all 3 forms of expansion paths is by Breinlich and Niemann (2011a). Using a UK 
dataset created from the Business Structure Database (BSD), the authors employed a multivariate 
fractional logit regression to study the impact of firm size on their choices of expansion between 1997 
and 2005. The authors separated the impact of firm size from expansion size and any sectorial 
differences in greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition activity such as differences in market 
concentration. Their results showed that internal expansion declines in importance with firm size while 
greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition increase in importance with the size of a firm. Their 
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results also revealed that firm size has a larger positive effect on greenfield investment than on mergers 
and acquisition when comparing the relative coefficient magnitudes between the 2 forms of external 
expansion. This paper thus, reveals that large firms rely more on external expansion. However, when 
choosing between the 2 forms of external expansion, large firms rely more on greenfield investment 
than on mergers and acquisition.  
A similar paper by Warusawitharana (2008) uses a panel of firm-level data to explore the relationship 
between firm size and profitability and their chosen path of external adjustment in US between 1984 
and 2004. Warusawitharana (2008) empirical implementation uses multinomial logit regression to test 
his theoretically predictions that large firms with high profitability are more likely to acquire asset while 
large firms with low profitability are more likely to sell assets and small firms neither buy nor sell assets. 
His result showed that size has strong impact on firms’ choice of external adjustment with large and 
profitable firms more like to acquire assets.  Although Warusawitharana (2008) failed to distinguish 
between internal expansion and greenfield investment and thus, did not explicitly consider the impact 
of firm size on all 3 paths of expansion, it can be inferred from their result that larger firms are more 
likely to use mergers and acquisition over internal expansion and/or greenfield investment. This 
contrasts with Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) findings that large firms are more likely to rely on 
greenfield investment over mergers and acquisition, when choosing between the 2 forms of external 
expansion. 
Firm size is also associated with their chosen path of contraction. Using the firms’ growth argument, a 
large troubled firm is more likely to be further along in its life cycle and therefore, more likely to exhaust 
its internal contraction option faster than a small firm. As a result, large firms are more likely to use 
external forms of contraction than small firms (e.g., Penrose, 1959). Furthermore, large firms are more 
likely to hold a wide range of plants that would stretch their managerial resources and would need to be 
occasionally reshuffled since the synergies between the various plants are likely to evolve over time 
following changes in market environment and technological possibilities. For instance, Penrose (1959) 
argued that the extent to which assets are efficiently managed falls with the diversity of activity 
undertaken by a firm. Indeed, John and Ofek (1995) showed that over diversification that leads to 
negative synergies between various assets are likely to be reflected in poor operating performance of a 
firm. Therefore if, as Berger and Ofek (1995) suggested that firm size may be viewed as a proxy for 
greater diversification, then large firms are more likely to be over diversified than small firms and size 
should be positively related with the intensity of external contraction. Finally, large firms may also 
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contract externally as a means of disposing unwanted parts of larger acquisitions (Maksimovic et al., 
2011) or as part of a reduction in the scale of their investments when demand fails to meet expectations 
(Warusawitharana, 2008). 
Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) were the first to provide supporting evidence for the relationship 
between firm size and the 3 paths of contraction. Using BSD data from the UK and employing a 
multivariate fractional logit regression, they found that large firms rely more on external contraction 
than small firms. However, the authors found that firm size has no influence on their chosen path of 
external contraction i.e., the relative coefficient magnitudes between plant sales and plant closure were 
economically negligible. Other studies have separately analysed the role of firm size in explaining 
internal contraction (or employee layoff or downsizing), plant sales (or divestment or asset sales) and 
plant closure (or plant shutdowns or plant deaths). For instance, Hallock (1998) found a positive 
relationship between firm size and layoff announcement, using a sample of 550 US firms with layoff 
announcement between 1987 and 1995. Also, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) found that the probability of 
employee layoffs was significantly higher among larger firms that experienced performance decline 
between 1988 and 1990 in Japan. Others such as Wagar (1997) and Coucke et al. (2007) have found a 
similar positive relationship between firm size and the propensity to implement workforce reduction in 
Canada and Belgium respectively. In contrast, Perry and Shivdasani (2005) and Yu and Park (2006) found 
no significant relationships between the size of a firm and employee layoffs in US and Korea 
respectively.  
Conflicting findings also characterize the relationships between firm size and the probability of plant 
closure. Although, Deily (1991) provide evidence of a negative relationship between firm size and the 
probability of exit, Lieberman (1990) found that increasing firm size raises the probability of plant 
closure by multi-plant firms but had no effect on single-unit firms. Gibson and Harris (1996) found that 
plants that shutdown during the period of trade liberalisation in New Zealand were smaller, younger, 
high costs and were owned by diversified multi-plant firms. This led the authors to argue that plant 
costs, not firm size, is more important for explaining plant closure behaviour since diversified multi-plant 
firms were more likely to close (high-cost) plants. There is, however, greater consensus on the 
relationship between firm size and the probability of plant sales with most studies indicating that plant 
sales is more prevalent among larger firms. For instance, Warusawitharana (2008) showed that large 
unprofitable firms are more likely to sell plants than an average firm in his sample, using SDC platinum 
mergers and acquisition data from the US. On a similar note, Hillier et al. (2009) found that the 
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probability of selling plants increases with the size of a firm in UK. Lastly, Haynes et al. (2003) 
documented a positive relationship between firm size and the frequency and intensity of selling plants 
to other firms in UK. In sum, existing literature linking firms’ chosen path of adjustment with their size 
typically report that large firms increasingly rely on external forms of adjustment – greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisition for expansion and; plant closure and plant sale for contraction. 
However, the results from empirical literature relating firm size to their chosen path of external 
adjustment are mixed. 
2.3.1.2 Adjustment Size 
External expansion such as mergers and acquisition allow firms to take advantage of economies of scale 
(scope) by eliminating duplicated indivisible tasks across 2 firms and spreading fixed cost of production 
across more units of (differentiated) outputs. This argument is frequently used to defend a proposed 
merger. However, to realise economies-of-scale through mergers and acquisition, firms must first pay 
upfront sunk-costs of acquiring and integrating firms/plants into their operations. It follows therefore, 
that the minimum amount of expansion planned by firms will have to be substantially large to cover the 
upfront sunk-cost of external expansion. For such large expanding output and/or employment, a firm 
can also achieve lower (average) cost of production by using mergers and acquisition over internal 
expansion. Vintage technology in greenfield plants may also result in a similar average cost reduction 
benefit for large expanding output, but firms must first overcome the high fixed costs associated with 
building new plants. Thus, the inclusion of adjustment size in modelling firm’s choice of expansion path 
can be justified because it acts as proxy for high fixed costs associated with the use of external 
expansion. Researchers such as Breinlich and Neimann (2011a) and Warusawitharana (2008) have 
theoretically modelled the idea. 
Consistent with this argument, Breinlich and Neimann (2011a) found that internal expansion declines as 
the overall size of an expansion increases in the UK, using turnover as a proxy for expansion size. 
Breinlich and Neimann (2011a) also found that external expansion - both greenfield investment and 
mergers and acquisition - increased in importance with the size of an expansion. However, expansion 
size was found to have a stronger impact on mergers and acquisition than on greenfield investment, 
implying that the largest expansions are more likely to be carried out through mergers and acquisition. 
Warusawitharana (2008) also provide some evidence to support this view. Using profitability as a proxy 
for required investment and thus, expansion size, Warusawitharana (2008) showed that firms with 
higher profitability are more likely to seek external growth through mergers and acquisition. The author 
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went on to argue that an increase in profitability leads to a corresponding increase in the optimal size 
and required investment of a firm, such that there is a profitability threshold above which the firm 
buys/acquire plants and a profitability threshold below which the firm invests in new plants. These 
findings are consistent with the presence of large fixed costs associated with using external forms of 
expansion particularly, mergers and acquisition.  
Another strand of related literature seeks to understand the relationship between expansion size and 
firms’ mode of expansion into foreign markets. This approach is based on the notion of “enhancement 
or development of capabilities” (Madhok, 1997). Essentially, firms have limited human resource 
endowment, which can be augmented by cross-border investment in mergers and acquisition. However, 
firms must overcome the sunk cost of expanding into foreign markets. A large empirical literature exists 
in this vein which tests whether relative expansion size (often measured as a relative number of 
employees between a subsidiary and a parent company) has an impact on how firms decide to expand 
into foreign markets i.e., through exports, greenfield foreign direct investment, cross-border mergers 
and acquisition or joint venture. For example, using a sample of 136 Japanese manufacturing firms in 
Western Europe, Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) found that firms prefer cross-border mergers and 
acquisition over greenfield foreign direct investment when investments are relatively large. A similar 
paper by Hennart and Reddy (1997) found that joint ventures are preferred over cross-border mergers 
and acquisition when the target size is large, as large firms with ‘indigestible’ plants are difficult to 
integrate. Finally, Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) found no relationship between investment size and 
mode of entry for Japanese firms. 
Large contractions are also often associated with plant closures and plant sales – both external 
contractions. Firms are likely to downsize in response to poor operating performance. From the 
viewpoint of scale or scope (dis)economies, a poor performing firm may be able to reduce its workforce 
as well as shed plants that interferes with its other operations to improve the average cost of production 
of the remaining plants. Firms may suffer from performance decline due to excessive diversification 
(John and Ofek, 1996), failure to meet targeted demand (Warusawitharana, 2008) or previous 
overinvestment in mergers and acquisition (Maksimovic et al., 2011). By reducing the amount of 
invested capital, a firm may be able to eliminate any negative synergy that emanates from poor 
performing plants. Selling plants could also allow firms to recover the value of excess plants that are 
undermining the profitability of their operations. However, using external contraction would cost the 
firm a substantial amount of money to search for and negotiate with suitable plant buyers (e.g., 
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Warusawitharana, 2008) or to disassemble, dismantle and rehabilitate the space occupied by plants that 
are to be closed (e.g., Clark and Wrigley, 1997). As a result, firms be willing to carry out large and 
strategic contraction in employment and/or output to use external contraction. Such large contraction 
in output and/or employment can also be used to achieve average cost savings from using external 
contraction. Indeed, Breinlich and Neimann (2011a) theoretically modelled this idea to show that firms 
would only use external contraction when the average cost savings from such contraction and/or 
proceeds from plant sales exceed the fixed cost of carrying out such activity. 
Relatively few empirical studies have been conducted on the impact of contraction size on firms’ path of 
contraction. Only Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) have considered the relationship between contraction 
size and all 3 paths of contraction. Using turnover as a proxy for the size of contraction, the authors 
found that both plant closure and plant sale are increasing in importance as the size of an overall 
contraction increases, while internal contraction declines with the size of a contraction in the UK. Their 
paper also revealed that the size of a desired contraction does not influence firms’ choice of external 
contraction i.e., the relative coefficient magnitudes between plant sales and plant closure were similar. 
In contrast, Warusawitharana (2008) found that the profitability of firms strongly impacts their choice to 
sell plants. The author showed that firms that sold plants demonstrated low realized return on assets 
prior to plant sales, implying that firms that needed to carry out large contraction due to low 
profitability were more likely to sell plants in the US between 1984 and 2004. In sum, contraction size 
has been generally found to be positively related to external forms of contraction, whereas the 
relationship between the size of a desired contraction and firms’ choice of a path of external 
contraction, is mixed. 
2.3.1.3 Firm-level Variables 
From the capital reallocation theory (discussed extensively in section 2.2.1.2 of this chapter), firms that 
invest in external forms of adjustment i.e., greenfield investment and/or mergers and acquisition, 
following a positive demand or supply shock, are often the ones better at managing capital (plant). The 
key economic idea is that large external adjustment costs (cost of buying and integrating additional 
plants) keep firms from adding plants until the additional profit from such activity exceeds the cost. 
However, when this occurs, firms that were previously more efficient at integrating and managing plants 
take better advantage of the increased demand or fall in cost by adding more plants because the cost of 
integrating and managing an additional plant is lower for these firms. Firm-level productivity is therefore 
an important theme of this type of approach. However, these neoclassical models of mergers and 
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acquisition often assume that a firm’s productivity is exogenous. According to the resource-based theory 
of the firm, put forward by Penrose (1959), firms can invest in intangible assets such as R&D to 
generate/upgrade knowledge internally and therefore become more productive, innovative and 
competitive (e.g., Bustos, 2009). As a result, efforts have recently been made to endogenize firm-level 
productivity and show that firms engage in productivity enhancing investment prior to their expansion 
activities. The empirical counterparts of this type of studies have used firm-level variables such as R&D 
to examine the relationship between innovation and mergers and acquisition. These firm-level variables 
can have an indirect effect (through productivity) or a direct effect on firms’ choices of adjustment. For 
instance, a large firm may increase its spending on R&D to boost productivity prior to making an 
acquisition or, it may reduce its R&D spending and acquire a small innovative (through R&D) firm to gain 
access to new technology. 
Technological innovation is increasingly recognized as one of the motives for mergers and acquisition. 
Firms can invest in innovative activities such as R&D to increase their productivity, which in turn 
increases a firms’ propensity to acquire other firms/plants. Indeed, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
suggested that there are 2 main channels through which R&D can contribute to higher productivity 
within a firm. The first is through the development of absorptive capacity that enables a firm to identify, 
assimilate, exploit and absorb external innovation made by other firms, which is likely to lead to indirect 
improvements in productivity (see, for instance, Zahra and George, 2003). The second channel is 
through the generation of product and process improvements that allows new and existing products to 
be produced with greater efficiency and is likely to lead to a direct increase in productivity. The resulting 
improvement in production efficiency from R&D enables firms to expand their productive capacity by 
acquiring less productive firms/plants and transferring their superior productivity level to acquired 
firms/plants (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). 
In contrast, Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) theoretically showed that (large) firms invest less in innovative 
activities prior to acquiring another firm and they engage in acquisition activities to gain access to new 
technology. In their model, a (large) profit-maximizing firm can either invest in R&D to innovative 
internally or acquire a small firm that has successfully innovated. Increased competition from many 
(small) R&D firms reduces the likelihood of a successful innovation but, increases the pool of potential 
successful innovators from which a large firm can acquire from. Acquiring innovation through mergers 
and acquisition is therefore, a less expensive and a more efficient path for large firms to obtain 
innovation because they can optimally outsource R&D to smaller firms and then subsequently acquire 
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those that have successfully innovated. Their model thus, predicts that the prospect of acquiring 
successfully innovative small firms reduces internal innovative activities by large firms and their 
spending on R&D. 
Using a US sample of 84,471 Compustat firm-year observation, Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) empirically 
examined the prediction of their model. The authors found that firm’s R&D expenditure (scaled by sales) 
responds positively to industry acquisition activity (captured by an industry’s mergers and acquisition 
activities in the past), but less so for large firms. The authors showed that (after controlling for the 
endogeneity of mergers and acquisition activity and interacting it with firm size) undertaking R&D is 
smaller for large firms than small firms in industries with high acquisition activity. Similarly, Hall (1988), 
using a sample of 2,519 US firms in Compustat between 1976 and 1985, found evidence of a negative 
relationship between firm’s R&D intensity (R&D expenditure divided by sales) and the probability of 
acquiring another firm. Thus, Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) and Hall (1988:3) showed evidence for 
reduced R&D spending before an acquisition, which is consistent with their argument that R&D and 
acquisition are substitutes – “an increase in the attractiveness of acquisition opportunities would 
depress spending on internal investment, including R&D”. 
Many more authors have studied the relationship between mergers and acquisition activities and the 
different stages of the development of innovation – innovation input or unrealized innovation in form of 
R&D and innovation output or realized innovation in form of legally enforceable patents. For instance, 
Bena and Li (2013) examined the effect on R&D expenses and patent portfolios on firms’ participation in 
mergers and acquisition. Using a US economy-wide patent-merger dataset from 1984 to 2006, the 
authors found that both acquirers and targets are actively involved in innovation activities, but have 
different innovation-related characteristics. Specifically, acquirers tend to have low-R&D expenditure 
and large patent portfolios while targets tend to have high-R&D expenditure and slow growth in 
patentable innovation. Zhao (2009) reaches the opposite conclusion that neither R&D expenditure nor 
the number of patents is related to firms’ acquisition decision. Instead, Zhao (2009) found that firms 
with smaller number of citations (proxy for lack of internal innovation success) are more likely to be 
acquirers. Finally, Sevilir and Tian (2012) showed that firms with limited ability to innovate internally are 
more likely to acquire innovative firms to enhance their post-merger innovative output. Thus, this 
literature has shown some evidence for reduced innovation activity (i.e., R&D expenditure) or 
unsuccessful internal innovation by acquirers, prior to them acquiring another firm. 
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Another channel through which productivity might influence firms’ propensity to acquire another 
firm/plant, is learning-by-doing effect associated with the age of the firm. As firms grow older, they 
discover what they are good at and learn how to do things better, all of which can improve their 
productivity – i.e., learning-by-doing (e.g., Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996). Moreover, since better firms are 
the ones that survive, their survival over time might indicate that they are the best among their cohort 
of firms (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982). This implies that productivity increases as firms grow older and that 
more-productive old firms are more likely to seek (external) productive opportunities through mergers 
and acquisition than less-productive young firms. In contrast, older firms might be less efficient because 
they are less likely to employ the latest technology that allows them to produce with greater efficiency 
(e.g., Jensen et al., 2001). When this happens, we would expect young firms to be more likely to make 
an acquisition than old firms. Another explanation for a positive relationship between firm’s age and 
their propensity to acquire another firm is that returns from internal activities decreases (i.e., decreasing 
returns-to-scale from internal expansion) as firms grow, which lead them to seek new productive 
opportunities. Gomes and Livdan (2004:508) formalized this idea by showing that slow-growing mature 
firms use mergers and acquisition “to explore attractive new productive opportunities”. Moreover, firms 
are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions later in their life cycle when their cash flow exceeds 
their internal growth opportunities and managers are reluctant to pay excess cash flow to shareholders 
– i.e., agency theory of acquisition (Mueller, 1972; Jensen, 1982; Denis et al., 1997). 
Empirically, Arikan and Stulz (2016) found evidence that both learning-by-doing and vintage effects are 
important in determining firm’s rate of acquisition using a US sample of 7,506 initial public offering (IPO) 
data from 1975 to 2008. Specifically, the authors found that the acquisition rate of firms is a U-shaped 
function of their age (time since IPO) and young firms acquire at the same rate as old firms. They argued 
therefore that, firms with better productive opportunities are likely to make acquisitions irrespective of 
their life cycle stage. Although not the focus of their paper Celikyurt et al. (2010) and Hovakimaian and 
Hutton (2010) have found mixed effect. Using a similar IPO data from 1985 to 2004, Celikyurt et al. 
(2010) found that the odds of becoming an acquirer increases with IPO years. The authors showed that 
77% of firms between 0 and 4 (IPO) years carried out at least one acquisition, while only 31% of firms 
become acquirers in the same year of their IPO. Hovakimaian and Hutton (2010), on the other hand, 
documented a negative relationship between a firm’s age and the likelihood of becoming an acquirer. 
Using a logit regression, Hovakimaian and Hutton (2010) found that the probability of an acquisition 
declines with firm’s (IPO) age.  
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A third channel through which productivity might influence firms’ propensity to acquire another 
firm/plant, is economies of scale effect associated with operating several plants. Firstly, multi-plant 
firms may benefit from economies of scale if they can specialize by diving production between plants 
and/or they are able to centralize services involving spreading risk, raising capital, procuring inputs at 
lower prices because of bulk buying, supporting R&D and engaging in sales promotion activities (c.f. 
Harris, 1989). If multi-plant firms benefit from these economies of scale and, are therefore more 
efficient, they are more likely to increase their number of plants than single-plant firms in response to a 
substantial and persistent increase in demand or fall in operating cost (see, for instance, Breinlich and 
Neimann, 2011a). Conversely, a multi-plant firm may be less efficient if it suffers from X-inefficiency 
caused by a lack of competitive pressure (Leibenstein, 1966). This is more likely to occur when the 
principal-agent problem is more severe in a multi-plant firms than a single-unit enterprise (where the 
manager is more likely to be the owner). Furthermore, single-plant enterprises with the attributes of 
‘smaller’ in terms of their organizational and managerial structure have greater flexibility and are 
therefore, more responsive to change than multi-plant firms. As Dhawan (2001:271) argued “efficiency 
of smaller firms is the result of their leaner organizational structure that allows them to take strategic 
actions to exploit emerging market opportunities and to create a market niche position for themselves”. 
When this happens, we would expect multi-plant firms to be less likely to increase their number of 
plants than single-plant firms. 
Finally, productivity can influence firms’ acquisition behaviour through the (foreign) ownership structure 
of the firm. To make it worthwhile for foreign multinationals to invest abroad, they must possess 
characteristics that gives them a cost advantage over domestic firms (Hymer, 1976). These 
characteristics may include better management or marketing capabilities and specialized knowledge 
about production by virtue of the firms’ link to the home country of the multinational (Pfaffermayr, 
1999; Caves, 1996). Once the choice to invest abroad has been made, foreign firms can purchase an 
existing plant or build a new one. The decision between greenfield entry and mergers and acquisition 
will depend on transaction costs and on firm-specific advantage (i.e., managerial capabilities). If a firm 
chooses to enter a foreign market through a greenfield subsidiary, it must incur the costs of replicating 
its structure and processes, building business networks and coordinating with business units abroad. 
Acquisition of technical know-how, on the other hand, requires the cost of integrating and adapting 
acquired units to the firm’s operation. These differences in transaction costs and capability 
requirements between mergers and acquisition and greenfield investment have been identified in 
literature to influence multinationals choice of foreign entry mode.  
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Hennart and Park (1993) argue that if a firm-specific advantage is associated with the management of its 
workforce (and assuming a foreign firm can bring its own managerial practice and avoid domestic trade 
unions), then a greenfield entry may be preferred due to less organizational control than mergers and 
acquisition. In contrast, mergers and acquisition would be preferred if the foreign firm has little previous 
experience of producing in the host country or if the combined value of acquired and existing plants 
outweighs the cost of integrating acquired plants (e.g., Nocke and Yeaple, 2007). An extension of this 
argument is that, for foreign firms to expand via external expansion – i.e., greenfield investment and/or 
mergers and acquisition - they must possess the aforementioned cost advantages over domestic firms. 
However, the choice of acquisition is likely to rise with lack of experience in the foreign market, cost 
advantage associated with adapting local plants and if local plants have greater value when combined 
with foreign assets than they do in the hands of local rivals. In sum, R&D, age, multi-plant and foreign-
ownership need to enter the model that considers the productivity-expansion path relationship at the 
micro-level.  
The role of firm-level productivity in determining firm’s path of contraction was also established in 
section 2.2.1.2 of this chapter. Specifically, we showed that high-productivity (troubled) firms are more 
likely to find themselves with too many plants following a negative demand and/or supply shock and are 
therefore, more likely to shed plants and put their scarce (managerial) resources back to its best use 
(e.g., Warusawitharana, 2008). Moreover, high-productivity firms with presumably vintage plants are 
more likely to find it easier to sell their plants in the mergers and acquisition market because acquirers 
are looking to avoid large integration cost associated with buying inferior plants from low-productivity 
firms (e.g., Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008; Breinlich and Niemann, 2011a). 
However, these arguments often treat productivity as exogenous and they fail to capture various firm-
level characteristics that might affect firms’ productivity-level and thus, their contraction choice.  
Firms can invest in innovative activities such as R&D to increase their productivity and the prospect of 
becoming an acquisition target. Indeed, Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) model showed that small firms 
would tend to invest more on R&D to increase the odds of a successful innovation (due to increased 
competition from many small firms) and the odds of being acquired by a large firm. Specifically, their 
model predicts that when there is a higher chance of being a target, small firms are incentivised to 
increase their spending on R&D and innovate because innovation strengthens their bargaining power 
during a negotiation with an acquirer, which in turn leads to greater acquisition surplus for the target 
firm. Empirical evidence in support of such a relationship between (small) firms increased R&D spending 
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and the greater probability of becoming a target was also provided by Phillips and Zhdanov (2013). Using 
a probit regression, the authors found that firm’s R&D investment responds positively to the probability 
of being a target. Their result also showed that firms invest more in R&D when there is greater 
bargaining power (captured by merger gains by target firms in previous years) and this effect is larger for 
small firms. In a related innovation-development-stage study, Bena and Li (2013) found that R&D-
intensive (i.e., high-innovation input) firms with slow growth in patentable innovation (i.e., low-
innovation output) are more likely to be acquired. However, Hall (1998), using a sample of 2,519 US 
manufacturing firms between 1976 and 1985, found no significant relationship between the R&D 
intensity of a firm and the likelihood of becoming an acquisition target. 
Given the earlier discussion that age is a major determinant of firm-level productivity, the productivity-
contraction path relationship is also likely to be driven by age. If an old firm is more-productive (due to 
learning-by-doing or survival effect) and it is facing a performance decline, it can reduce the scale of 
previous overinvestment and free up management time that can be redeployed to higher value 
operations (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002) and; plant sales should indeed increase with firm’s age. 
However, old firms are more likely to operate plants with older technology that are unattractive to 
acquirers because of high cost of integration. When this happens, plant sales would drop with firm’s age 
as potential acquirers seek vintage plants that are likely to be operated by younger firms. An alternative 
explanation as to why older firms are more likely to sell plants is because of higher organizational 
rigidities in old firms. As firms get older, they focus primarily on serving production and marketing goals 
(Holmstrom, 1989). In the process of pursuing these goals, organizational rules are created that induces 
bureaucratization and hampers innovation which in turn, leads to operational rigidities. These rigidities 
make it difficult for old firms to create and exploit growth opportunities outside their core business. 
Instead, it allows them to focus their efforts on managing plants that are in place and to spend less time 
in exploring external growth opportunities. Under this view, maintaining current profitability (not lack of 
profitability) drives old firms’ decision to sell plants to free up management time that can redeployed to 
their core competences (Loderer et al., 2016). However, the same operational ‘rigidities’ could render 
old firms increasingly difficult to integrate into another organization therefore, making them an 
unattractive target (Loderer and Waelchli, 2015).  
Only recently have some papers started to examine the role of age in explaining firms’ decision to sell 
plants. Berchtold et al., (2014) used a sample of 70,220 firm-year observation from 1985 to 2010 to 
investigate the relationship between firm’s age and their propensity to sell plants in the US. The authors 
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found that the probability of selling plants increases with firm’s age. Specifically, they found that, a 1 
standard deviation increase in a firm’s age increases the odd ratio of a plant sale by 18%. The positive 
relationship remained after controlling for synergistic values of acquisition (i.e., firm size, demand shock, 
profitability, diversifying acquisition) that have been found in literature to drive firms’ plant selling 
decisions. Finally, the authors found that plant sale activity intensifies when managers are faced with a 
high degree of organizational rules and process (proxied by firm's selling, general and administrative 
expenses); when managers feel more competitive pressure (proxied by industry median R&D 
expenditures, normalized by assets) and; when a firm operates more plants in its peripheral division, all 
of which supports their hypothesis that old (operationally-rigid) firms are more likely to sell plants to 
free up management time and focus on their core competences. 
By contrast, Loderer and Waelchli (2015) found that probability of being acquired declines with firm’s 
age, using a sample of 83,790 firm-year observations in the US between 1978 and 2009. Using delisting 
codes to distinguish between different forms of firm’s exit (i.e., takeover, failure and ‘other reasons’) 
and implementing a multinomial logistic regression, their marginal effects result revealed that the 
takeover hazard of a 25-year-old firm can be as much as 32% lower than the takeover hazard of a 5-
year-old firm. According the authors, the underlying driver of such a negative relationship between a 
firm’s age and the probability of being acquired is the high cost of integrating old firms with operational 
rigidities into a different organization. Indeed, using firms’ cost structure, investment policy, product 
portfolio and organizational structure as proxies for operational rigidities, they showed that older firms 
with accumulated operational rigidities and thus, higher merger integration cost, have lower takeover 
hazard.  
Age can also influence a firms’ decision to close plants. According to Jovanovic (1982), older firms are 
less likely to close plants mainly because firms experiment less uncertainty about their productivity type 
in the latter stages of their life. In Jovanovic’s (1982) model, firms are uncertain about their productivity 
levels, but they know the distribution of such parameter. Based on the estimate of their productivity-
level, firms choose their output level and if profits are larger than expected at the end of the period, a 
firm can infer that it is more productive than it had estimated in the preceding period. When this 
happens, firms update their estimate and increase their output. Over time, firm’s estimate of 
productivity becomes more precise as they continuously update their estimate based on observed 
actual productivity. Firms close plants when the estimate of their productivity falls below a threshold. 
Since, older firms are more likely to set their productivity levels closer to their ‘true productivity’ level, 
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the probability of a plant closure should fall with age. Further, if younger firms have higher scrap value 
for their newer vintage plants, then we would expect older firms to be less likely to close plants than 
young firms (i.e., Baden-Fuller, 1989). However, Deily (1991) predicts that older firms operating plants 
that embody old inefficient technologies would have to make reinvestment decisions that involves plant 
closure.  
Another firm-level variable that can influence firms’ decision to close plants is the number of plants they 
operate. If a multi-unit enterprise is more productive than a single-plant firm (due to the earlier 
discussed economies-of-scale effect) then the probability of a plant closure should be negatively related 
to a larger number of plants operated by a firm. This is because a more-productive (multi-plant) firm is 
more likely to operate high-productivity plants that would enable the firm to have positive discounted 
future profits that is greater than its liquidation (or scrap) value over future periods (Harris and Moffat, 
2011). Furthermore, a more productive (multi-plant) firm that can easily shift resources within the firm 
and/or has access to external sources of capital might be able to avoid a plant closure during a negative 
demand shock such as a temporary drop in demand for one of its product. However, the ability to shift 
production to another plant following a negative demand shock might increase the probability of plant 
closure by multi-plant firms since they can transfer production to another plant without exiting the 
market. In contrast to the single-plant enterprise, a plant closure in a multi-unit firm does not mean a 
complete withdrawal from the manufacturing activities in the market or complete shutdown of the 
enterprise (Colombo and Delmastro, 2000). As a result, if the sunk cost of creating a firm differs from 
the sunk cost of creating a plant, then a single-plant enterprise would incur a higher cost of re-entry 
than a multi-unit firm and the former is less likely to close a plant (Bernard and Jensen, 2007). 
Indeed, a positive association between the probability of a plant closure and the number of plants 
operated by the firm was found in Bernard and Jensen (2007). First, using a panel of 236,092 plant-year 
observation and an unconditional (univariate) probit model specification, the authors found that plants 
owned by multi-unit firms have a 3.4 percentage point reduction in their probability of death. However, 
the authors also showed that plants that are part of a multi-unit firm are older, larger, more-productive 
and more capital-intensive than stand-alone plants – plant attributes that have been previously found to 
improve plant survival. Once they controlled for these plant attributes that reduces the probability of 
plant death (and ran a multivariate conditional probit regression), they found that multi-plant firms are 
indeed more likely to close comparable plants than single-plant enterprises. In a similar plant-level 
analysis in the UK, Disney et al. (2003) found that, when single-plant enterprises are conditioned on the 
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average characteristics of group (multi-unit) establishments, plants that belong to the former are more 
likely to survive than plants that are part of the latter group. For New Zealand, Gibson and Harris (1996) 
showed that the probability of plant closure increased with the number of plants operated by a firm. 
Thus, these studies conclude that multi-unit firms are more likely to close plants, particularly if the plant 
has a relatively different cost structure (or productivity) to the rest of the firm. By contrast, Dunne et al. 
(1989) found that large multi-unit firms are less likely to close plants than large single-unit firms, using a 
US sample with about 200,000 plants over the period 1967-1977.  
Lastly, productivity can also influence plant closure behaviour through the (foreign) ownership structure 
of a firm. On one hand, multinationals may acquire firms with higher level of productivity (see, for 
instance, Harris and Robinson, 2002 and; McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995 for empirical evidence) with 
features that make them less likely to close plants. Furthermore, if multinationals share their superior 
technology and/or propriety asset with their foreign subsidiaries, this would reduce the probability of 
plant closure in host countries (Harris and Li, 2007). On the other hand, multinationals may have higher 
plant shutdown probabilities because of their inability to integrate acquired domestic plants into their 
operations (e.g., due to lack of understanding between the management of a multinational and labour 
attitudes in host country, argued in, for instance, Dunning, 1988). Additionally, a multinational with little 
or no experience in a foreign market may be more inclined to close its foreign subsidiaries if its 
operation abroad impedes the plants owned by the multinational. It is therefore not clear whether 
foreign-owned firms are less or more likely to close plants.  
The empirical evidence is also inconclusive. Gibson and Harris (1996) found that being owned by a 
foreign firm leads to a 4.7 percentage point reduction in the probability of plant closure, during the 
period of trade liberalisation in New Zealand. This is in contrast to their original expectation that 
multinationals are more likely to close plants because they can probably meet domestic demand 
through lower cost imports during the period of trade liberalization that reduces import barriers. By 
contrast, Bernard and Jensen (2007) found that plants owned by US multinationals (defined as a firm 
with at least 10% of its assets outside the US in 1987) have a 4.5 percentage point increase in their 
probability of death, once the authors controlled for plant attributes known to reduce the probability of 
plant closure. Bernard and Jensen (2007) argued that their finding supports the notion that 
multinationals have greater flexibility of moving their operations to another country which raises the 
probability that they may close one of their domestic plants. 
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2.3.1.4 Industrial Effects 
Going hand in hand with the impact of adjustment size (discussed in section 2.3.1.2) is the existence of 
industry effects, in terms of variation in the fixed cost of external adjustment amongst different sectors. 
If external adjustments are unattractive because they are costlier to implement (proxied by the size of 
an adjustment), one would expect these forms of adjustment to be particularly unappealing in industries 
with higher fixed cost. This argument follows from a simple cost-benefit analysis of adjustment, as 
expected benefits (i.e., from economies of scale) are more likely to fall below the fixed cost of using 
external adjustment in industries with higher fixed costs. Therefore, if adjustment size is a proxy for 
fixed cost associated with using external adjustment, we would expect that the issue of adjustment size 
should be more prevalent in industries with high fixed cost of external adjustment. In other words, 
industrial factors would capture the fixed cost advantages and disadvantages over and above any fixed 
cost associated with using external forms of adjustment.  
The only paper that has empirically examined industry differences in the adjustment size-path 
relationship is by Breinlich et al. (2010). Using frequencies, the authors showed that firms operating in 
high fixed cost industries use external forms of adjustment less frequently, but undertake large 
adjustment when they do. Specifically, they showed that the external forms of expansion (contraction) 
account for over 25% (50%) of aggregate turnover adjustment in manufacturing, utilities and mining 
sector, but they account for around 3% (4%) in the agricultural sector. They went on to argue that 
sectors with high fixed costs of adjustment such as manufacturing, utilities and mining, rely less 
frequently on external forms of adjustment, but will tend to undertake a relatively large adjustment 
when they do. In a somewhat similar vein, Loderer and Waelchli (2015) found a further negative 
relationship between integration costs (proxied by firm’s age) and takeover probability after controlling 
for industry effects. In particular, the authors found that while old firms have lower takeover probability 
because of the high cost associated with integrating them, industry distress (proxied by negative 
industry median sales growth and median stock return below -30%) further reduces the takeover hazard 
of older firms. The authors argued that firms with high integration cost (old firms) would have lower 
takeover probability, particularly, at times of industry distress when the gains to takeover drops. 
2.3.2 Effects of Alternative Forms of Expansion on Productivity 
In section 2.2.2, we used 2 theoretical ideas – matching theory and the theory of vintage capital - to 
hypothesize that external expansion, particularly, mergers and acquisition should lead to higher 
productivity levels than internal expansion. Central to this prediction is that mergers and acquisition can 
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be used to avoid hiring costs (which are significant because of the hiring process) because workers from 
acquired plants will be better matched to their jobs than new worker that need to be taken on through 
internal expansion. Despite this theoretical appeal, we are not aware of any empirical research that has 
attempted to estimate the causal impact of choosing alternative forms of expansion on firm-level 
productivity. Instead, much attention has been focused on analysing the role of plant-level adjustments 
i.e., opening/closure of plants and reallocation of resources towards highly-productive continuing 
plants, in explaining aggregate productivity growth (e.g., Disney et al., 2003; Harris and Moffat, 2013).  
Relatedly, the only paper that has examined the contribution of alternative forms of expansion – 
internal expansion, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition - to aggregate productivity 
growth is by Breinlich et al. (2012). Using a dataset that was created by merging ARD into the BSD, the 
authors employ the Foster et al. (2006) method to decompose labour and total factor productivity 
growth between 1997 and 2005 in UK agricultural and manufacturing sector. This allows them to 
identify the share of the growth of aggregate productivity attributable to each path of expansion. Their 
result show that, amongst the 3 channels of expansion, internal expansion is the largest contributor to 
labour productivity, while the contribution to TFP growth comes primarily from mergers and acquisition. 
Specifically, they found that internal expansion, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition 
account for 11.85%, 0.28% and 4.03% of the growth in labour productivity respectively, while the same 
channels of expansion account for 4.87%, 1.25% and 15.48% of TFP growth respectively.  
Breinlich et al. (2012) reveals the proportion of UK productivity growth that is attributable to each path 
of expansion. However, and as stated above, no study has attempted to estimate the causal impact of 
alternative forms of expansion on firm-level productivity. Some studies such as Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2002) have focused on the impact of a particular path of adjustment (e.g., mergers and acquisition) on 
productivity, but these impacts are never compared to the effect of alternative forms of expansion (e.g., 
internal expansion and/or greenfield investment). The remainder of this section reviews such studies 
(grouped according to each path of expansion) to allow for comparisons of our empirical results in 
chapter five. 
2.3.2.1 Effect of Internal Expansion 
Workforce (or internal) expansion is expected to have an impact on firm-level productivity through 2 
main channels. Most obviously, hiring new employees (or managers) with higher efficiency parameters 
should lead to greater productivity levels – i.e., the managerial skill model of Jovanovic (1982). This is 
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because, a skilled workforce is more likely to use a firm’s tangible inputs in the most effective way as 
well as act as compliments to organizational practices and improved technologies (e.g., Battu et al., 
2003). Literature on human capital has tied several factors to such higher efficiency parameters 
including education, skills, training and experience, which lead to greater productivity performance. For 
instance, Holland et al. (2013) found that a 1 per cent increase in the share of the workforce with a 
university degree raises the level of productivity in the UK by 0.2-0.5 per cent in the long-run. The 
second channel is through the “Penrose effect” (Penrose, 1959). This effect is based on the notion that 
there is a maximum growth rate above which productivity declines if a firm tries to hire new workers. 
Hiring new employees’ above a firm’s maximum growth rate places additional demand on the firm’s 
managerial resources as managers redirect their attention to training and internalizing new employees. 
As such, productivity declines from internal expansion that is above a firms’ maximum (internal) growth 
rate15. Indeed, productivity may also decline or at least remain the same in the long-run if internal 
expansion involves hiring skilled workers in large firms i.e., due to diminishing returns to skill in Lucas 
(1978). In such a situation, a firm can only improve productivity by investing in additional capital.  
Ample evidence has been provided at the macroeconomic level, regarding the linkage between a 
country’s productivity growth and changes in its workforce composition. These studies have mostly 
shown that productivity growth is positively related to upskilled workforce (often proxied by higher level 
of education, skills and experience). For instance, Mason et al (2012) decompose improvement in labour 
quality into 2 components – higher educational attainment and on-the-job training and experience – 
and find these factors to be positively related to productivity growth. Others that have found a similar 
positive relationship between productivity growth and higher labour quality include: Jorgenson et al. 
(1987), O’Mahony (2012), Van Reenen (2013) and Holland et al. (2013). The intuition behind such 
findings is that “if the total number of hours worked stayed the same, but they were increasingly 
worked by more intelligent and able workers, which are presumed more efficient, this would result in 
increased output” (Rincon-Aznar et al., 2015:53). Thus, these studies have shown that higher labour 
quality leads to improvement in productivity even though they fail to adequately quantify this effect at 
the firm-level.  
 
15 This argument is similar to standard economic theory that an increase in labour leads to an increase in 
output, until diminishing marginal returns to labour occurs. At this point, only high-quality labour would 
lead to a faster increase in output. 
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In contrast, empirical evidence at the firm- or plant-level provide a rather different and unique 
perspective to disentangle the labour quality-productivity relationship, taking into account the 
heterogeneity of productivity amongst firms with different labour input quality. Such studies often 
interact the fields of industrial and labour economics by carefully merging employer-employee datasets 
to provide some evidence of the importance of labour quality in explaining productivity difference 
between firms. Haltiwanger et al. (1999) do exactly this using US matched worker-firm data to show that 
productivity (the natural log of sales per employee) increases in worker’s skills. They used worker’s 
education as a proxy for labour quality to show that firms with more-educated workers are more 
productive than their counterparts with less-educated workers, having controlled for firm characteristics 
(i.e., firm size and ownership structure) and other workforce composition (i.e., worker’s age, gender and 
place of birth). The authors remarked that their finding is not only consistent with the argument that 
higher quality workforce make firms more productive but also that there is sorting and matching 
amongst firms and employees which leads to higher productivity outcome. Haltiwanger et al. (1999) 
finding is echoed in Abowd et al. (1999) investigation with similar French data. Specifically, Abowd et al. 
(1999) find a positive relationship between worker’s skill (measured from employer/employee wage 
equations) and labour productivity. Further empirical evidence that more productive firms have high-
skilled workforce is provided in Haskel et al., (2005) for UK; Iranzo et al. (2008) for Italy; Ilmakunnas et al 
(2004) for Finland; and Fox and Smeets (2011) for Denmark. 
The studies reviewed above focus mainly on contemporaneous association between human capital and 
firm- or plant-level productivity, and therefore neglect any dynamic considerations affecting the 
relationship between internal expansion and productivity (i.e., diminishing returns to skills). The only 
study that has considered such dynamic relationship is by Coad and Broekel (2012). Using a unique 
panel of 6,715 French firms from 1996 to 2004, Coad and Broekel (2012) studied the relationship 
between employment growth and firm-level productivity growth. They focused on internal expansion by 
excluding firms that have undergone any kind of structural modification such as mergers and acquisition 
in their sample and used a vector autoregression (VAR) model to study relationships. First, the authors 
find that employment growth is positively related with subsequent growth of labour productivity while it 
is negatively related with subsequent TFP growth. They attributed this contrasting result to the fact that, 
unlike labour productivity, TFP takes into account the efficiency with which capital is utilized. Second, 
they find that the negative relationship between employment growth and TFP growth persist with firm 
size (i.e., the negative coefficient on employment growth persists even after splitting their sample into 
different size groups). Overall, their result is consistent with the “Penrose effect” of productivity decline 
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from internal expansion. The authors also argued that their result is in accordance with the notion of 
adjustment cost (e.g., Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006) associated with investment in human capital.  
2.3.2.2 Effect of Greenfield Investment 
There are 2 main channels through which new ‘greenfield’ investment (i.e., in recent capital vintages) 
may affect firm-level productivity. First, greenfield plants may embody the latest technology that allow 
firms to produce existing products and/or new products with greater efficiency. Indeed, in many vintage 
models, new plants enter industries with improved technology embedded in their capital and often 
outperform existing plants operating in the same industry - an assumption that is frequently referred to 
as machine-embodied technical change (e.g., Cooley et al., 1994; Campbell, 1998). Thus, greenfield 
investment with plant-embodied technical change should result in higher productivity levels for the firm 
- a vintage effect. The second channel through which greenfield investment may affect firm-level 
productivity is the technology-specific human capital required for adopting new technology. Following 
an immediate switch to new technology, firms may need to learn about the given technology before 
they can realize higher levels of productivity (e.g., learning-by-doing in Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1994). In 
fact, following such technological switch, firm-level productivity may fall below its previous level due to 
delayed learning of how to adopt new technology in greenfield plant (e.g., Andolfatto and MacDonald, 
1993; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994). However, as firms become more knowledgeable about the 
greenfield technology, productivity would increase – a learning-by-doing effect.  
In terms of empirical evidence, several studies have tried to carefully construct measures of capital-
embodied technological progress within ‘new’ and ‘old’ existing plants and compare their productivity 
levels to see whether new plants produce with better technology and greater efficiency than old plants. 
Jensen et al. (2001) do exactly this by comparing the relative productivity of plants with different entry 
years. Using US manufacturing plant-level data from 1963 to 1992, they find that more-recent entrants 
enter with higher productivity levels than earlier entrants (i.e., when compared to the cohort of plants 
that entered the US manufacturing industry in 1963, productivity is 47% higher in the cohort of plants 
that entered in 1992). The authors suggested that newer plants bring with them the latest technology 
that contributes substantially to labour productivity growth in the US manufacturing industry. However, 
Jensen et al. (2001) find that existing plants become more productive over time contributing also to 
overall productivity growth in manufacturing industry. Indeed, Jensen et al. (2001:11) report that 
productivity increases in plant age, indicating “the possibility that these surviving plants undertake large 
investments that effectively allow them to retool and replicate the latest capital”.  Thus, Jensen et al. 
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(2001) result suggests that both investment in new ‘greenfield’ plant and old ‘existing’ plant can lead to 
productivity improvements at the firm-level. Van Biesebroeck (2003) using dataset from the US 
automobile industry, found a similar contribution to industry-level productivity growth of both entry of 
new ‘lean’ plants and the transformation of earlier ‘mass’ plants. However, Van Biesebroeck (2003) 
reported that changes in lean production plants dominated the growth in the US automobile labour 
productivity between 1980 and 1996. 
Focusing on existing plants, Power (1998) find that new investment, in for instance capital vintage, is not 
associated with an increase in subsequent plant-level productivity. In particular, Power (1998) use plant-
level data in the US manufacturing industry and found that high-levels of ‘recent’ investment in existing 
plants is not related to high-levels of productivity (after controlling for plant fixed effects and age). Thus, 
contrary to Jensen et al. (2001) conjecture, this result suggests no productivity improvement following 
periods of large investments in existing plants. However, Power (1998) argue that their result could be 
due to expansion investment occurring in the US manufacturing industry over their sample period - i.e., 
large investments in US manufacturing plants are carried out by successful plants to expand capacity 
rather than update their vintage technology with more productive capital. In contrast, Sakellaris and 
Wilson (2004), using a similar measure of investment history, find that productivity is 12% higher in 
plants that carried out ‘new’ investment, when compared to plants with previous investment. They 
report that these investments in new equipment accounted for as much as two-thirds of the TFP growth 
in the US manufacturing industry between 1972 and 1996.  
2.3.2.3 Effect of Mergers and Acquisition 
Existing arguments on the role of mergers and acquisition in explaining firm-level productivity offers 2 
very different views. The key distinction between these 2 arguments is managerial motive for mergers 
and acquisition. On the one hand, the ‘free cash flow’ hypothesis from Jensen (1986) suggest that 
opportunistic managers may acquire another firm that they are unable to operate efficiently, if there is 
excess cash available to do so. Thus, under this view, mergers and acquisition are driven by managerial 
(empire-building) objectives that leads to a decline in post-merger productivity. On the other hand, 
economic theory recognizes that some firms have valuable scarce resources that allows them to manage 
multiple plants more efficiently than others. These neoclassical models of firm organization (i.e., 
Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) often use demand/supply shock in one 
industry to show how firms with different efficiency levels trade plants. Specifically, industry shock 
changes firm’s payoff/profit of operating marginal plants and trade occurs until the payoff is equalized. 
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When this occurs, plants flow from less efficient firms to more efficient firms and productivity increases 
in latter firms due to the better management of acquired plants. Thus, under this view, mergers and 
acquisition should generate improvement in productivity that is driven by managerial incentive to 
maximize profit.  
To test which of these arguments predominates, several studies have used plant-level data to examine 
the productivity of plants before and after ownership changes16. Findings, however, have been mixed. 
For instance, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) compared productivity of US manufacturing plants before 
and after an acquisition and found that between 1972 and 1981, productivity in acquired plants declined 
years before acquisition, but productivity improved afterwards until eventually there was no 
productivity gap between acquired and unacquired plants. However, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) 
distinguished between different types of mergers and acquisition and found that while there was a 
general positive impact on productivity of mergers and acquisition, productivity grew faster in plants 
that underwent a leveraged and management buyout (LBOs and MBOs) than the productivity of plants 
that underwent other types of mergers. Similarly, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) using plant-level data 
on US food manufacturing industry, found that while acquired plants enjoyed higher productivity growth 
than their unacquired counterparts several years after a change in ownership, productivity grew faster 
in larger unacquired plants than larger acquired plants. By contrast, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 
1989) found that acquired plants were highly profitable/efficient before acquisition with little or no gain 
in the acquiring plant post-acquisition. In sum, these earlier studies have provided inconclusive evidence 
regarding the impact of mergers and acquisition on the productivity of acquired plants. 
In contrast to earlier studies, majority of recent studies have found evidence of improvement in plant-
level efficiency following mergers and acquisition. For instance, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) found 
that productivity in US manufacturing plants fell before an acquisition, but rose afterwards. The extent 
of this ex-post increase in productivity depends on the ex-ante productivity of the seller and buyer and 
on the type of division (i.e., main or peripheral) that is selling and/or buying the plants. A similar paper 
by Schoar (2002) found that mergers and acquisition has a positive impact on the productivity of newly 
 
16 There is of course an enormous literature on mergers and acquisition, far too large to cover here, that 
has tied this activity to firm performance including share prices, discount value etc. Much of this work in 
corporate finance has focused on shareholder’s wealth as outcome of interest. A smaller set of studies 
has focused on the productivity impact of mergers and acquisition.  
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acquired plants, even when the acquisition is a diversifying one. Maksimovic et al. (2011) also reported a 
productivity increase in acquired plants that are subsequently retained (as opposed to acquired plants 
that are latter closed or sold off), particularly for plants that operate in the acquirer’s main industry. 
Other recent studies that have found a positive relationship between an ownership change and the 
productivity of the transferred plants include: Gugler et al. (2003), Ollinger et al. (2006) and Li (2013). 
Hence, by showing improvements in the productivity of transferred plants, these recent studies support 
profit maximizing hypothesis as explanations for mergers and acquisition. 
In addition, the acquisition of new plants might also affect the productivity of the acquirer’s existing 
plants. On one hand, a shift in managerial focus from acquirer’s existing plants to newly acquired plants 
might reduce the productivity of existing plants. Indeed, Schoar (2002) observed that acquirer’s existing 
plants suffer productivity losses following the acquisition of new plants, and since firms have on average 
many more existing than new plants (that experience an increase in productivity), the aggregate effect 
of mergers and acquisition on firm-level productivity is negative – referred to as a “new toy” effect. On 
the other hand, the further restructuring that often follows mergers and acquisition (i.e., the closure and 
sales of inefficient plants) might improve the match between the remaining ‘existing’ plants and the 
firm’s main ability, leading to an increase in the productivity of existing plants. This argument is 
supported by Maksimovic et al. (2011) findings that acquirer’s existing plants (alongside newly acquired 
plants) increased in productivity, when compared to an average plant in the industry, Thus, while recent 
studies have often concluded that mergers and acquisition has a positive effect on transferred plants, 
the evidence on the productivity effect of the same activity on acquirer’s existing plants is mixed. It is 
therefore not clear from the literature whether mergers and acquisition should be expected to have a 
positive or negative effect on firm-level productivity.  
2.3.3 Effects of Alternative Forms of Contraction on Productivity 
The previous section reviewed empirical papers that have attempted to estimate the causal impact of 
different forms of expansion on productivity. In this section, we turn to a number of literatures that 
have examined the productivity impact of choosing alternative forms of contraction. The productivity 
impact of different forms of contraction was theoretically motivated in section 2.2.3. We hypothesized, 
using 2 theoretical ideas - the theory of uncertainty under organizational decline and the theory of firm 
boundary under comparative advantage – that external contraction, particularly, plant closure should 
lead to higher productivity level than internal contraction. The underlying idea used to generate such 
prediction is that plant closure, unlike internal contraction, often removes the uncertainty associated 
64 
 
with firms’ downsizing decisions and creates an environment that allows employees to improve and 
innovate. However, we are not aware of any empirical research that has tested this predictiion. Instead, 
researcher have focused much of their attention on the role plant-level adjustment play in explaining 
aggregate productivity growth. 
Relatedly, Breinlich et al. (2012) also examined the contribution of alternative forms of contraction – 
internal contraction, plant closure and plant sale - to aggregate productivity growth in the UK. They 
found that plant closure is the largest contributor to labour productivity and TFP growth; this was 
followed by internal contraction and plant sale. Indeed, their result show that plant closure, internal 
contraction and plant sale account for 34.16%, 27.26% and 22.41% of labour productivity growth 
respectively, while the same channels of contraction account for 32,98%, 24.87% and 19.53% of TFP 
growth respectively. This paper reveals the proportion of aggregate productivity growth that is 
accounted for by the different forms of contraction. It does not attempt to estimate the causal impact of 
these alternative forms of contraction on firm-level productivity.  
2.3.3.1 Effect of Internal Contraction 
Employee downsizing (or internal contraction) has long been perceived as a cost cutting activity that is 
often used to improve productivity (or performance) during organizational decline. As Freeman and 
Cameron (1993:12) put it “the objective of downsizing is to improve the organizational efficiency, 
productivity and/or competitiveness”. The key economic idea is that firms downsize to eliminate 
unnecessary levels of management, reduce bloated bureaucracy within the organization, reduce 
operating labour costs and streamline operations. The resulting elimination of redundancies improves 
(labour) productivity by reducing input worker hours that falls faster than the loss of output. Thus, 
internal contraction that is used to shed fat and lose no useful output should lead to an improvement in 
organizational efficiency. However, critics of employee downsizing have argued that such productivity 
benefits from downsizing may be minimal or non-existent, if the process involved in downsizing is not 
managed effectively. For instance, it has been argued that ineffective downsizing process, characterized 
by the uncertainty on where the axe will fall next, can lead to increased resistance to change (e.g., 
Brockner et al., 1992; Morris et al., 1999), increased absences or propensity to leave (e.g., Littler et al., 
2003a, 2003b), reduced trust and loyalty (e.g., Cameron, 1994) and reduce morale and commitment 
(e.g., Cameron et al., 1993) among downsizing survivors. These negative responses from downsizing 
survivors can lead to productivity decline. A further typical negative effect of internal contraction is that 
it can erode key employees’ skill, knowledge and experiences when they are moved into a new role or 
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leave the firm entirely (Hitt et al., 1994). There are therefore reasons to expect employee downsizing to 
have both negative and positive impact on organizational efficiency.  
Several studies have sought to examine whether downsizing leads to improvement in organizational 
efficiency. However, findings have been mixed. Chen et al. (2001) is one of the first studies to empirically 
show that there is a positive relationship between employee layoffs and firm-level productivity. The 
authors employed a sample of 349 layoff announcements in the US between 1990 and 1995 and 
compared labour productivity in layoff firms to those of similar firms (based on 2-digits SIC codes, book 
value of assets and return on assets in the year prior to the layoff) that did not downsize i.e., control 
firms. Using a Wilcoxon sign rank test, Chen et al. (2001) showed that, relatively to non-layoff firms, 
labour productivity (sales per employee) increased faster in layoff firms, especially in the 3-year post 
layoff period. Similarly, Chalos and Chen (2002) observed increased labour productivity, following firms’ 
downsizing announcement. Using a sample of employees downsizing in 365 Fortune 500 firms between 
1993 and 1995, and employing a univariate t-test, Chalos and Chen (2002) found that different forms of 
downsizing (revenue-refocusing and cost-cutting) resulted in improved labour productivity, in the 
ensuing 3-year post layoff period relatively to the 3-year period prior to downsizing. Other related 
studies such as Kang and Shivdasani (1997), Espahbodi et al. (2000) and Perry and Shivdasani (2005) 
have found that employee layoffs lead to improvements in operating performance, particularly 2 to 3 
years after downsizing, emphasizing the view that benefits from layoffs are experienced only in the long 
term. 
By contrast, Mishra and Mishra (1994) reported that downsizing firms had lower labour productivity 
than non-downsizing firms in the North American automotive industry. Using a survey data that 
comprised of 511 managers at 91 business units (representing 43 firms in the North American 
automotive industry), Mishra and Mishra (1994) found that workforce reduction had a negative impact 
on labour productivity in 1991. In Canada, Zatzick and Iverson (2007) also found that workforce 
reduction led to lower labour productivity, particularly, in high-involvement workplaces. Indeed, Zatzick 
and Iverson (2007) combined employee layoffs and high involvement work practices (HIWP) to show 
that firms with greater HIWP experienced lower labour productivity (log of revenues minus expenditures 
per employee) as a consequence of employee layoff. The authors argued that the negative effect of 
layoffs on labour productivity is particularly damaging in firms where employees’ skills and motivation 
are crucial for sustained productivity i.e., firms that use HIWP more extensively. Others have found no 
significant relationship between downsizing and labour productivity. For instance, Said et al. (2007) 
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showed that there is no statistical difference in labour productivity between downsizers and non-
downsizers, using a sample of 239 (140 downsizers and 99 non-downsizers) US and Canadian firms. 
Similarly, using 258 publicly traded firms in Korea between 1997 and 1999, Yu and Park (2006) found 
that layoff has no effect on productivity (neither sales per employee nor value added per employee). 
2.3.3.2 Effect of Plant Closure 
Although there is limited economic literature on how plant closure affects firm-level productivity, some 
key findings have emerged. For one, economic studies generally support the notion that plant closure is 
a major contributor to country- and industry-level productivity growth. In particular, studies by Oulton 
(2000), Disney et al. (2003) and Harris and Moffat (2013b) have all found that one of the major 
contributors to labour productivity and TFP growth is the exit of less productive establishments that are 
often replaced by more productive entrants in the UK – a market selection process. Bartelsman and 
Dhrymes (1998) and Foster et al. (2001) have found similar results in the US. However, these 
productivity-decomposition-type studies are often speculative in explaining the mechanism through 
which firm-level productivity improvements from plant closure arises. For instance, Disney et al. (2003) 
speculated that firms achieve productivity growth by closing plants because of the emergence of new 
technologies that requires new plants or new workers and therefore, the closure of old existing plants.  
In contrast, the mechanism through which plant closure improves plant-level productivity has been 
extensively researched in the management literature. These studies often link productivity 
improvements at the plant planning to shutdown to human efforts, instead of being driven by capital 
investment – labelled as ‘Closedown effect’ in Bergman and Wigblad (1999). 2 sets of studies belong to 
this stream of research. One set suggest that productivity improvements arises from reduced 
management control that provides greater operative space for workforce to practice their innovative 
skills and improve their work methods. Wigblad et al. (2012) offer one of the most comprehensive 
studies relating such worker’s job autonomy to improved productivity. The authors surveyed 11 
managers, 8 labour union representatives and 85 shop-floor workers from 3 plants in Sweden. Surveys 
were conducted via formal interviews focusing on changes that occurred after the closure 
announcement compared to the period before the announcement. Wigblad et al. (2012) documented 
that the countdown period (i.e., the period between advanced notice of the closure and the final day) 
was characterized by increased labour productivity (output per employee and time unit) in all 3 
establishments. More importantly, their result showed that worker’s job autonomy was responsible for 
such improvement in productivity (i.e., there was a 10 to 15 minutes reduction between batches and 
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start-up times in a particular establishment after the previously tight controls of management was 
relaxed). Other studies such as Bergman and Wigblad (1999) and Hansson and Wigblad (2006) have 
found similar positive relationship between greater workforce control and improvement in productivity.  
The second set of studies uses ‘goal theory’ to argue that plant closure often constitutes clear goals that 
is characterized by high certainty of job loss thereby creating a new working environment that is more 
conducive to the cognitive process of generating new goals. The only empirical paper that exists in this 
vein is by Häsänen et al. (2011). Using questionnaires, Häsänen et al. (2011) surveyed 275 employees in 
a large medical manufacturing company in Sweden to examine whether goal setting during the process 
of a plant closure increases worker’s performance. The authors found that productivity increased by 8 
percent within 13 months from the period of implementation of a goal setting programme. Häsänen et 
al. (2011) argued that it is possible to maintain a goal setting programme during a closedown process 
without hindering employees’ motivation. Limitation of these studies is the primary focus on single 
facilities where the closure occurs therefore, failing to consider the consequences of plant closure at the 
firm-level. Thus, there is no comparison between a closure in a multi-unit firm and the ex-post 
productivity effect in the remaining organization.  
2.3.3.3 Effect of Plant Sale 
An argument that is frequently used to motivate plant sales (or corporate divestiture) is the elimination 
of negative synergies within an organization. Whether through the pursuit of self-serving managerial 
goals (e.g., Jensen, 1986) or through previous investment mistakes such as unsuccessful mergers and 
acquisition (e.g., Maksimovic et al., 2011), firms may find themselves with excessive diversification such 
that their managerial capabilities are insufficient to cope with the range of business activities being 
undertaken17. Such firms may sell unrelated plants (or plants that operate in their peripheral division) 
and refocus managerial resources on fewer and less diverse operations to improve efficiency. Firms may 
generate similar positive synergies by closing unrelated plants. However, plant sale is a preferred option 
when the plant has a better fit and is worth more as part of another organization than it is as part of the 
current organization (John and Ofek, 1995). 
Indeed, a positive association between plant sale that appeared to narrow the focus of firm’s activities, 
and their ex-post performance level was provided in John and Ofek (1995). Using a sample of 321 US 
 
17 Schoar (2002) notes that diversified firms are not bad per se, but that it is the very act of diversifying into new 
line of business that reduces firm productivity. Put differently, managerial resources become stretched with each 
diversifying move and it is this move that leads to productivity disadvantage.  
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divestitures (each worth $100 million or more) from 1986 to 1988, the authors first show that there is 
often a significant increase in focus of the seller’s operation i.e., the average number of lines of business 
reported by plant sellers declined during the year of divestiture. Further, they show that, after 
divestiture, profitability increases in the remaining plants - using 3 different accounting measures 
namely; earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITD) to sales ratio, EBITD to book value of 
assets and EBITD to market value of assets. Finally, the authors ran a regression and found that focus-
increasing plant sales (as measured by change in the number of segments, change in Herfindahl index 
and a dummy variable that equals one if the sold segment’s main 4-digit SIC code is different from the 
seller’s main SIC code, and zero otherwise) has a positive impact on seller’s operating margins 
(measured as change in seller’s EBITD/sales from year 0 to t minus the median change in the industry). 
Their findings are consistent with the argument that diversification-reducing or focus-increasing plant 
sales improves performance level in the remaining organization.  
A similar study is by Bergh (1995). The author examined the impact of selling unrelated plants on the 
post-sell-off performance of 112 parent companies in US that undertook a plant sale between 1986 and 
1990. Using hierarchical multiple regression, the authors found that relatedness of plant sold (measured 
by a dummy variable that equals one if the sold unit’s main 2-digit SIC code matches the parents main 
SIC code, and zero otherwise) is negatively associated with seller’s post-sell-off performance (as 
measure by the seller’s post-sell-off return on assets). His result indicates that firms that sell related 
plants lose part of their distinctive competencies and, therefore, have a poor performance record after 
such plant sales. Other studies such as Rosenfeld (1984), Jain (1985), Montgomery and Thomas (1988), 
Markides (1992), Haynes et al. (2002) and Hillier et al. (2009) have found a positive relationship between 
plant sales and seller’s post-sell-off performance. However, the resulting findings often fail to show the 
channel through which the improvement in seller’s post-sell-off performance occurs. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter reviewed what predictions are available from the theoretical literature 
concerning the empirical analyses of chapters four and five. In relation to how firms systemically choose 
between the different paths of adjustment, the theoretical literature appears to suggest that more 
productive firms are more likely to use external forms of adjustment – greenfield investment and 
mergers and acquisition for expansion and, plant closure and plant sale for contraction - than less 
productive firms. With respect to the productivity impacts of alternative forms of adjustment, theory 
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also suggests that external forms of adjustment should lead to higher productivity performance than 
internal adjustments.  
The key factors that are frequently documented in the literature to determine firms’ choice of 
adjustment include firm size, adjustment size, firm-level factors (R&D, age, multi-plant and foreign 
ownership) and industry structure. Firm size has been found to have positive and significant effect on 
external forms of adjustment i.e., large firms are more likely to choose external forms of adjustment 
than small firms. However, empirical studies have provided mixed evidence regarding the impact of firm 
size on a particular channel of external adjustment. With regards to adjustment size (usually used as a 
proxy for sunk cost of adjustment), researchers such as Breinlich and Neimann (2011a) have found that 
external forms of adjustment tend to increase in importance with the size of an adjustment with 
stronger impact on mergers and acquisition. In terms of firm-level variables, empirical literature 
generally provides mixed results. For instance, Berchtold et al. (2014) found that older firms are more 
likely to sell plants, while Loderer and Waelchli (2015) reported that probability of being acquired 
declines with firm’s age. Lastly, in relation to industry structure, Breinlich et al. (2010) found that firms 
operating in high fixed cost industries tend to rely less frequently on external forms of adjustment, but 
will undertake a relatively large adjustment when they do. 
In terms of the productivity impact of alternative forms of adjustment, empirical studies often focus on 
a particular path of adjustment (e.g., mergers and acquisition) without comparing this impact to the 
effect of other forms of adjustment (e.g., internal expansion and/or greenfield investment). Additionally, 
these empirical papers offer ambiguous evidence concerning what may be expected from the chapter 
that examines the impact of alternative forms of adjustment on productivity. For instance, Coad and 
Broekel (2012) find that internal expansion has a positive effect on labour productivity while the same 
channel of expansion has a negative effect on TFP growth. Schoar (2002) observe a similar positive and 
negative effect of mergers and acquisition on acquirer’s ‘purchased’ and ‘existing’ plants respectively. 
Jensen et al. (2001) also report that both investment in new ‘greenfield’ plant and old ‘existing’ plant 
lead to productivity improvements. Similar mixed effects on the productivity impact of different 
channels of contraction have also been found: negative effects were reported in for instance, Mishra 
and Mishra (1994) and Bergh (1995) and, positive effects in Chen et al. (2001) and John and Ofek (1995). 
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Introduction  
The dataset that will be used in the empirical analyses of chapters four and five is created by merging 
Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) and Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct 
Investment (AFDI) into Annual Respondents Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS).  The BERD 
and AFDI are panel data covering information on business research and development and foreign direct 
investment respectively. The ARD/ABS is a longitudinal business micro dataset that contains key 
financial information such as factor inputs and outputs. All these data are collected by the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS).  Successfully linking all datasets is crucial as failure to include key variables 
such as R&D and FDI will undermine the results in our empirical analyses. The work undertaken to 
merge all datasets builds on that of Harris (2005). First, a firm- and plant-level dataset on manufacturing 
and marketable services is constructed using the ARD/ABS database. This dataset is then linked with 
other panel data covering business research and development (BERD data) and information on foreign 
direct investment (AFDI data).  
The chapter is structured as follows: The next section describes our key database – The Annual 
Respondent database/Annual Business Survey; the third section explains the method used to classify 
firms and plants into different adjustment categories. The fourth and fifth sections provide descriptive 
statistics for different sub-categories within net expanding and net contracting firms respectively.  The 
sixth section concludes.  
3.2 The Annual Respondents Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS) 
The Annual Respondents Database (ARD, currently available from 1973 to 2008)18 is a longitudinal 
business micro data for the UK. It is constructed by combining information from the Inter-Departmental 
Business Register (IDBR) named ‘indicative data’ with more comprehensive information collected from 
the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) termed ‘returned data’. The IDBR, introduced in 1994, is a 
comprehensive list of UK businesses that covers the names, addresses, ownership structure, industrial 
classification and employment of businesses in all parts of the economy; except some very small 
businesses (those without employees and self-employed with turnover below the tax threshold) and 
some non-profit making organisations. There are over 2 million businesses on the IDBR; covering 99 per 
 
18 The annual business survey (ABS) has since replaced the ARD and it is available up until 2016. 
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cent of UK economy activity (by turnover) and it serves as the main sampling frame for most business 
surveys carried out by government departments, including the Office for National Statistics (ONS).  
The more detailed information in the ARD is constructed from the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) from 
1998 onwards and other previous source surveys before that, such as the Annual Census of Production 
(ACOP, from 1974 to 1997) and Annual Census of Construction (ACOC, from 1991 to 1997)19. The ABI is a 
compulsory business survey that compiles the most comprehensive financial information of businesses 
in the UK, such as turnover, capital expenditure, employment costs and level, purchases, ownership, 
industry, location etc. To carry out the ABI, the ONS selects a sample of businesses from the IDBR each 
year. Plants are organised into reporting unit, local unit, enterprise and enterprise group in the IDBR. 
ONS (2012) defines an enterprise group as an “association of enterprises bound together by legal and/or 
financial links” while an enterprise is defined as “the smallest combination of legal units, which have a 
certain degree of autonomy within an enterprise group”. ONS (2012) also defines a local unit as “an 
enterprise or part thereof (e.g., a workshop, factory, warehouse or office) situated in a geographically 
identified place”.   
A reporting unit which questionnaires are sent to is the smallest unit that can provide the full 
comprehensive information for the ABI. Often, the reporting unit is the same as the enterprise and can 
provide full information on the enterprise (except for a minority of larger businesses or businesses 
which have a more complex structure). If the reporting unit is unable to provide full information on the 
enterprise, it will report for parts of the enterprise identified by lists of local units. As a result, ABI 
reporting unit counts are presented as enterprise counts. An enterprise may consist of one or more local 
units i.e., the head office for a group of shops. Therefore, an enterprise may have local units at different 
geographical locations, and may operate at different industries.  
Reporting units are selected for surveying in the ABI based on employment data in the IDBR with the 
sampling frame skewed towards the largest businesses. From 1998, 100 per cent of businesses with 250 
or more employees are surveyed; the proportion of businesses with employees between 100 and 249 
that were surveyed varies by industry from 100 to less than or equal to 50 per cent; 50 per cent of 
businesses with between 10 and 99 employees are surveyed while 25 per cent of businesses with fewer 
 
19 Note that the ACOP, ACOC, Annual Distribution and Services Inquiry (ADSI) and, Purchase Inquiry (PI) were all 
combined in 1998 to become the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) which was then replaced by the Annual Business 
Survey in 2009.   
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than 10 employees are surveyed in the ABI (Oulton, 1997 and; Barnes and Martin, 2002). Given this 
sampling frame, weights must be applied to obtain statistics that are representative of the population. 
When the ONS dispatches questionnaires for the ABI, it uses different form-types, often categorized into 
either short or long form-type. The short form-types are sent to businesses with fewer than 250 
employees requesting for totals i.e., total turnover.  The long form-types, on the other hand, are sent to 
businesses with 250 or more employees and to a proportion of selected businesses with lower 
employment asking for more detailed breakdowns. The data are collected in 2 parts: Part 1 (or ABI, Part 
1) collects employment record as soon as possible after 12th December of each year. Part 2 (or ABI, Part 
2) collects financial information, which may be submitted up to 12 months after each financial year end. 
This survey is designed to generate statistics for calculating the national income accounts and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). In 2009, the ARD was renamed the Annual Business Survey. The ABS now 
contains the financial information of businesses covering the production, construction, distribution and 
service industries, which represents about two-thirds of the UK economy in terms of the GVA 
3.3 Adjustment Classification 
Upon entry into the IDBR, the ONS assigns 3 unique identification numbers to each plant, identifying its 
status as a local unit, enterprise and enterprise group. These unique reference numbers allow the 
analysis of demographic events over time. Since the local unit is the lowest level of aggregation for 
which we have the information to identify the different demographic events over time, we start our 
classification by focusing on the local unit unique identifier. If between 2 census years, a new local unit 
identifier appears, we code this as a plant entry. Likewise, if one disappears, we code this as a plant exit.  
Thirdly, if a local unit identifier survives between 2 census years, we check to see if the enterprise 
identifier associated with the local unit identifier also survived between the same census years.  If the 
enterprise identifier survives and there is a change in employment, we code this as internal expansion 
for positive changes and internal contraction for negative changes. Secondly, if the enterprise identifier 
survives and there is no change in employment between the 2 census years we code this ‘No change’. 
Thirdly, if the enterprise identifier changes between the 2 census years, we code this as ownership 
changes. The local unit identifier associated with the new enterprise identifier is coded as mergers and 
acquisition; while the local unit identifier associated with the old enterprise identifier is coded as plant 
sold. Because adjustment decisions are made at the level of the firm (i.e., enterprise level), we 
aggregate these classifications to that level for our analysis. We can of course distinguish between plants 
that enter/exit, but are part of a surviving firm (i.e., an enterprise identifier that survives between 2 
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census years) from those that belong to an entering or exiting firm (i.e., an enterprise identifier that 
appears or disappears between 2 census years). The same can be done for plants that are acquired and 
sold.  
Taken together, firms can use one or more of the aforementioned adjustment strategies to adjust their 
overall (net) employment. Indeed, a continuing firm20 that wants to raise its overall employment may 
choose to increase employment at existing plants (internal expansion); create new plants (greenfield 
investment) or acquire existing plants from other firms (mergers and acquisition). The same firm may 
choose to combine some/all of the 3 expansion (and contraction) paths in order to raise its net 
employment. There are 53 potential path combinations (and a total of 56 expansion paths including the 
3 major expansion paths) available to continuing firms that wish to expand their net employment. Net 
contracting firms have 56 similar contracting paths available to them. Continuing firms could sometimes 
use some/all of the adjustment paths without changing their net employment21. We regard to such firms 
as ‘No change’. If between 2 census years, a continuing firm fails to use any adjustment path, it is also 
classified as a ‘No change’ firm22. Finally, for entry (exiting) firms, they may only access (leave) domestic 
market through greenfield investment (plant closure) or mergers and acquisition (plant sale) or both. 
Table 3.1 presents some basic descriptive statistics on the employment changes and number of firms 
carrying out such changes under different sub-categories. This table separates net expanding firms 
(Panel A) from net contracting firms (Panel B) and classify all firms into 5 broad categories. The first 4 
categories are those using either internal expansion (internal contraction); greenfield investment (plant 
closure); mergers and acquisition (plant sale) or ‘No change’. For firms using combinations of expansion 
and contraction paths (106 combinations for net expanding and contracting firms), we collapse them 
into the 4 categories; according to the path that is used as a dominating strategy23.  
  
 
20 A continuing firm is one that existed in period t and t-1, an entrant is a firm that existed in period t but not t-1, 
and; an exitor is a firm that existed in period t-1 but not t. 
21 For instance, a firm with 100 employees in period t-1, may in period t, employ 10 new workers in some existing 
plants (internal expansion) and deploy 10 existing workers in other existing plants (internal contraction), so that 
the net employment in this particular firm remains at 100 employees in t even though the firm has both expanded 
and contracted internally between periods t-1 and t. 
22 We also include firms with employment changes of less than 5 employees into the ‘No change’ category as these 
represents small changes in employment possibly reflecting other things than expansion/contraction.     
23 Detailed information on all 106 combinations is given in sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.  
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  Table 3-1: Employment change and number of firms; averages per year, 1997-2012 
              
    percent of employment change   Percent of number 
  
Employment 
change Total Sub-group Number of firms Total Sub-group 
Panel A: Expanding firms 
All firms 2,139,151 100   1,447,009 100   
Greenfield investment 1,129,537   52.8 217,017   15.0 
Internal expansion 671,664   31.4 31,359   2.2 
Mergers and acquisition 281,800   13.2 1,575   0.1 
At least 2 dominant 1,582   0.1 62   0.0 
No change 54,569   2.6 1,196,996   82.7 
              
Continuing firms 1,264,292 59   1,234,122 85   
Greenfield investment 342,601   27.1 4,866   0.4 
Internal expansion 671,664   53.1 31,359   2.5 
Mergers and acquisition 193,989   15.3 841   0.1 
At least 2 dominant 1,468   0.1 60   0.0 
No change 54,569   4.3 1,196,996   97.0 
              
Entrants 874,860 41   212,887 15   
Greenfield investment 786,936   89.9 212,151   99.7 
Mergers and acquisition 87,810   10.0 734   0.3 
At least 2 dominant *   * *   * 
              
Panel B: Contracting firms 
All firms 2,048,754 100   1,417,233 100   
Plant closure 1,154,381   56.3 194,933   13.8 
Internal contraction 516,722   25.2 22,630   1.6 
Plant sale 322,078   15.7 2,620   0.2 
At least 2 dominant 1,003   0.0 54   0.0 
No change 54,569   2.7 1,196,996   84.5 
              
Continuing firms 890,006 43   1,224,044 86   
Plant closure 265,584   29.8 4,164   0.3 
Internal contraction 516,722   58.1 22,630   1.8 
Plant sale 52,350   5.9 205   0.0 
At least 2 dominant 780   0.1 49   0.0 
No change 54,569   6.1 1,196,996   97.8 
              
Exitors 1,158,748 57   193,189 14   
Plant closure 888,797   76.7 190,769   98.7 
Plant sale 269,728   23.3 2,415   1.2 
At least 2 dominant *  * *  *        
              
Notes: All categories include firms that expanded/contracted by 5 or more employees; whereas ‘No change’ category includes 
firms with employment changes between 0 and 4 employees. A continuing firm is one that existed in period t and t-1, an 
entrant is a firm that existed in period t but not t-1, and; an exitor is a firm that existed in period t-1 but not t.  
(*) Exact annual average values cannot be reported due to disclosure restriction (Number of observations underlying the cell is 
less than 10). 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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For instance, if a firm expands employment by 100 employees in an existing plant (internal expansion) 
and contracts employment by closing another plant with 10 employees (plant closure), such a firm is 
clearly using internal expansion as a dominating strategy. As such, it will be classified under the internal 
expansion category. We compute the employment changes and number of firms which at any stage 
continued operation, entered or exited. The table shows annual averages.   
As shown in the first row of panel A, on average each year there were around 2,140,000 employment 
expansions carried out by almost 1,450,000 firms over the period considered. Of the total employment 
expansions, 60 per cent were carried out in continuing firms while 40 per cent were due to firm entry.  
The next 3 rows of panel A show that 97 per cent of the employment expansions were carried out via 
greenfield investment (52.8 per cent), internal expansion (31.4 per cent) and mergers and acquisition 
(13.2 per cent), even though firms using these expansion paths only account for 17 per cent of the total 
numbers of firms. About two-third of greenfield investment expansion was due to firm entering through 
the creation of new plants24.  Turning now to net contracting firms. The first row of panel B shows that 
on average around 2,050,000 employment contractions was carried out each year by almost 1,420,000 
firms. 43 per cent of the total employment contractions were carried out in continuing firms while 60 
per cent were due to firm exit. The next 2 rows of panel B show that 82 per cent of the employment 
contractions were carried out via plant closure (56.3 per cent) and internal contraction (25.2 per cent), 
even though firms using these contraction paths only account for 15 per cent of the total number of 
firms. About three quarter of plant closure contraction was due to firm exiting through the closure of 
existing plants. 
The averaged data in Table 3.1 may hide important differences across years. Figure 3.1 shows 
employment changes for each year between 1997 and 2012. The employment numbers between 2008 
and 2009 should be treated with caution as, due to the replacement of the ARD with ABS, the ONS may 
have largely updated the employment figures in the IDBR (which goes into the ABS) to make sure that 
their employment-size sampling frame for the then new ABS was adequate in 2009. As is clear in Figure 
3.1, employment expansion has fluctuated considerably between 1997 and 2008. Dramatic rise and fall 
in employment expansion was witnessed between 2008 and 2010, due to the aforementioned 
replacement of the ARD with ABS in 2009. However, after the 2008/2009 period, employment 
expansion has displayed an upward trend. Turning to employment contraction, there is no obvious trend 
 
24 Note that by construction; only continuing firms can use either internal expansion or internal contraction. 
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across years. Employment contraction was however in its highest during the global financial crisis of 
2007/08. Compared to employment expansion i.e., net adjustment, again, there is no obvious trend 
between the periods 1997 to 2012.  
Figure 3.2 shows the number of firms carrying out the adjustments displayed in Figure 3.1. Most firms 
fall into the ‘No change’ category. For expanding firms, there is no clear trend across years. More 
interestingly, the dramatic rise and fall in employment expansion between 2008 and 2010 cannot be 
accounted for by the change in number of firms. While the number of firms expanding employment 
between 2008 and 2010 increased and fell, these changes were not as dramatic as the employment 
expansion itself.  Finally, the trend in the number of firms contracting follow a similar pattern to 
employment contraction. 
 
78 
 
Figure 3-1: Employment change in United Kingdom by year, 1997-2012 
 
Notes: Total expansion and total contraction includes only firms that expanded/contracted by 5 or more employees; whereas ‘No change’ 
includes firms with employment changes between 0 and 4. Net adjustment is calculated as total expansion minus total contraction. The number 
above each bar represents total employment change for each year. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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Figure 3-2: Number of firms in the United Kingdom by year, 1997-2012 
 
Notes: Total expansion and total contraction includes only firms that expanded/contracted by 5 or more employees; whereas ‘No change’ 
includes firms with employment changes between 0 and 4. Net adjustment is calculated as total expansion minus total contraction. The number 
above each bar represents total number of firms for each year.  
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Net Expanding Firms 
As discussed in the previous section, firms were classified into 5 major expansion categories - ‘No 
change’, internal expansion ‘only’, greenfield investment ‘only’, mergers and acquisition ‘only’ and a mix 
of adjustment path used to achieve net expansion.  
Table 3-2: Employment expansion by majora expansion path; average per year, 1997-2012 
Expansion path Employment 
expansion per 
yearb 
Number of firms 
per yearc 
Employment 
expansion per firmd 
Panel A: All firms 
Greenfield investment only 785,701 212,375 4 
Greenfield investment dominant 343,836 4,642 74 
Internal expansion only 440,987 28,731 15 
Internal expansion dominant 230,678 2,628 88 
Mergers and acquisition only 81,080 985 82 
Mergers and acquisition dominant 200,720 590 340 
At least 2 dominant 1,582 62 25 
Total expansion 2,084,582 250,013 629 
Total contractione 1,994,185 220,237 777 
No change (0-4)f 54,569 1,196,996 0.05 
Panel B: Continuing firms 
Greenfield investment only 17,626 260 68 
Greenfield investment dominant 324,975 4,606 71 
Internal expansion only 440,987 28,731 15 
Internal expansion dominant 230,678 2,628 88 
Mergers and acquisition only 29,333 303 97 
Mergers and acquisition dominant 164,656 538 306 
At least 2 dominant 1,468 60 25 
Total expansion 1,209,723 36,867 601 
Panel C: Entrants 
Greenfield investment only 768,075 212,115 4 
Greenfield investment dominant 18,861 35 535 
Mergers and acquisition only 51,747 682 76 
Mergers and acquisition dominant 36,064 52 695 
At least 2 dominant * * * 
Total expansion 874,860 212,887 1,354 
a The 53 gross expansion (and contraction) path combinations in Table 1 has been collapsed into 3 major expansion paths 
according to the expansion path used as the dominating strategy. If a firm uses more than one expansion path as a dominating 
strategy, it is classified into the ‘At least 2 dominant’ group.  
b Employment expansion of each of the expansion path summed over the period 1997-2012 divided by the number of years. 
c Number of firms using each of the expansion path summed over the period 1997-2012, divided by the number of years. 
d Employment expansion per year divided by number of firms per year.  
e Employment contraction, number of firms and employment contraction per firm for all contraction path summed over the 
period 1998-2012, divided by the number of years. 
f Employment change, number of firms and employment change per firm for all firms with no adjustment summed over the 
period 1997-2012, divided by the number of years. ‘No change’ includes firms with employment changes between 0 and 4 
employees. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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Firms that used a combination of adjustment paths were further classified into 4 categories, according 
to the path of adjustment that was used as a dominating strategy – i.e., internal expansion ‘dominant’, 
greenfield investment ‘dominant’, mergers and acquisition ‘dominant’ and at least 2 ‘dominant’. The 
‘dominant’ and ‘only’ expansion paths were merged to show the aggregate figures in panel A of table 
3.1 (i.e., Greenfield investment = Greenfield investment ‘only’ + Greenfield investment ‘dominant’). In 
this section, we separate the ‘dominant’ from ‘only’ expansion paths to provide more detailed 
information. 
Table 3.2 provide some basic information on employment expansion and number of firms for each of 
the ‘dominant’ and ‘only’ expansion paths. The table shows that although the dominating categories are 
rare events, firms using greenfield investment as a dominating strategy, account as major contributors 
to employment expansion. This expansion path is also the most frequently used out of the 4 ‘dominant’ 
categories. However, on average, when used, mergers and acquisition ‘dominant’ strategy is used to 
carry out a larger expansion in employment than all other 6 expansion paths. The importance of 
mergers and acquisition ‘dominant’ path is persistent when we separate continuing firms from starters 
(See panels B and C of table 3.2). 
The averaged data in Table 3.2 may hide important differences across years. As a result, we present 
figures 3.3 and 3.4 to show year-on-year differences, according to the 7 paths of expansion. Figures 3.3 
and 3.4 are mirror images (the top half of the x-axis) of figures 3.1 and 3.2 respectively, with the 
expansion bar in the latter figures broken down into 7 expansion paths. Like in Figure 3.1, there is no 
obvious trend in all the 7 expansion paths. However, across all years, greenfield investment (and 
greenfield investment dominant amongst the dominant paths) is the largest contributor to employment 
expansion. It is also clear from figure 3.3 that the dramatic rise and fall in employment shown in figure 
3.1 was largely due to the substantial rise and fall in employment expansion via greenfield investment 
and internal expansion. Figure 3.4 shows that while the number of firms using internal expansion tripled 
in 2008/09 (the period in which there was a dramatic rise in employment), the number of firms using 
greenfield investment fell over the same period. This suggests that while the substantial rise in 
employment via internal expansion can be accounted for through the huge rise in the number of firms 
using internal expansion; the big rise in employment that is due to greenfield investment cannot be 
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explained by the number of firms using this path. To better illustrate this, Figure 3.5 shows the 
employment expansion per firm25 for each year, according to the 7 channels of expansion.  
Figure 3.5 shows that internal expansion per firm remains steady for the entirety of the period so that, 
the substantial rise in internal employment expansion in 2008/09 is accommodated for by the huge rise 
in the number of firms using this path of expansion. On the hand, greenfield investment per firm, 
experienced a dramatic increase in 2008/09, which means that the substantial rise in greenfield 
employment expansion cannot be explained by fall in the number of firms using this path. In moving 
from ARD to ABS in 2009, the ONS updated a lot of the employment figures for continuing firms with 
continuing plants, so that both internal employment expansion and the number of firms using internal 
expansion would increase in the 2008/09 period. The big rise in greenfield investment per firm in 
2008/09 suggests that even though fewer firms used greenfield investment in 2009 (the year ABS was 
introduced), those that used it, carried a larger expansion in employment compared to previous years. 
The dramatic rise in greenfield investment in 2008/09 can only be attributed to the switch from ARD to 
ABS in 2009.
 
25 The numbers in Figure 3.5 are calculated by dividing the numbers in Figure 3.3 (employment expansion per 
expansion path per year) by the numbers in Figure 3.4 (number of firms using each expansion path yearly). 
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Figure 3-3: Employment expansion by expansion path by year, 1997-2012 
 
Notes: Each expansion path includes firms that expanded (and contracted) by 5 or more employees. The number above each bar represents 
total employment expansion between 2 years. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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Figure 3-4: Number of firms using each expansion path by year, 1997-2012 
 
Notes: Each expansion path includes firms that expanded (and contracted) by 5 or more employees. The number above each bar represents 
total number of firms between 2 years. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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Figure 3-5: Employment expansion per firm by expansion path by year, 1997-2012 
 
 
Notes: Numbers are calculated by dividing employment expansion per expansion path per year (Figure 3.3) by number of firms using each 
expansion path yearly (Figure 3.4). 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS).
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For completeness, we further disaggregate the ‘dominant’ expansion paths to show how firms combine 
different paths of adjustment to attain a net expansion. Table 3.3 presents all the 53 possible 
combinations of adjustment and the 3 ‘only’ expansion path (making a total of 56 expansion paths).  
Between 1997 and 2012, most of the 56 available options are used at least once (see third column of 
table 3.3). The 3 main expansion channels – Internal expansion ‘only’, greenfield investment ‘only’ and 
merger and acquisition ‘only’ – were used in about 97 per cent of overall employment expansion in the 
UK economy, with the clear majority occurring via greenfield investment ‘only’ (85 per cent). On 
average, greenfield investment also accounts as the major contributor (about 38 per cent) to 
employment expansion. Combining gross expansion (and contraction) path into overall net expansion 
are rare events; used in only about 3 per cent of employment expansions in the UK economy between 
1997 and 2012. However, on average, the 53 gross expansion (and contraction) path combinations 
account for a large share – one-third – of the economy-wide employment expansion between 1997 and 
2012. Indeed, when they occur, these gross expansion (and contraction) path combinations are major 
events as shown in the fourth column of table 3.3. The average gross expansion (and contraction) path 
combination employment expansion per firm is 150 times bigger than the average greenfield investment 
employment expansion per firm. 
The most obvious lesson from tables 3.2 and 3.3 is that gross expansion (and contraction) path 
combinations account for a large fraction of overall employment expansion despite their infrequent 
occurrence. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to include these gross expansion (and contraction) 
path combinations into our empirical analyses. However, examining how firms choose between 7 or 56 
different channels of expansion (as in tables 3.2 and 3.3) and their impacts on firm-level productivity can 
be very complex, particularly when we come to using multinomial logit/probit to empirically model the 
unordered multiple firms’ choice of using different expansion paths to increase output/employment. As 
a result, we merged the different gross expansion (and contraction) combinations into the Internal 
expansion ‘only’, greenfield investment ‘only’ and mergers and acquisition ‘only’ categories. In other 
words, we used the categorisation in panel A of table 3.1 to carry out our empirical analyses in chapters 
four and five. 
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Table 3-3: Employment expansion by expansion path; averages per year, 1997-2012 
Expansion path Employment 
expansion per 
yeara 
Number of firms 
per yearb 
 Employment 
expansion per firmc 
1  = Greenfield investment only 785,701 212,375 4 
2  = Internal expansion only 440,987 28,731 15 
3  = 1 + Internal expansion + Internal contraction + Plant closure 155,736 593 263 
4  = 1 + 2 + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction + Plant closure 105,004 106 993 
5  = Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition 81,744 123 665 
6  = Mergers and acquisition only 81,080 985 82 
7  = Greenfield investment + Plant closure 78,989 2,811 28 
8  = Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Internal contraction 57,886 702 82 
9  = Greenfield investment + Internal expansion 44,508 767 58 
10 = Internal expansion + Internal contraction 35,054 1,011 35 
11 = 1 + 2 + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction * * * 
12 = Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition + Plant closure 18,318 48 380 
13 = Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Plant closure 17,640 196 90 
14 = Internal expansion + Internal contraction + Plant closure 17,340 175 99 
15 = Greenfield investment + Internal contraction 15,954 405 39 
16 = Internal expansion + Plant closure 15,314 336 46 
17 = Mergers and acquisition + Plant closure 12,029 193 62 
18 = Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition 10,799 80 135 
19 = 2 + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction 10,105 54 187 
20 = 1 + 2 + 6 +Internal contraction + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
21 = Greenfield investment  + Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition 9,218 24 382 
22 = 2 + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction + Plant closure * * * 
23 = Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction * * * 
24 = 1 + Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition + Plant closure * * * 
25 = 1 + 2 + Internal contraction + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
26 = 1 + Mergers and acquisition + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
27 = Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction 5,587 64 87 
28 = 1 + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction + Plant closure * * * 
29 = Greenfield investment + Internal contraction + Plant closure 3,745 50 75 
30 = Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition + Plant closure * * * 
31 = 1 + 2 + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
32 = Greenfield investment + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
33 = Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition + Plant sale * * * 
34 = Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction + Plant closure * * * 
35 = 1 + Internal expansion + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
36 = 2 + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
37 = 1 + Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition + Plant sale * * * 
38 = Greenfield investment + Plant sale * * * 
39 = 1 + 2 + Mergers and acquisition + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
40 = Mergers and acquisition + Plant sale * * * 
41 = Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Plant sale * * * 
42 = Mergers and acquisition + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
43 = 2 + 6 + Internal contraction + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
44 = Internal expansion + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
45 = Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
46 = 1 + Internal contraction + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
47 = Internal expansion + Plant sale * * * 
48 = Internal expansion + Internal contraction + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
49 = Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
50 = Greenfield investment + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
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Expansion path Employment 
expansion per 
yeara 
Number of firms  
per yearb 
 Employment 
expansion per firmc 
51 = Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition + Plant sale * * * 
52 = 2 + Mergers and acquisition + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
53 = Internal expansion + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
54 = 1 + Mergers and acquisition + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
55 = 1 + 6 + Plant closure + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
56 = 6 + Internal contraction + Plant closure + Plant sale * * * 
Total expansion 2,084,582 250,013 29,078 
Total contractiond 1,994,185 220,237 32,576 
No changee 54,569 1,196,996 0.05 
a Employment expansion of each of the expansion path summed over the period 1997-2012 divided by the number of years. 
b Number of firms using each of the expansion path summed over the period 1997-2012, divided by the number of years. 
c Employment expansion per year divided by number of firms per year.  
d Employment contraction, number of firms and employment contraction per firm for all contraction path summed over the 
period 1997-2012, divided by the number of years. 
e Employment change, number of firms and employment change per firm for all firms with no adjustment summed over the 
period 1997-2012, divided by the number of years. ‘No change’ includes firms with employment changes between 0 and 4 
employees. 
Notes: (*) Exact annual average values cannot be reported due to disclosure restriction (Number of observations underlying the 
cell is less than 10). 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
 
Because of theoretical predictions on firms’ adjustment choice (as discussed in chapter two of this 
thesis), Figures 3.6 and 3.7 focus on some key firm-level variables which may determine the choice of 
adjustment channel. Firm size has figured prominently in the theoretical works of Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2002), Warusawitharana (2008) and Breinlich and Neimann (2011). Their models have 
predicted that following a positive demand- or supply-side shock, large firms (those with lower marginal 
costs and/or better organizational capabilities) are more likely to expand through greenfield investment 
and mergers and acquisition. However, when choosing between greenfield investment and mergers and 
acquisition, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and Warusawitharana (2008) show that large firms rely 
more on the latter path. Figure 3.6 provide some initial evidence on how firm size (based on 
employment band) correlates with the choice of expansion channel. The figure shows that greenfield 
investment (Dominant)26 accounts for the largest share of the employment expansion for 4 out of the 6 
 
26 Because the number of firms underlying some cells in Figure 3.6 are less than 10 (i.e., less than the threshold 
required for disclosure restriction) we have combined greenfield investment with greenfield investment dominant 
and now refer to it as greenfield investment (Dominant). The same has been done to internal expansion and 
internal expansion dominant as well as mergers and acquisition and mergers and acquisition dominant.  
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firm size categories. However, when we separate continuous firms from entrants, Figure 3.6 shows that 
the importance of greenfield investment for continuing firms rises steadily with firm size. A similar 
pattern arises when we look at mergers and acquisition. For the smallest firms (those with employees 
between 0 and 9) mergers and acquisition only account for about 3 per cent of overall employment 
expansion.  As firm size increases, however, mergers and acquisition become increasingly more 
important. For the largest firms (those with employees of at least 250), around 25 per cent of overall 
employment expansion is achieved via mergers and acquisition. 
Ownership type has also figured extensively in the works of Hymer (1976), Harris and Robinson (2003) 
and Harris and Moffat (2012). For foreign firms to enter into a domestic market and incur the sunk cost 
of setting up or acquiring a plant, the foreign firms must possess superior characteristics such as 
specialized knowledge about production that gives them a cost advantage over domestic firms (Hymer, 
1976). However, such superior characteristics may disappear as domestic firms learn to emulate the 
foreign firms as a result of knowledge spillover (Harris and Robinson, 2003). Figure 3.7 show how firm 
ownership-type correlates with the choice of expansion path. The Figure shows that greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisition account for the largest share of employment expansion for UK-
owned firms (91 per cent for UK-owned firms without FDI and 71 per cent for UK-owned firms with 
outward FDI). For Foreign-owned firms (US-owned, EU-owned and Other Foreign-owned) greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisition account for about two-thirds of overall employment expansion. 
One shortcoming of the descriptive approach in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 is the failure to accommodate a 
multivariate relationship between for instance, a combination of firm size and ownership-type and 
firms’ choice of expansion. Thus, it is unclear whether the correlations displayed in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 
are driven by firm size, ownership-type or a combination of both. 
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Figure 3-6: Employment expansion by expansion path by firm size; average per year, 1997-2012 
 
Notes: Each expansion path includes firms that expanded/contracted by 5 or more employees. The number above each bar represents annual 
average from 1997 to 2012. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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Figure 3-7: Employment expansion by expansion path by ownership type; average per year, 1997-2012 
 
 
Notes: Each expansion path includes firms that expanded/contracted by 5 or more employees. The number above each bar represents annual 
average from 1997 to 2012. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS
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3.5 Descriptive Statistics for Net Contracting Firms 
Turning to net contracting firms, this section provides detailed information on the gross contraction 
(and expansion) path combinations. Specifically, we separate the ‘dominant’ from ‘only’ contraction 
paths – shown in panel B of table 3.1 as internal contraction, plant close and plant sale - to provide more 
comprehensive information. 
Table 3-4: Employment contraction by majora contraction path; average per year, 1997-2012 
Contraction type Employment 
contraction per 
yearb 
Number of firms 
per yearc 
Employment 
contraction per 
firmd 
Panel A: All firms 
Plant closure only 883,469 191,018 5 
Plant closure dominant 270,912 3,914 69 
Internal contraction only 298,326 20,239 15 
Internal contraction dominant 218,397 2,391 91 
Plant sale only 163,117 2,307 71 
Plant sale dominant 158,961 313 508 
At least 2 dominant 1,003 54 19 
Total contraction 1,994,185 220,237 777 
Total expansione 2,084,582 250,013 629 
No changef 54,569 1,196,996 0.05 
Panel B: Continuing firms 
Plant closure only 15,631 314 50 
Plant closure dominant 249,953 3,850 65 
Internal contraction only 298,326 20,239 15 
Internal contraction dominant 218,397 2,391 91 
Plant sale only 3,254 45 72 
Plant sale dominant 49,096 160 307 
At least 2 dominant 780 49 16 
Total contraction 569,853 22,884 501 
Panel C: Exitors 
Plant closure only 867,839 190,705 5 
Plant closure dominant 20,958 64 328 
Plant sale only 159,863 2,262 71 
Plant sale dominant 109,865 153 719 
At least 2 dominant * * * 
Total contraction 1,158,748 193,189 1,162 
a The 53 gross contraction (and expansion) path combinations in Table 1 has been collapsed into 3 major contraction paths 
according to the contraction path used as the dominating strategy. If a firm uses more than one contraction path as a 
dominating strategy, it is classified into the ‘At least 2 ‘dominant’ group. 
b Employment contraction of each of the contraction path summed over the period 1997-2012 divided by the number of years. 
c Number of firms using each of the contraction path summed over the period 1997-2012, divided by the number of years. 
d Employment contraction per year divided by number of firms per year.  
e Employment expansion, number of firms and employment expansion per firm for all expansion path summed over the period 
1998-2012, divided by the number of years. 
f Employment change, number of firms and employment change per firm for all firms with no change summed over the period 
1997-2012, divided by the number of years. ‘No change’ includes firms with employment changes between 0 and 4 employees. 
Notes: Panel A focuses on all firms while panel B and C focuses on continuing firms and entrants respectively. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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Table 3.4 provide some basic information on employment contraction and number of firms for each of 
the ‘dominant’ and ‘only’ contraction path. The table shows that although, the dominating categories 
rare events, firms using plant closure as a dominating strategy account as major contributors to 
employment contraction. Out of the 4 ‘dominant’ strategy, plant closure ‘dominant’ is the most 
frequently used. However, on average, plant sale ‘dominant’ strategy is used to carry out a larger 
contraction in employment than all other 6 contraction paths. The importance of plant sale ‘dominant’ 
path is persistent when we separate continuing firms from exitors (see panels B and C of Table 3.4). 
The averaged data in Table 3.4 may hide important differences across years. As a result, we present 
figures 3.8 and 3.9 to show yearly differences, according to the 7 paths of contraction. Figures 3.8 and 
3.9 are mirror images (the bottom half of the x-axis) of figures 3.1 and 3.2 respectively, with the 
contraction bar in the latter figures broken down into 7 contraction paths. Like Figure 3.1, there is no 
obvious trend in all 7 paths of contraction. However, across all years, plant closure (and plant closure 
dominant amongst the dominant paths) is the largest contributor to employment contraction. Figure 3.8 
also shows that the substantial rise in employment contraction during the global financial crisis of 
2007/08 was largely due to plant closure. The number of firms that closed plants over the same period 
also rose, but not in proportion with the employment contraction via plant closure (see figure 3.9). As a 
result, Figure 3.10 shows a slight increase in plant closure per firm in 2007/08 period. Furthermore, 
Figure 3.8 reveals a sudden rise in employment contraction via internal contraction in 2009/10 followed 
by a substantial fall in 2010/2011. In Figure 3.9, the number of firms using internal contraction increased 
and then fell in proportion with the employment contraction via internal contraction. As a result, 
internal contraction per firm remains steady between 2009 and 2010. Like in expansion paths, the 
updating of employment figures that was carried out when the ONS moved from ARD to ABS has caused 
the sudden changes in internal contraction. 
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Figure 3-8: Employment contraction by contraction path by year, 1997-2012 
 
Notes: Each contraction path includes firms that contracted/expanded by 5 or more employees. The number above each bar represents total 
employment contraction between 2 years. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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Figure 3-9: Number of firms using each contraction path yearly, 1997-2012 
 
Notes: Each contraction path includes firms that contracted (and expanded) by 5 or more employees. The number above each bar represents 
total number of firms between 2 years. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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Figure 3-10: Employment contraction per firm by contraction path by year, 1997-2012 
 
 
Notes: Numbers are calculated by dividing total employment contraction per year by total number of firms per year. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
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We further disaggregate the ‘dominant’ contraction paths to show how firms combine different paths of 
adjustment to achieve a net contraction. Table 3.5 presents all the 53 possible combinations of 
adjustment and the 3 ‘only’ contraction path (making a total of 56 contraction paths). On average, 
between 1997 and 2012, most of the 56 available options are used at least once. The 3 major 
contraction path – Internal contraction, plant closure and plant sale – were used in about 97 per cent of 
overall employment contraction in the UK economy, with the clear majority occurring via plant closure 
(87 per cent). On average, plant closure also accounts as the major contributor to employment 
contraction (about 44 per cent).  Combining gross contraction (and expansion) paths into overall net 
contraction are rare events; used, on average, in only about 3 per cent of employment contractions in 
the UK economy between 1997 and 2012. However, on average, the 53 gross contraction (and 
expansion) path combinations account for a large share – 33 per cent – of the economy-wide 
employment contraction between 1997 and 2012. Indeed, when they occur, these gross contraction 
(and expansion) path combinations are major events as shown in the fourth column of table 3.5. The 
average gross contraction (and expansion) path combination employment contraction per firm is 120 
times bigger than the average plant closure employment contraction per firm.  
It is clear from Table 3.5 that gross contraction (and expansion) path combinations account for a large 
share of overall employment contraction despite their infrequent occurrence. As a result, it would seem 
reasonable to include these gross contraction (and expansion) path combinations into our empirical 
analyses. However, examining how firms choose between 7 or 56 different paths of contraction (as in 
tables 3.4 and 3.5) and their impacts on firm-level productivity can be very complex, particularly when 
we come to using multinomial logit/probit to empirically model the unordered multiple firms’ choice of 
using different contraction paths to reduce output/employment. As a result, we merged the different 
gross contraction (and expansion) combinations into the Internal contraction ‘only’, plant closure ‘only’ 
and plant sale ‘only’ categories. In other words, we used the categorisation in panel B of table 3.1 to 
carry out our empirical analyses in chapters four and five 
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Table 3-5: Employment contraction by contraction path; average per year, 1997-2012 
Contraction type Employment 
contraction per yeara 
Number of firms  per 
yearb 
Employment 
contraction per firmc 
1 = Plant closure only 883,469 191,018 5 
2 = Internal contraction only 298,326 20,239 15 
3 = Plant sale only 163,117 2,307 71 
4 = Plant closure + Plant sale 134,675 232 581 
5 = 1 + Internal contraction + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion 116,673 465 251 
6 = Plant closure + Internal contraction + Internal expansion 76,743 662 116 
7 = Plant closure + Greenfield investment 51,308 2,061 25 
8 = Plant closure + Internal contraction 44,185 852 52 
9 = Internal contraction + Internal expansion 36,919 940 39 
10 = 1 + 2 + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
11 = 1 + 2 + Plant sale + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion * * * 
12 = Plant closure + Internal expansion 15,673 456 34 
13 = Plant closure + Internal contraction + Greenfield investment 13,035 156 84 
14 = Internal contraction + Greenfield investment 12,923 307 42 
15 = Plant closure + Internal contraction + Plant sale + Internal expansion * * * 
16 = 1 + 2 + 3 + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
17 = Internal contraction + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion 9,227 125 74 
18 = Plant closure + Plant sale + Greenfield investment * * * 
19 = 1 + Internal contraction + Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
20 = Plant closure + Internal contraction + Plant sale * * * 
21 = Plant closure + Mergers and acquisition 3,789 61 62 
22 = Plant closure + Plant sale + Greenfield investment + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
23 = Internal contraction + Plant sale + Internal expansion * * * 
24 = Internal contraction + Plant sale 3,343 34 99 
25 = Plant closure + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion 3,340 45 75 
26 = Plant sale + Greenfield investment 3,333 33 101 
27 = Plant closure + Internal contraction + Plant sale + Greenfield 
investment 
* * * 
28 = Plant closure + Plant sale + Internal expansion * * * 
29 = 1 + Internal contraction + Greenfield investment + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
30 = 1 + 2 + Plant sale + Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
31 = Plant sale + Internal expansion 1,870 30 62 
32 = Plant closure + Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
33 = Plant closure + Plant sale + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion * * * 
34 = 2 + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
35 = Plant sale + Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
36 = Internal contraction + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
37 = Plant closure + Internal contraction + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
38 = Internal contraction + Plant sale + Greenfield investment + Internal 
expansion 
* * * 
39 = Internal contraction + Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
40 = Plant sale + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
41 = Internal contraction + Plant sale + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
42 = Internal contraction + Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
43 = Internal contraction + Plant sale + Greenfield investment * * * 
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Contraction type Employment 
contraction per yeara 
Number of firms  per 
yearb 
Employment 
contraction per firmc 
44 = Plant closure + Internal contraction + Plant sale + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
45 = 1 + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
46 = 3 + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
47 = Plant closure + Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
48 = Plant closure + Plant sale + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
49 = 1 + 3 + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
50 = Plant sale + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion * * * 
51 = 2 + Plant sale + Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
52 = Internal contraction + Plant sale + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
53 = Plant sale + Internal expansion + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
54 = Plant closure + Plant sale + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
55 = 2 + 3 + Greenfield investment + Internal expansion + Mergers and 
acquisition 
* * * 
56 = 1 + 2 + Plant sale + Greenfield investment + Mergers and acquisition * * * 
Total contraction 1,994,185 220,237 32,576 
Total expansiond 2,084,582 250,013 29,078 
No changee 54,569 1,196,996 0.05 
    
a Employment contraction of each of the contraction path summed over the period 1997-2012 divided by the number of years. 
b Number of firms using each of the contraction path summed over the period 1997-2012, divided by the number of years. 
c Employment contraction per year divided by number of firms per year.  
d Employment expansion, number of firms and employment expansion per firm for all expansion path summed over the period 
1997-2012, divided by the number of years. 
e Employment change, number of firms and employment change per firm for all firms with no change summed over the period 
1997-2012, divided by the number of years. ‘No change’ includes firms with employment changes between 0 and 4 employees. 
Notes: (*) Exact annual average values cannot be reported due to disclosure restriction (Number of observations underlying the 
cell is less than 10). 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
 
Following the theoretical predictions of  Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Warusawitharana (2008) and, 
Breinlich and Neimann (2011) and the empirical work of Hymer (1976), Harris and Robinson (2003) and 
Harris and Moffat (2012), Figures 3.11 and 3.12 focus on some key firm-level variables which may 
determine the choice of adjustment channel. Figure 3.11 shows that plant closure (Dominant)27 
accounts for the largest share of the employment expansion for all 6 firm size categories. When we 
separate continuous firms from entrants, Figure 3.11 shows that the importance of plant closure for 
continuing firms rises steadily with firm size. A similar pattern arises when we look at plant sale. For the 
 
27 Because the number of firms underlying some cells in Figure 3.11 are less than 10 (i.e., less than the threshold 
required for disclosure restriction) we have combined plant closure with plant closure dominant and now refer to 
it as plant closure (Dominant). The same has been done to internal contraction and internal contraction dominant 
as well as plant sale and plant sale dominant.  
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smallest firms (those with employees between 0 and 9) plant sale only account for about 5 per cent of 
overall employment contraction.  However, as firm size increases, plant sale become increasingly more 
important. For the largest firms (those with employees of at least 250), around 28 per cent of overall 
employment expansion is achieved via plant sale. 
Turning to the correlation between firm ownership-type and their choice of contraction path, Figure 
3.12 displays come initial evidence. The Figure shows that plant closure and plant sale account for the 
largest share of employment contraction for UK-owned firms (88 per cent for UK-owned firms without 
FDI and 70 per cent for UK-owned firms with outward FDI). For Foreign-owned firms (US-owned, EU-
owned and Other Foreign-owned) plant closure and plant sale account for about 66 per cent of overall 
employment contraction. However, Figures 3.11 and 3.12 have similar shortcomings to those of Figure 
3.6 and 3.7.  The descriptive approach in Figures 3.11 and 3.12 fail to accommodate a multivariate 
relationship between for instance, a combination of firm size and ownership-type and firms’ choice of 
contraction. Thus, it is unclear whether the correlations displayed in Figures 3.11 and 3.12 are driven by 
firm size, ownership-type or a combination of both. 
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Figure 3-11: Employment contraction by contraction path by firm size; average per year, 1997-2012 
 
Notes: Each contraction path includes firms that contracted (and expanded) by 5 or more employees. The number above each bar represents 
annual average from 1997 to 2012. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). 
365
2
364
116
13
103 103
14
89 70
14
56 91 27 65
409
196 213
21
21
53
53
65
65
50
50
70
70
257
257
3
0
3
5
0
5
16
1 15
20
1 19
39
3 36
239
47
191
390
23
367
175
66
108
184
80
104
141
66 75
200
99 101
904
500
404
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
A
ll 
fi
rr
m
s
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
Ex
it
o
rs
A
ll 
fi
rr
m
s
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
Ex
it
o
rs
A
ll 
fi
rr
m
s
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
Ex
it
o
rs
A
ll 
fi
rr
m
s
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
Ex
it
o
rs
A
ll 
fi
rr
m
s
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
Ex
it
o
rs
A
ll 
fi
rr
m
s
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
Ex
it
o
rs
0-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250+
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
co
n
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
(T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
)
Firm size (employment band)
Plant closure (Dominant) Internal contraction (Dominant) Plant sale (Dominant)
102 
 
 
 
Figure 3-12: Employment contraction by contraction path by ownership type; average per year, 1997-2012 
 
 
Notes: Each contraction path includes firms that contracted (and expanded) by 5 or more employees. The number above each bar represents 
annual average from 1997 to 2012. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the Annual Respondent Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS).
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3.6 Conclusion 
The chapter has described the data that will be employed in the empirical analyses of chapters four 
and five. It began by explaining our key data source – the Annual Respondent database/Annual 
Business Survey (ARD/ABS). The next section explains how firms are classified into different 
adjustment categories. The process involves using local unit and enterprise unit (plant and firm 
respectively) unique identifiers in the ARD to capture demographic events which led to 112 
adjustment classifications (56 for net expanding firms and 56 for net contracting firms). However, 
examining how firms choose between 56 different channels of expansion and contraction and their 
impacts on firm-level productivity can be very complex. As a result, we collapsed the 112 adjustment 
classification into 12 categories, according to the path that is used as a dominating strategy (see 
section 3.3 for a detailed description of our adjustment classification). A description of each path of 
adjustment was then provided.  In addition, we provided a comparison between some key firm-level 
variables and the different channels of adjustment. This showed that firms that rely on external 
forms of adjustment - greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition for expansion and, plant 
closure and plant sales for contraction – tend to be larger and UK-owned. A limitation of this 
descriptive approach used is that it fails to accommodate a multivariate relationship between 
several firm-level variables and firms’ choice of adjustment. As a result, we employ econometrics 
techniques to study such multivariate relationships in subsequent chapters.  
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4 The Determinants of Firms’ Choice of Expansion and Contraction 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter empirical examines the determinants of firms’ choice of adjustment. As shown in 
chapter 1.1 of this thesis, a firm can increase or decrease its productive capacity through 3 main 
channels. On the one hand, firms seeking to increase output may do so at existing plants (internal 
expansion), create new plants (greenfield investment) or acquire existing plants from other firms 
(mergers and acquisition). On the other hand, firms can reduce their productive capacity by cutting 
employment at existing plants (internal contraction), closing existing plants (plant closure) or selling 
existing plants (plant sale). Each path, if chosen, is likely to be fundamentally related to firms’ 
characteristics such as firm-level productivity as motivated in the theoretical models of firm 
organizational capability (e.g., Breinlich and Niemann, 2011a) and capital reallocation theory (e.g., 
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). 
Indeed, in chapter 2.2.1, we show that firms’ chosen path of adjustment depends fundamentally on 
their prospects for profits, and this in turn is dependent on their productivity level and the sunk cost 
of adjustment. Theory has shown that there are large sunk costs associated with using external 
forms of adjustment – greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition for expansion, and plant 
closure and plant sale for contraction – such that a firm must be (ex-ante) more productive to 
overcome such costs. As such, firms that use external forms of adjustment are likely to be more 
productive than firms that use internal forms of adjustment. Theory is, however, less clear in its 
prediction on how firms choose between the different channels of external adjustment. For 
instance, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) show that high-productivity firms are more likely to choose 
mergers and acquisition over greenfield investment when there is a technological shock that 
requires the reallocation of existing plants from less-efficient producers to more-efficient firms. 
However, when the technological gap between a potential (high-productivity) acquirer and (low-
productivity) target is too large such that the cost of converting the inferior technology is target’s 
plant exceeds any benefits from say, additional product variety, a potential acquirer may favour 
greenfield investment over mergers and acquisition (e.g., Breinlich and Niemann, 2011a). 
In empirical counterparts to this, a set of firm-level characteristics have been used to examine the 
relationship between these firm-level variables and different paths of adjustment. We adopt a 
similar approach in this thesis. However, this is the most comprehensive and up-to-date of its kind 
for United Kingdom; and, in particular, provides empirical evidence to how firms systematically 
choose between alternative forms of adjustment. With respect to our econometrics modelling, we 
employ the multinomial logit model because the dependent variable takes the value 0, 1 and 2 
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depending on whether a firm expands internally (contracts internally), creates a new plant (closes an 
existing plant), or acquires an existing plant (sell an existing plant) respectively. However, marginal 
effects are computed to provide an interpretable measure of the relationship between explanatory 
variables and the dependent variable. 
The next section will set out the multinomial logit model used, in which the probability of firms’ 
choice of adjustment is explained by variables described in chapter 2.3.1. The third section will 
describe how the multinomial logit is estimated; the issues that complicate the interpretation of 
multinomial logit model coefficients and discuss marginal effects estimator which is one way of 
interpreting the relationship between an explanatory variable and the dependent variable in a 
multinomial logit model. The fourth section presents the results and the fifth section concludes.  
4.2 Econometric Model and Variables Used 
This section sets out the model of firms’ decision to expand internally, create a new plant or acquire 
an existing plant. For contracting firms, the choices are whether to contract internally, close an 
existing plant or sell an existing plant. The dependent variable in this model therefore takes the 
value 0, 1 and 2 depending on whether a firm expands internally (contracts internally), creates a new 
plant (closes an existing plant), or acquires an existing plant (sells an existing plant) for expanding 
(contracting) firms respectively. The model can be expressed as: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡) =
exp(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑗)
∑ exp(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑗)
2
𝑗=0
           𝑗 = 0, 1, 2.                                                                  (4.1)  
This is the probability that firm i will select alternative j (j = 0, 1, 2), 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observed 
variables (i = 1, . . . , k; t = 1, . . . , T), thought to explain firms’ choice of adjustment28 and βj is a 
vector of coefficients that contains the intercept β0j and the slope coefficients βkj. Thus, there is one 
set of coefficients for each choice alternative. The model in equation 4.1 has 3 (J) equations of which 
only 2 (J – 1) can be estimated. This is because the probabilities of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
events must sum to one i.e. ∑ 𝑝
𝑖𝑗
2
𝑗=0 = 1. In other words, if we determine any 2 probabilities, then 
the third probability is automatically determined, therefore, we cannot estimate the third 
probability independently. The common practice in multinomial logit model is to set βj to zero for 
one of the categories and interpret coefficients with respect to that category. Therefore, βj is set to 
zero for internal expansion for expanding firms and internal contraction for contracting firms. The 
coefficients of other alternatives are interpreted in reference to the base group – internal expansion 
for expanding firms and internal contraction for contracting firms. Setting β0 = 0 when 𝑦0= 0 (i.e., 
 
28 The independent variables have been extensively reviewed in Chapter 2.3.1. 
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when a firm uses internal expansion for expansion and internal contraction for contraction) and 
computing the probabilities yields: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡) =
exp(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑗)
1 + ∑ exp(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑗)
2
𝑗=1
           𝑗 = 1, 2.        𝛽0 = 0                                          (4.2) 
And for the baseline category – internal expansion/internal contraction, the probability is: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡) =
1
1 + ∑ exp(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑗)
2
𝑗=1
           𝑗 = 1, 2.        𝛽0 = 0                                         (4.3) 
The variables included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are frequently documented variables (reviewed in chapter 2.3.1) that 
determine firms’ choice of adjustment. These variables include firm size, adjustment size and firm-
level variables (R&D, age, multi-plant ownership and foreign ownership). Table 4.1 sets out the list of 
these variables, along with the sources of data.  
Firm size is defined as a set of dummy variables that indicate whether a firm belongs to one of the 
following 6 size bands: 0-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249 or 250+ employees. Adjustment size is the 
relative employment ratio at the firm level between 2 consecutive years. Age represents the number 
of years a firm has been in operation. R&D represents a set of dummy variables that indicate 
whether a firm has no R&D expenditure or whether a firm has a positive R&D expenditure and 
belongs to one of the 4 equal percentiles. A single-plant enterprise dummy, equal to one if a firm 
owns only one plant and zero otherwise. Foreign ownership is a vector of dummy variables that 
indicate whether firms are UK-owned without outward FDI, UK-owned with outward FDI, SE Asia-
owned, EU-owned, USA-owned, Australia/Canada/South Africa-owned and other-foreign owned.  
Also included in equation (4.1) is set of dummy variables that capture the path of adjustment that a 
firm chooses in period, t-1, in an attempt to test for entry (sunk) costs of adjustment. For instance, in 
trade literature, Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) have shown that 
hysteresis in exports is due to sunk costs associated with entering the exports market. By extension, 
a firm that seeks to expand either through greenfield investment or mergers and acquisition would 
need to spend considerable time looking for suitable plants or creating a new one. This can be 
thought of as a learning cost associated with external forms of adjustment. Typically, there would be 
legal and administrative costs associated with creating or buying plants as well as possible 
restructuring costs associated with adapting built or acquired plants with the firm (see, for instance, 
Warusawitharana, 2008). Learning-by-adjustment captures these sunk costs and allows for  
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Table 4-1: Variable definitions used in ARD/ABS/IDBR/BERD panel dataset for 1997-2012 
Variables Definitions Source 
Firm size   
0 -9 employees Dummy coded 1 if firm employs fewer than 10 people ABS 
10 -19 employees Dummy coded 1 if firm employs 10-19 people ABS 
20 - 49 employees Dummy coded 1 if firm employs 20-49 people ABS 
50 - 99 employees Dummy coded 1 if firm employs 50-99 people ABS 
100 - 249 employees Dummy coded 1 if firm employs 100-249 people ABS 
250+ employees Dummy coded 1 if firm employs 250 or more people ABS 
Adjustment size   
Employee ratio Number of employees in the firm at period, t divided by number of 
employees at period, t-1 
ABS 
Firm-level variables   
Age Number of years firm has been in operation based on year of entry IDBR 
R&D band 1 Dummy coded 1 if firm has no R&D expenditure BERD 
R&D band 2 Dummy coded 1 if firm has positive R&D expenditure and lies in the 
first percentile 
BERD 
R&D band 3 Dummy coded 1 if firm has positive R&D expenditure and lies in the 
second percentile 
BERD 
R&D band 4 Dummy coded 1 if firm has positive R&D expenditure and lies in the 
third percentile 
BERD 
R&D band 5 Dummy coded 1 if firm has positive R&D expenditure and lies in the 
fourth percentile 
BERD 
Single-plant firm Dummy coded 1 when firm has a single plant ABS 
UK-owned firm (Without 
FDI) 
Dummy coded 1 if firm is UK-owned by those not involved in outward 
FDI ABS 
UK-owned firm (With FDI) Dummy coded 1 if firm is UK-owned by those involved in outward FDI ABS 
SE Asia-owned firms Dummy coded 1 if a firm is SE Asia-owned ABS 
EU-owned firms Dummy coded 1 if a firm is EU-owned ABS 
USA-owned firms Dummy coded 1 if a firm is USA-owned ABS 
AUS/CAN/SA-owned firms Dummy coded 1 if a firm is Australian- Canadian- and SA-owned ABS 
Other Foreign-owned firms Dummy coded 1 if firm is owned by other countries ABS 
Other variables   
Internal expansiont-1 Dummy coded 1 if firm expanded internally at period, t-1 ABS 
Greenfield investmentt-1 Dummy coded 1 if firm created plant at period, t-1 ABS 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 Dummy coded 1 if firm acquired an existing plant at period, t-1 ABS 
Internal contrationt-1 Dummy coded 1 if firm contracted internally at period, t-1 ABS 
Plant closuret-1 Dummy coded 1 if firm closed plant at period, t-1 ABS 
Plant salet-1 Dummy coded 1 if firm sold plant at t-1 ABS 
Region Dummies coded 1 if firm is in one of 11 Government Office regions ABS 
City 
Dummies coded 1 if firm is in a major GB city (defined by NUTS3 
code) ABS 
Industry Dummy coded 1 depending on 1992 SIC of firm (used at 2-digit level) ABS 
2008 Onwards Dummy coded 1 from 2008 onwards ABS 
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continuing external expanders to have a lower adjustment cost than first time expanders. There may 
be similar lower cost of adjustment for firms that continue to contract externally, as they are able to 
learn from previous contractions. 
A time dummy that takes the value of one if the year is 2008 onwards, and zero otherwise, is also 
included in equation (4.1). This dummy variable is included to capture the effect of uncertainty 
created by the 2008 financial crisis. The a priori expectation is that the uncertainty created by the 
2008 economy-wide shock would adversely affect firm-level investment behaviour. In particular, this 
economy-wide shock might be expected to be more important in firm’s external adjustment decision 
as these forms of adjustment are the costliest. For instance, Harris and Moffat (2016) found that the 
probability of plant closure in the UK has reduced post-2007 financial crisis. Thus, firms are expected 
to be less likely to (dis)invest in external forms of adjustment, post-2007. Lastly, regional and city 
dummies are included in equation (4.1) to control for variation in regional industrial structure and 
other regional and city characteristics. The dummies are equal to one when a firm is located within a 
government office region and a major Great Britain city (defined by NUTS3 code)29. Our expectation 
is that firms located in regions and cities where it is costly to build a greenfield plant or acquire and 
existing one i.e., firms located in south east region such as London, are less likely to use external 
forms of adjustment. Recent work in economic geography have highlighted the importance of 
regional industrial structure in explaining plant closure and survival (e.g., Duranton and Puga, 2000).  
In order to account for the industrial effect discussed in chapter 2.3.1.4, equation (4.1) is estimated 
separately for 8 industrial sectors (defined in Table 4.2 by the sophistication of technology used; 
following Harris and Moffat, 2011, 2016a, 2016b)30. We also include a full set of 2-digit (SIC92) 
Industrial dummies in all our specifications. These dummies are included to capture cost differences 
even within well-defined industry sub-groups. For instance, the cost of greenfield investment for a 
pharmaceutical firm and an aircraft and spacecraft manufacturing firm would likely differ even 
though they both operate in the high-tech manufacturing sector. 
 
 
 
 
29 For firms operating plants at different cities/region, we select the region/city with the highest level of 
employment i.e., the dominant region/city. 
30 The results for all 8 industrial sectors for expansion and contraction are separately presented in Appendices 
4.7.1 and 4.7.2 with analysis restricted to continuing firms.  
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Table 4-2: Definitions of industrial sub-sectors (1992 standard industrial classification) 
High-tech manufacturing Pharmaceuticals (SIC244); Office machinery and computers (SIC30); Radio, TV 
and communications equipment (SIC32); Medical and precision instruments 
(SIC33); Aircraft and spacecraft (SIC353) 
Medium high-tech 
manufacturing 
Chemical (SIC24 exc. Pharmaceuticals SIC244); Machinery and equipment 
(SIC29); Electrical machinery (SIC31); Motor Vehicles (SIC34); Other transport 
equipment (SIC35 exc. Ships and boats, SIC351, and Aircraft and spacecraft, 
SIC353) 
Medium low-tech 
manufacturing 
Coke and petroleum (SIC23); Rubber and plastics (SIC25); Other non-metalic 
(SIC26); Basic metals (SIC27); Fabricated metals (SIC28); Ships and boats (SIC351) 
Low-tech manufacturing Food and beverages (SIC15); Tobacco (SIC16); Textiles (SIC17); Clothing (SIC18); 
Leather goods (SIC19); Wood products (SIC20); Paper products (SIC21); 
Publishing, printing (SIC22); Furniture and other manufacturing (SIC36); 
Recycling (SIC37) 
High-tech knowledge-intensive 
(KI) services 
Telecoms (SIC642); Computer and related (SIC72 exc. Maintenance and repair, 
SIC725); R&D (SIC73); Photographic activities (SIC7481); Motion pictures 
(SIC921); Radio and TV activities (SIC922); Artistic and literary creation (SIC9231 
KI services Water transports (SIC61); Air transport (SICSIC62); Legal, accountancy and 
consultancy (SIC741 exc. Management activities of holding companies, SIC7415); 
Architecture and engineering (SIC742); Technical testing (SIC743); Advertising 
(SIC744) 
Low KI services Hotels and restaurants (SIC55); Land transport (SIC60); Support for transport 
(SIC63); Real estate (SIC70); Renting machinery (SIC71); Maintenance and repair 
of office machines (SICSIC725); Management activities of holding companies 
(SIC7415); Labour recruitment (SIC745); Investigation services (SIC746); 
Industrial cleaning (SIC747); Packaging (SIC7482); Secretarial services (SIC7483); 
Other business services (SIC7484); Sewage and refuse (SIC90); Sales and repairs 
of motor vehicles (SIC50); Wholesale (SIC51); Retail (SIC52) 
Other low KI services Postal services (SIC641); Membership organization (SIC91); Other entertainment 
services (SIC923 exc. Artistic and literary creation, SIC9231); News agencies 
(SIC924); Sporting activities (SIC926); Other recreational activities (SIC927); 
Other services (SIC92) 
Note: Equation 4.1 was estimated separately for each of these sub-groups. The groups chosen are based on common levels 
of technology being used. 
Source: Harris and Moffat (2013a) 
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Table 4-3: Mean and standard deviation of variables by sector, 1997-2012 
Variables All firms Manufacturing firms Non-manufacturing firms 
 
N 
(Thousands) Mean SD 
N 
(millions) Mean SD 
N 
(millions) Mean SD 
Internal expansiont-1 3,389 0.209 0.407 0.395 0.224 0.417 2.994 0.208 0.406 
Greenfield investmentt-1 3,389 0.135 0.342 0.395 0.102 0.302 2.994 0.137 0.344 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 3,389 0.002 0.041 0.395 0.004 0.060 2.994 0.001 0.039 
Internal contrationt-1 2,824 0.132 0.339 0.346 0.161 0.367 2.478 0.129 0.335 
Plant closuret-1 2,824 0.005 0.070 0.346 0.010 0.097 2.478 0.004 0.066 
Plant salet-1 2,824 0.000 0.018 0.346 0.001 0.030 2.478 0.000 0.015 
0 -9 employees 20,180 0.807 0.394 2.164 0.663 0.473 18.016 0.820 0.384 
10 -19 employees 20,180 0.074 0.261 2.164 0.117 0.321 18.016 0.070 0.255 
20 - 49 employees 20,180 0.035 0.185 2.164 0.081 0.273 18.016 0.030 0.172 
50 - 99 employees 20,180 0.011 0.103 2.164 0.030 0.171 18.016 0.009 0.092 
100 - 249 employees 20,180 0.006 0.079 2.164 0.020 0.139 18.016 0.005 0.068 
250+ employees 20,180 0.067 0.249 2.164 0.089 0.284 18.016 0.067 0.250 
Adjustment size 19,835 1.758 86.22 2.138 2.995 73.45 17.697 1.609 87.64 
Age 20,172 6.086 4.818 2.156 7.176 6.592 18.016 5.955 4.543 
R&D band 1 20,161 0.991 0.094 2.161 0.964 0.187 18.000 0.994 0.075 
R&D band 2 20,161 0.002 0.046 2.161 0.005 0.074 18.000 0.002 0.041 
R&D band 3 20,161 0.002 0.047 2.161 0.007 0.082 18.000 0.002 0.041 
R&D band 4 20,161 0.002 0.048 2.161 0.011 0.102 18.000 0.001 0.036 
R&D band 5 20,161 0.002 0.049 2.161 0.013 0.115 18.000 0.001 0.033 
Single-plant firm 18,918 0.966 0.182 2.000 0.946 0.227 16.918 0.967 0.179 
UK-owned firm (Without FDI) 20,181 0.919 0.272 2.164 0.892 0.310 18.016 0.920 0.272 
UK-owned firm (With FDI) 20,181 0.010 0.100 2.164 0.013 0.112 18.016 0.010 0.099 
SE Asia-owned firms 20,181 0.001 0.026 2.164 0.001 0.038 18.016 0.001 0.024 
EU-owned firms 20,181 0.004 0.063 2.164 0.009 0.096 18.016 0.003 0.058 
USA-owned firms 20,181 0.002 0.048 2.164 0.006 0.080 18.016 0.002 0.043 
AUS/CAN/SA-owned firms 20,181 0.000 0.020 2.164 0.001 0.027 18.016 0.000 0.019 
Other Foreign-owned firms 20,181 0.001 0.025 2.164 0.001 0.029 18.016 0.001 0.024 
2008 Onwards 20,181 0.323 0.468 2.164 0.278 0.448 18.016 0.318 0.466 
 
Table 4.3 presents some basic descriptive statistics for the variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 I, broken down into 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector (excluding agricultural sector). It is clear from Table 
4.3 that mergers and acquisition (plant sale) are rare events; used, on average, in only about 0.2% 
(0.1%) by previous adjusters. Internal adjustment, on the other hand, is prevalent among previous 
adjusters. With regard to firm size, Table 4.3 shows that almost 81% of the firms in our sample are 
small firms (firms with 0-9 employees) with these firms representing 66% of the firms in the 
manufacturing sector and 82% in the non-manufacturing sector.  In general manufacturing firms 
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were carrying out larger (relative) adjustments and were often older than non-manufacturing firms. 
No R&D was undertaken in about 99% of the firms in our sample, making R&D an uncommon event. 
Around 97% of the firms in our sample own only one plant with little variation between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Around 92% (89% for manufacturing and 92% for non-
manufacturing) of firms in our sample were UK owned and were not engaged in outward FDI. Lastly, 
32% of firms in our sample existed sometime after 2007 
4.3 Estimation Strategy 
This section is divided into 2 parts. The first briefly describes how multinomial logit model of the 
form of equation 4.1 can be estimated using maximum likelihood. It will then discuss the issues that 
complicate the interpretation of the coefficients in a multinomial logit model. To overcome those 
issues, marginal effect is explained in the second part. 
4.3.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Estimation of unknown parameters in the multinomial logit model is done using the method of 
maximum likelihood. Since, statistical programs such as STATA used in this study provide ‘point and 
click’ routines to estimate multinomial logit model, we do not dwell on the details of the numerical 
methods used to obtain maximum likelihood estimates (see Greene, 2002 for extensive discussion). 
However, in this section, we provide a brief explanation as to how the method of maximum 
likelihood is used to estimate the unknown parameters in the multinomial logit model. First, one 
must determine the form of the likelihood function of the model. Once determined, the estimates 
are then derived by maximizing the likelihood function. This involves setting the first derivatives of 
the natural logarithm of the model’s likelihood function to zero and solving for the coefficients. To 
illustrate, let dij = 1 if alternative j (j = 0, 1, 2) is chosen by firm i, and zero if not. Then for each firm i, 
one and only one of the dij’s is 1. The log-likelihood function takes the form31 
ln 𝐿 = ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=0
𝑛
𝑖=1
ln Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗)                                                                                                                      (4.4) 
The first order conditions for maximization require 
 
31 For binary models, each observation is assumed to be an independent Bernoulli trial with success probability  
Pr (y = 1 | x) = F (x’β) and the failure probability Pr (y = 0 | x) = [1 −  F (x’β)]. For a sample  of n observations, 
the likelihood function takes the form:  
𝐿 = ∏[𝐹 (𝑋′𝛽)]𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 [1 −  𝐹 (𝑋′𝛽)]1−𝑦𝑖 
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𝜕 ln 𝐿
𝜕𝛽𝑗
=  ∑[𝑑𝑖𝑗 − 𝑃𝐼𝐽]
𝑖
𝑋𝑖 = 0        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, . . . . , 𝐽.                                                                              (4.5) 
In general, the first derivative equations are non-linear, so an exact analytical solution for the 
coefficients cannot be obtained. As a result, the beta coefficients that maximize the natural 
logarithm of the model’s likelihood function are obtained using an iterative numerical method (c.f. 
Greene, 2002). 
4.3.2 Multinomial Logit Model Coefficients and Interpretations 
2 main issues complicate the interpretation of multinomial logit model coefficients. First, the 
direction (sign) of an estimated coefficient cannot be used to ascertain the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the probability of choosing a particular path of adjustment. Instead, the 
sign on a single coefficient only tells us about the contrast among the categories, making it difficult 
to see the implication for each category from the estimated coefficient. For instance, a negative sign 
on a coefficient in a multinomial logit model does not necessarily mean that an increase in the 
independent variable corresponds to a decrease in the probability of choosing a particular path of 
adjustment. Second, the relationship between the independent variables and the probability of 
choosing a particular path of adjustment is non-linear; β therefore, cannot be interpreted as the 
coefficient of marginal effect. Consequently, this thesis uses another means of interpretation 
namely; marginal effects which indicates the effect of each explanatory variable on the probability of 
belonging to a particular path of adjustment. The marginal effect estimation is described below. 
4.3.3 Marginal Effects Estimation 
One way of interpreting the relationship between an explanatory variable and the dependent 
variable in a multinomial logit model is by computing the marginal effects. Marginal effects indicates 
the effect of a change in variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡  on the probability that alternative j is chosen. For a continuous 
variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡  the marginal effects are:  
𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 =  
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑘
=  
𝜕 Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑘
=  𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝛽𝑘𝑗 −  ?̅?𝑖)                                                                                   (4.6) 
Where ?̅?𝑖 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑚Pr (
2
𝑚=1 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚|𝑥𝑖) is a probability weighted average of the coefficients for 
different choices. As can be seen in equation 4.6, marginal effects are non-linear and would vary 
across values of all the explanatory variables in the model. Further, the sign of the marginal effect 
may change across the range of each predictors i.e., it may be positive (𝛽𝑘𝑗 >  ?̅?𝑖) for some values 
of 𝑋𝑖𝑘  and negative (𝛽𝑘𝑗 <  ?̅?𝑖) for others. 
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There are 2 main ways in which equation 4.6 can be calculated. The first is to set the values of all 
predictors to their sample mean resulting to “marginal effects at the mean”. However, the major 
downside to this method is that it is unlikely that there is any firm in the sample that has the average 
of all model variables. As a result, this thesis presents averaged marginal effects (AME) which relies 
on actual values of the predictors. AME involves estimating the marginal effect for all firm-year 
observations and then taking the average as shown below. 
𝐴𝑀𝐸 =  
1
𝑛
 ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
−  ?̅?𝑖)                                                                                                                           (4.7) 
4.4 Firm-level Results for Net Expanding Firms 
As stated in the introduction, the focus of this chapter is to examine the crucial factors that are likely 
to determine firms’ choice of expansion and contraction in the UK. We carry out separate analysis 
for expanding and contracting firms (discussed in the subsequent section of this chapter). To avoid 
imposing common coefficients across industries operating with potentially distinct cost structure 
and technologies, estimation is performed separately for 8 industrial sectors (defined in Table 4.2 by 
the sophistication of technology used; following Harris and Moffat, 2011, 2016a, 2016b)32. The 
coefficients obtained at the 8 industrial sectors level33 are then aggregated into one table by taking 
the weighted average (based on number of observation) to provide a broad overview of results. 
Table 4.4 shows the aggregated result for expanding firms, as well as separately for the 8 industrial 
sectors in Appendix 4.7.1. In this section, we discuss our results by grouping variables into those that 
are related to firm size, adjustment size, firm-level variables (R&D, age, multi-plant and foreign 
ownership) and other factors (industry and geography and, persistence and crisis). 
In order to probe the robustness of the results in table 4.4 and that results are not sensitive to 
measurement issues; we recode each expansion category and repeat the exercise in the preceding 
paragraph. Internal expansion was recoded from internal expansion ‘only’ + internal expansion 
‘dominant’ to internal expansion ‘only’. Greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition were 
recoded to a similar ‘only’ path. This led to a fourth category of firms that used a combination of 
various adjustment methods to achieve a net expansion – referred to as expansion dominant - 
internal expansion ‘dominant’ + greenfield investment ‘dominant’ + mergers and acquisition 
‘dominant’. The results (presented in table 4.22 in appendix 4.7.3) are qualitatively similar to those 
presented in table 4.4.  
 
32 The results for all 8 industrial sectors for expansion and contraction are separately presented in Appendices 
4.7.1 and 4.7.2 with analysis restricted to continuing firms.  
33 This also allows brevity of results presented.  
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Table 4-4: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in UKa 
 
Internal 
expansion 
Greenfield 
investment 
Mergers and 
Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
Firm size    
10 -19 employees -0.055 0.048 0.006 
20 - 49 employees -0.090 0.081 0.009 
50 - 99 employees -0.104 0.093 0.011 
100 - 249 employees -0.123 0.111 0.013 
250+ employees -0.240 0.224 0.016 
Adjustment size    
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.032 0.028 0.004 
Firm-level variables    
R&D band 2 0.013 -0.013 0.000 
R&D band 3 0.017 -0.017 0.000 
R&D band 4 0.027 -0.028 0.001 
R&D band 5 0.038 -0.039 0.001 
ln Age 0.003 -0.003 0.000 
Single-plant firm -0.004 0.007 -0.003 
UK-owned firm (With FDI) 0.025 -0.027 0.002 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.021 -0.023 0.002 
EU-owned firms 0.022 -0.024 0.002 
USA-owned firms 0.023 -0.025 0.002 
AUSCANSA-owned firms 0.021 -0.024 0.003 
Other Foreign-owned firms 0.019 -0.022 0.003 
Region    
North-East -0.003 0.003 0.000 
Yorkshire-Humberside -0.001 0.001 0.000 
North-West -0.001 0.001 0.000 
West Midlands -0.001 0.001 0.000 
East Midlands 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
South-West 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Eastern  0.000 0.000 0.000 
London 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
Scotland -0.023 0.022 0.000 
Wales -0.017 0.017 -0.001 
Tyneside 0.007 -0.008 0.000 
Northern Ireland -0.022 0.029 -0.007 
Major UK Cities    
Manchester 0.005 -0.005 0.001 
Liverpool 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Birmingham 0.003 -0.003 0.000 
Coventry 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
Leicester 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
Nottingham 0.008 -0.007 -0.001 
Bristol 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
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Internal 
expansion 
Greenfield 
investment 
Mergers and 
Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
Glasgow  0.009 -0.008 -0.001 
Edinburgh 0.003 -0.004 0.001 
Cardiff 0.006 -0.006 0.000 
Persistence and crisis    
Internal expansiont-1 -0.006 0.007 -0.001 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.065 0.069 -0.004 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.010 -0.034 0.043 
2008 Onwards 0.037 -0.033 -0.003 
a 
Weighted coefficients from tables 4.6 to 4.13.  
4.4.1 Firm Size 
The results in table 4.4 shows that firm’s size affects internal expansion in 2 ways. First, larger firms 
are less likely to use internal expansion, vis-à-vis the baseline group (i.e., firms that employ less than 
10 people), as shown by the negative coefficients on the size dummies. Second, the probability of 
using internal expansion declines with firm size. This implies that large firms are not only less likely 
to use internal expansion, the probability of using this form of expansion grows increasingly negative 
with firm size. Indeed, table 4.4 shows that moving from the smallest firms (i.e., firms that have less 
10 employees) to firms with 10-19 employees reduces the probability of using internal expansion by 
5.5%; a reduction in the probability by 10.4% in the 50-99 employees group and up to a reduction of 
about 24% for firms with 250 employees or more. The underlying coefficients associated with table 
4.4 are negative and economically significant across all 8 industrial sectors, as shown in tables 4.6 - 
4.13 (in Appendix 4.7.1).  However, the size of the coefficients varies substantially across sectors. For 
instance, the impact of size on internal expansion is highest in the low-tech KI service sector where 
the largest firms are 31% less likely to use internal expansion, and lowest in the KI-service sector 
where the same firms are 11% less likely to use internal expansion than the smallest firms.  
Conversely, table 4.4 shows that firm size has a positive impact on the 2 forms of external expansion 
- greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition. Our result indicates that the probability of 
choosing external forms of expansion increase with firm’s size, with the largest firms being the most 
likely to use these forms of expansion. All estimates associated with table 4.4 are statistically 
significant at the 1% level (i.e., all the coefficients on firm size in 4.6 - 4.13 of Appendix 4.7.1). When 
comparing magnitudes, table 4.4 also shows that firms within the same size category have higher 
probability of choosing greenfield investment over mergers and acquisition. For instance, the largest 
firms (i.e., 250 employees or more) are 22.4% more likely to use greenfield investment, whereas the 
same firms are only 1.6% more likely to use mergers and acquisition, when compared to the smallest 
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firms. This implies that that although, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition increase in 
importance with firm size, large firms tend to rely more on greenfield investment than on mergers 
and acquisition. The gap in the probabilities is particularly large in the low-tech KI service sector 
(where the largest firms are 28.4% more likely to use greenfield investment compared to 1.2% for 
mergers and acquisition), but quite small in the medium high-tech manufacturing sector (where the 
largest firms are 8.7% more likely to use greenfield investment compared to 5.7% for mergers and 
acquisition), as shown in tables 4.6 - 4.13. Nonetheless, it remains evidently clear that large firms 
rely more on greenfield investment than mergers and acquisition across all sectors 
In sum, our result shows that the probability of using internal (external) form of expansion declines 
(increases) with firm’s size. However, large firms are more likely to rely on greenfield investment 
than on mergers and acquisition, when choosing between the 2 forms of external expansion. This is 
in line with Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) model, which predicts that high-productivity (large) firms 
are more likely to expand externally, and they do so by relying more on greenfield investment than 
on mergers and acquisition. The authors also found empirical evidence in support of their theoretical 
prediction. Our result also shows that the gap between greenfield investment and mergers and 
acquisition varies substantially across sectors, ranging from 3% (8.7% - 5.7%) in the medium high-
tech manufacturing sector to 27.2% (28.4% - 1.2%) in the low-tech KI service sector. In general, 
manufacturing sectors with higher percentage of large firms (as shown in table 4.3) tend to rely 
closely on the 2 forms of external expansion. This suggest that there might be lower cost of capital 
conversion associated with using mergers and acquisition in industries with large firms such that 
there is little difference in the economies of scale benefits from using the 2 forms of external 
expansion.  
4.4.2 Adjustment Size 
The result obtained for adjustment size in table 4.4 shows that firms are less likely to rely on internal 
expansion when the desired size of expansion is large. Specifically, it shows that a one standard 
deviation increase in desired expansion reduces the likelihood of choosing internal expansion by 
3.2%. This variable is statistically significant (at the 1% level) in every sector, however there is 
substantial sectorial variation, as shown in tables 4.6 - 4.13. The tables show that the impact of 
adjustment size on internal expansion is highest in medium high-tech manufacturing sector (5.5%), 
followed by high-tech manufacturing (5%), low-tech manufacturing (4.3%) and medium low-tech 
manufacturing (4.2%), and generally lower in the service sectors (ranging from 2.5% to 3.2%). This 
suggests that firms in the manufacturing sectors tend to rely less on internal expansion (relatively to 
firms in the service sectors) when the desired size of expansion is large.  
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As to the impact of adjustment size on external forms of expansion, table 4.4 shows that the former 
has a positive impact on greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition. However, the impact of 
expansion size on external expansion is largest for greenfield investment. Indeed, table 4.4 shows 
that a one standard deviation increase in desired expansion increases the probability of using 
greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition by 2.8% and 0.4% respectively. The primary 
coefficients associated with table 4.4 are statistically significant across all 8 industrial sectors, with 
little sectorial variation. When the desired size of expansion is large, firms in the manufacturing 
sectors tend to rely more on the 2 forms of external expansion (3.2%-3.7% for greenfield 
investment, and 0.9%-1.6% for mergers and acquisition) than firms in the service sectors (2.2%-2.9% 
for greenfield investment, and 0.3%-0.4% for mergers and acquisition).  
Overall, table 4.4 shows that firms are more (less) likely to rely on external (internal) expansion, 
particularly, greenfield investment when the desired size of expansion is large. This is partly, 
consistent with the empirical finding of Breinlich and Niemann (2011a), that firms are more likely to 
rely on external forms of expansion for large expansion. However, our finding that firms rely more 
on greenfield investment than on mergers and acquisition, is in contrast with the results in Breinlich 
and Niemann (2011a) and Warusawitharana (2008). One important reason for our contrasting result 
may be the way in which expansion size is measured in this paper, which is different from measure 
used in Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) and Warusawitharana (2008). The size of an expansion is 
empirically not observable. In fact, there is no item on the financial data that tells us if, and the 
extent to which, a firm is carrying out a large expansion. However, there is a specificity associated 
with expansion size that one should expect to be reflected in a good measure i.e., it should be firm 
specific. For instance, adding an addition worker to a firm with one employee is very different from 
doing the same to a firm with 1,000 employees. Such expansion could be considered as a large 
expansion for the former as it is doubling its workforce whereas; the same action represents only a 
0.1% increase in the workforce of the latter firm.  
Therefore, a large expansion in one firm might represent a small expansion in another and; using 
different thresholds to arbitrarily define adjustment size as done in Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) 
and Warusawitharana (2008) may be flawed. To capture what we believe to be firm-specific 
adjustment size, we use relative employment ratio at the firm-level between 2 consecutive years. 
This represents an attempt to capture future profits as firms will generally increase their workforce 
as perception of future profit improves. Finally, our appendix result indicates that firms operating in 
high fixed cost industries (i.e., manufacturing sectors) are more likely to rely on the 2 forms of 
external expansion, when the desired size of expansion is large. This is consistent with our argument 
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(in section 2.3.1.4) that the issue of adjustment size should be more prevalent in industries with high 
fixed cost as expected benefits (i.e., from economies of scale) from using external expansion are 
more likely to fall below their fixed cost in these industries. Breinlich and Niemann (2010) found a 
similar result that external expansion accounts for over 25% of aggregate turnover expansion in 
manufacturing, utilities and mining sector, but they account for around 3% in the agricultural sector. 
4.4.3 Firm-level Variables 
As reviewed in chapter 2.3.1.3, the key firm-level variables that are frequently documented to 
determine firms’ expansion behaviour include R&D, age, multi-plant and foreign ownership. This 
section discusses the relationship between these firm-level variables and firms’ choice of expansion. 
The result obtained for the first of our firm-level variables shows that all the firms with positive R&D 
spending are more likely to expand internally, vis-à-vis the baseline group (i.e., firms with no R&D 
expenditure). Further, the probability of using internal expansion is increasing in firm’s R&D 
expenditure. Thus, internal expansion is not only positively related with R&D activity, it is also 
increasing in such activity – firms with high-R&D expenditure have a relatively higher probability of 
using internal expansion. In terms of sectorial result in the appendix, the coefficients on the R&D 
dummies are generally positive and economically significant except for other low-tech Ki service 
sector where there is no statistically significant relationship between any of the R&D dummies and 
the probability of using internal expansion. The effect of R&D on internal expansion is particularly 
strong in the low-tech KI service sector where all the coefficients on the R&D dummies are 
economically significant and positive.  
With regards to the effect of firm’s R&D on the probability of choosing external forms of expansion, 
table 4.4 shows that greenfield investment is negatively related to firm’s R&D expenditure and it is 
increasing in such expenditure. Indeed, table 4.4 shows that firms with the largest R&D expenditure 
(i.e., R&D band 5) are 4% less likely to use greenfield investment, when compared to firms with zero 
R&D stock. The disaggregated coefficients are generally negative and significant across industrial 
sectors except for other low-tech KI service sector where there is no statistically significant 
relationship between any of the R&D dummies and the probability of using greenfield investment. 
This result suggests that firms that engage less in innovative activities such R&D are more likely to 
use greenfield investment to gain access to new technology, which is unsurprising given the nature 
of vintage technology that is often embodied in greenfield plants.  
By contrast, table 4.4 shows that the firms that engage in R&D activity are somewhat more likely to 
use mergers and acquisition – i.e., firms with the largest R&D expenditure are 0.1% more likely to 
use mergers and acquisition, vis-à-vis firms with no R&D expenditure. This contrasts with the 
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theoretical prediction and empirical findings of Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) that large firms spend 
less on R&D prior to acquiring another firm, and they later engage in acquisition activities to gain 
access to new technology. However, most of the coefficients on the R&D dummies are statistically 
insignificant at the industrial sectors. Furthermore, the signs on the R&D coefficients are mixed in 
sectors where there is at least one statistically significant R&D coefficient (5 out of the 8 industrial 
sectors). Indeed, the tables in the appendix show that the impact of R&D expenditure on the 
probability of using mergers and acquisition is negative in medium high-tech manufacturing sector, 
low-tech manufacturing sector and other low-tech KI service sector; and it is positive in high-tech KI 
service sector and KI service sector.  
Turning to our second firm-level variable - firm’s age - table 4.4 shows that firms are more likely to 
rely on internal expansion as they grow older. Precisely, table 4.4 shows that a one standard 
deviation increase in firm’s age increases the probability of using internal expansion by 0.3%. The 
underlying coefficients associated with this variable are positive and economically significant (at the 
1% level) in all industrial sectors except for the low-tech Ki service sector where there is a negative 
relationship between firm’s age and the likelihood of using internal expansion (shown in tables 4.6 - 
4.13). In terms of sectorial variation, tables 4.6 - 4.13 show that there is little variation across 
industrial sectorial. The impact of age on the probability of using internal expansion ranges from 
0.6% in the low-tech manufacturing and high-tech KI service sectors to 1.7% in the other low-tech KI 
service sector. In sum, our result suggests that old firms tend to rely more on internal expansion 
than young firms, and this is consistent across 7 (out of 8) industrial sectors.  
In contrast, table 4.4 shows that old firms are less likely to rely on greenfield investment than young 
firms. A one standard deviation increase in age reduces the likelihood that a firm uses greenfield 
investment by 0.3%. The coefficients on age are also statistically significant and negative in all 
sectors except for low-tech KI service sector where there is a positive relationship between firm’s 
age and the probability of using greenfield investment. When comparing sectorial coefficients, tables 
4.6 - 4.13 show little variation across sectors – ranging from 0.5% in the low-tech manufacturing and 
high-tech KI service sectors to 1.6% in the other low-tech KI service sector. Lastly, we find that firm’s 
age is significantly related to the probability of using mergers and acquisition in all sectors, but these 
coefficients are negligible (i.e., they are close to zero). Our result is somewhat like that of Arikan and 
Stulz (2016) who found that older firms use mergers and acquisition at the same rate as young firms, 
and that the acquisition rate of firms is a U-shaped function of their age. 
As to the third firm-level variable, our result shows that single-plant enterprises are less likely to 
expand via internal expansion. Indeed, table 4.4 shows that single-plant enterprises are some 0.3% 
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less likely to use internal expansion, when compared to multi-unit firms. However, the tables in the 
appendix (i.e., tables 4.6 - 4.13) shows that we obtain a largely positive and statistically significant 
coefficient across the industrial sectors except for low-tech KI service sector where the sign of the 
coefficient is negative. Table 4.4 shows a negative relationship between single-plant enterprises and 
the probability of using internal expansion because it represents aggregated result based on the 
number of observations in tables 4.6 - 4.13, and around 63% of our total number of observations are 
in the low-tech KI service sector – the only sector with a negative coefficient. In general, tables 4.6 - 
4.13, show that single-plant enterprises in the manufacturing sector are the most likely to use 
internal expansion (from 4.9% in the low-tech manufacturing sector to 6.8% in the medium high-
tech manufacturing sector), compared to the same enterprises in the service sector (from 1.1% in 
the KI service sector to 4.5% in the other low-tech KI service sector). This suggests that, in response 
to a positive demand and/or supply shock, single-plant enterprises are more likely to explore the 
internal expansion option ahead of multi-unit firms, which is unsurprising given that external forms 
of expansion are often associated with large sunk costs and managerial commitment. 
Table 4.4 also shows that, in contrast to the general result in our appendix (all statistically different 
from zero), there is a positive relationship between single-plant enterprises and the probability of 
using greenfield investment. This is again, due to the positive coefficient associated with single-plant 
enterprises in the low-tech Ki service sector - the only sector (out of the 8 sectors) that has a positive 
coefficient and represents 63% of our total number of observations. As for the other industrial 
sectors, our results in tables 4.6 - 4.13 show that single-plant enterprises in the manufacturing sector 
are the least likely to use greenfield investment (from 4.5% in the low-tech manufacturing sector to 
6.3% in the medium high-tech manufacturing sector), compared to the same enterprises in the 
service sector (from 0.8% in the KI service sector to 4.2% in the other low-tech KI service sector). 
Tables 4.6 - 4.13 also show that, compared to multi-unit firms, single-plant enterprises are less likely 
to acquire existing plants (ranging from 0.3% in KI service, low-tech KI service and other low-tech KI 
service sector to 0.7% in high-tech manufacturing sector). Thus, our result shows that single-plant 
enterprises tend to rely less on external forms of expansion, particularly on, greenfield investment. 
This suggests that there may be economies of scale benefit associated with owning more than one 
plant that makes multi-unit firms more productive than single-plant enterprises, and in turn, more 
likely to use external forms of expansion (e.g., Breinlich and Neimann, 2011a). 
With regards to the fourth firm-level variable - foreign ownership – our result in table 4.4 shows that 
all foreign-owned firms (including UK multinational firms) are more likely to expand internally, vis-à-
vis the baseline group (i.e., UK firms without foreign investment). However, this result is driven 
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mainly by the positive and economically significant coefficients in low-tech KI service sector. In this 
sector, all foreign-owned enterprises (including UK multinationals) are between 3.3% and 3.8% more 
likely to use internal expansion, when compared to UK firms. As for the other industrial sectors, our 
results in tables 4.6 - 4.13 are mixed. Firstly, we find that UK multinationals are less likely to use 
internal expansion in most sectors except for high-tech and other low-tech KI service sectors (all the 
coefficients on this variable are statistically significant at the 1% level). For other economically 
significant coefficients, firms owned by SE-Asia are 3.2 and 1.8% more likely to use internal 
expansion in the high-tech and low-tech manufacturing sectors respectively; while EU-owned firms 
are 1.9 % and 1.0% less likely to use the same form of expansion in the medium high-tech and low-
tech manufacturing sectors respectively. US-owned firms are 2.2%, 1.4% and 0.8% less likely to 
expand internally in the high-tech manufacturing, medium high-tech manufacturing and KI service 
sectors respectively. Lastly, the probability of using internal expansion is 6.2% lower for the other 
foreign-owned firms in the medium high-tech manufacturing sector.  
In a similar vein, the negative relationship between foreign ownership and the probability of using 
greenfield investment, shown in table 4.4 is driven mainly by the results in the low-tech KI service 
sector. Foreign-owned firms in this sector are between 3.5% and 4.1% less likely to build new plants, 
when compared to UK firms (all the coefficients on this variable are statistically significant at the 1% 
level). For economically significant coefficients in other sectors, tables 4.6 - 4.13 show that UK 
multinationals are more likely to use greenfield investment in 4 sectors (medium high-tech 
manufacturing, medium low-tech manufacturing, low-tech manufacturing and KI service sectors) 
while the same firms are less likely to use greenfield investment in 2 sectors (high-tech KI service 
sector and other low-tech KI service sector). In the high-tech manufacturing industry, firms owned 
by SE Asia countries are 2.2% less likely to expand via greenfield investment. Finally, EU-, US- and 
other foreign-owned companies are more likely to build new plants in the medium high-tech 
industry. Perhaps more interestingly, tables 4.6 - 4.13 show that foreign-owned firms are generally 
more likely to acquire an existing domestic plant than UK firms. Although generally lower in 
magnitude than greenfield investment, these coefficients are broadly statistically significant in most 
sectors. This result is in line with our argument (in section 2.3.1.3) that foreign-owned firms are 
more likely to acquire a domestic plant if they lack experience in their host market; have a cost 
advantage associated with adapting local plants or if local plants have greater value when combined 
with foreign assets than they do in the hands of local rivals. 
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4.4.4 Other Factors 
Further to the well-documented variables discussed in previous sections, we also examine the links 
between the decision to expand in t-1 and the decision to expand in t. These lagged values of 
expansion are included in equation (4.1) to test for entry sunk costs of expansion discussed in 
section 4.2. The result in table 4.4 shows that previous internal expanders are less likely to use the 
same form of expansion in the next period - firms that used internal expansion in period, t-1, are 
0.6% less likely to use the same form of expansion in period t. These coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant across all sectors (as shown in tables 4.6 - 4.13). Tables 4.6 - 4.13 also show 
that previous internal expanders in the manufacturing sector are the least likely to use internal 
expansion in the next period (from -2.1% in the medium high-tech manufacturing sector to -2.5% in 
the high-tech and medium low-tech manufacturing sector), compared to the same enterprises in the 
service sector (from -0.2% in the low-tech KI service sector to -1.0% in the KI service and other low-
tech KI service sector). This suggests that, the sunk cost from using internal expansion is very low 
such that there is no learning cost that allows for continuing internal expanders to have a lower 
adjustment cost than first time internal expanders. This result is also unsurprising given that internal 
expansion can lead to diminishing returns from the continuous increase in workforce without a 
corresponding increase in capital. 
On the other hand, table 4.4 shows that past participation in greenfield investment increases the 
probability that a firm will continue to use the same form of expansion by 6.9%. The underlying 
coefficients associated with this variable are positive and economically significant (at the 1% level) in 
all industrial sectors except for 2 service sectors (Ki service is statistically insignificant and; other low-
tech sector is statistically significant) where there is a negative relationship between greenfield 
investment in period t-1 and greenfield investment in period t. Table 4.4 also shows a positive 
relationship between mergers and acquisition in period t-1 and mergers and acquisition in period t – 
past participation in mergers and acquisition increase the likelihood that a firm will continue to 
acquire another firm/plants by 4.3%. These coefficients are positive and economically significant in 
all sectors with large variation across sectors – from 0.2% in the KI service sector to 6.5% in the low-
tech KI service sector. As these variables are in the model to proxy for sunk cost that allows for 
continuing external expanders to have a lower expansion cost than first time external expanders, it 
is not surprising that we find that previous users of external forms of expansion are more likely to 
rely on similar paths of expansion. 
A time dummy that takes the value of one if the year is 2008 onwards, and zero otherwise, was also 
included in equation (4.1) to test for the uncertainty that was created by the 2008 economy-wide 
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shock. The result obtained for this variable in table 4.4 shows that firms are more likely to expand 
internally post-2007. Indeed, firms in the UK are some 3.7% more likely to use internal expansion 
between the period 2008 and 2012. The underlying coefficients associated with this variable are 
positive and economically significant (at the 1% level) in all industrial sectors, as shown in tables 4.6 - 
4.13. This implies that, between the period 2008 and 2012, firms were more likely to use internal 
expansion in every industrial sector. Tables 4.6 - 4.13also show that there is little industrial variation 
– the higher probability of using internal expansion ranges from 2.8% in the KI service sector to 4.0% 
in the low-tech KI service sector. In sum, our result suggests that expanding firms tend to rely more 
on internal expansion post-2007 and this is consistent across all the 8 industrial sectors. 
In contrast, table 4.4 shows that expanding firms are less likely to rely on the 2 forms of external 
expansion – greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition. Specifically, table 4.4 shows that, 
post-2007, firms in the UK are some 3.3% and 0.3% less likely to build a new plant and acquire an 
existing one respectively. The coefficients obtained for this dummy variable are negative and 
economically significant in every industrial sector shown in tables 4.6 - 4.13 – implying that, since the 
2008 recession, expanding firms are less likely to rely on external forms of expansion in all sectors. 
There is also little industrial variation shown in tables 4.6 - 4.13. The lower probability of using 
greenfield investment ranges from -2.0% in the high-tech manufacturing sector to -3.7% in the low-
tech KI service sector and; that of using mergers and acquisition ranges from -0.2% in the other low-
tech KI service sector to -0.9% in the high-tech manufacturing sector. In general, our result provides 
support for the adverse effect uncertainty caused by the 2008 financial crisis has on firm-level 
investment behaviour, particularly, firms’ external expansion decision. 
With regards to regional rankings, table 4.4 shows that firms located in most government office 
region are less likely to use internal expansion, vis-à-vis the baseline group (i.e., firms located in the 
South-Eastern region of England). The impact of being located in a particular region on the 
probability of choosing internal expansion is economically significant in at least one sector except for 
firms located in the North-Western part of England, as shown in tables 4.6 - 4.13. Overall, tables 4.6 - 
4.13 show that firms based in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are the least likely to expand 
internally (around 3.1-8.5% lower in the high-tech KI service sector and 2.5-7.3% in the other low-
tech KI service sector). The coefficients associated with these regions are statistically significant in all 
the service sectors as well as in the low-tech manufacturing sector.  
On the other hand, table 4.4 shows that firms located in most government office region are more 
likely to build plants, vis-à-vis the baseline group (i.e., firms located in the South-Eastern region of 
England). The coefficients associated with these regional dummies are statistically significant in at 
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least one industrial sector except for firms located in the East-midlands, as shown in tables 4.6 - 
4.13. Tables 4.6 - 4.13 also show that firms located in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are the 
most likely to use greenfield investment (around 2.6-7.5% higher in the other low-tech KI service 
sector and 3.0-11.6% in the high-tech KI service sector). These coefficients are also economically 
significant across all the service sectors as well as in the low-tech manufacturing sector. In terms of 
mergers and acquisition, our result in tables 4.6 - 4.13 shows that the impact of being located in a 
particular region on mergers and acquisition is generally insignificant and numerically unimportant. 
Overall, regional impacts are partly in accord with expectations that there are high (sunk) costs 
associated with building new plants in the South-East Region, which make firms in this region less 
likely to rely on greenfield investment.   
As to differences based on cities, it is not possible to consider, say, negative coefficient in isolation 
since there is a need to consider simultaneously the impacts of the region in which the city is 
located.  Table 4.4 shows that the parameter estimates on the city dummies are positively related to 
internal expansion for all the major cities in Britain. These coefficients are particularly significant in 
the low-tech KI service sector, as shown in table 4.12. In this sector, the positive coefficient 
associated with the city dummies are matched by similar negative coefficients on their respective 
regions. This implies that positive ‘cities’ estimates are mostly offset by negative ‘region’ estimates, 
and that there is little difference in the probability of choosing internal expansion in most of the 
major cities vis-à-vis the South-East region. For greenfield investment, the negative city coefficients 
are also matched by similar positive coefficients on their respective regions. The city coefficients on 
mergers and acquisition are generally insignificant and numerical negligible, as shown in tables 4.6 - 
4.13. In effect, what is apparent from our results is that, there is little difference in the likelihood of 
choosing internal expansion or greenfield investment in most of the major cities vis-à-vis the South-
East region  
Lastly, as to industrial variation (not shown in Table 4.434 but, available in the tables 4.6 - 4.13), our 
results shows that there is sectorial variation even within well-defined industrial sectors. We find 
that firms operating in high fixed cost sectors tend to rely less (more) on greenfield investment and 
mergers and acquisition (internal expansion) relative to firms operating in low fixed cost sectors. The 
probability of choosing internal expansion is generally higher for firms operating in a higher fixed 
cost sectors when compared to the baseline group of firms operating in lower cost industries 
(Pharmaceutical for high-tech manufacturing; Chemicals for medium high-tech manufacturing; Coke 
 
34 This is because our 2-digit industrial dummies vary across the 8 technologically defined industries and since 
Table 4.4 contains weighted average coefficients obtained at the 8 industrial sectors level, we can only present 
variables that are common across sectors.  
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and petroleum for medium low-tech manufacturing; Food and beverages for low-tech 
manufacturing; Telecoms for high-tech KI service; Water transport for KI service sector; Hotels and 
restaurants for low-tech KI service; and Postal services for other low-tech KI service). On the other 
hand, firms tend to rely less on greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition when they 
operate in a high fixed cost industry, as shown in tables 4.6 - 4.13. In general, results in Tables 4.6 - 
4.13 tend to confirm that firms operating in high fixed cost sectors tend to rely less on external 
forms of adjustment as predicted by the “Q-theory of Mergers” (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). For 
instance, Table 4.6 shows that when compared to firms operating in the pharmaceutical industry, 
firms in the aircraft and spacecraft industry are 1.6% less likely to build a new plant; even though 
they both operate in the high-tech manufacturing sector. 
4.5 Firm-level Results for Net Contracting Firms 
In this section, we interpret results for contracting firms. Similar to expanding firms, estimation is 
performed separately for 8 industrial sectors (defined in table 4.2 by the sophistication of 
technology used; following Harris and Moffat, 2011, 2016a, 2016b)35 to avoid imposing common 
coefficients across industries operating with potentially distinct structure and technologies. The 
coefficients obtained at the 8 industrial sectors level36 are then aggregated into one table by taking 
the weighted average (based on number of observation). In this section, we discuss our results by 
grouping variables into those that are related to firm size, adjustment size, firm-level variables (R&D, 
age, multi-plant and foreign ownership) and other factors (industry and geography and, persistence 
and crisis). 
As a robustness, we recode each contraction category and repeat the exercise in the preceding 
paragraph. Internal contraction was recoded from internal contraction ‘only’ + internal contraction 
‘dominant’ to internal contraction ‘only’. Plant closure and plant sale were recoded to a similar ‘only’ 
path. This led to a fourth category of firms that used a combination of several adjustment paths to 
achieve a net contraction – referred to as contraction dominant - internal contraction ‘dominant’ + 
plant closure ‘dominant’ + plant sale ‘dominant’. The results (presented in table 4.23 in appendix 
4.7.3) are qualitatively similar to those presented in table 4.5.  
 
 
35 The results for all 8 industrial sectors for expansion and contraction are separately presented in Appendices 
4.7.1 and 4.7.2 with analysis restricted to continuing firms.  
36 This also allows brevity of results presented.  
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Table 4-5: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK 
 Internal contraction Plant Closure Plant Sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
Firm size    
10 -19 employees -0.045 0.044 0.001 
20 - 49 employees -0.046 0.044 0.002 
50 - 99 employees -0.040 0.038 0.002 
100 - 249 employees -0.040 0.038 0.002 
250+ employees -0.049 0.046 0.003 
Adjustment size    
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.042 -0.040 -0.002 
Firm-level variables    
R&D band 2 0.001 0.000 0.000 
R&D band 3 0.009 -0.010 0.001 
R&D band 4 -0.003 0.002 0.000 
R&D band 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ln Age 0.012 -0.012 0.000 
Single-plant firm 0.229 -0.218 -0.012 
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.003 0.002 0.001 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.003 -0.003 0.000 
EU-owned firms -0.008 0.007 0.000 
USA-owned firms -0.005 0.006 0.000 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.016 0.016 0.000 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.010 0.010 0.000 
Region    
North-East 0.009 -0.008 0.000 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.004 -0.004 0.000 
North-West 0.005 -0.005 0.000 
West Midlands 0.004 -0.004 0.000 
East Midlands 0.004 -0.004 0.000 
South-West 0.003 -0.002 0.000 
Eastern  0.002 -0.002 0.000 
London 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Scotland 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wales -0.002 0.002 0.000 
Tyneside -0.004 0.004 0.000 
Northern Ireland 0.060 0.084 -0.144 
Major UK Cities    
Manchester 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
Liverpool 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
Birmingham 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Coventry 0.006 -0.004 -0.002 
Leicester 0.008 -0.007 -0.001 
Nottingham 0.001 0.004 -0.005 
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 Internal contraction Plant Closure Plant Sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
Bristol 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
Glasgow  0.001 0.000 0.000 
Edinburgh -0.005 0.005 -0.001 
Cardiff 0.010 0.013 -0.022 
Persistence and crisis    
Internal contractiont-1 0.003 -0.004 0.000 
Plant closuret-1 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
Plant salet-1 -0.027 0.025 0.002 
2008 Onwards 0.033 -0.033 -0.001 
a 
Weighted coefficients from tables 4.14 to 4.21.   
4.5.1 Firm Size 
It is evident from table 4.5 that the large firms are less likely to use internal contraction than the 
smallest firms (i.e., firms that employ less than 10 people). However, unlike our result for expanding 
firms, the probability of using internal contraction does not decline with firm size. Indeed, table 4.5 
shows that the probability of using internal contraction initially increased with firm size (i.e.,  an 
increase from -4.6% to -4.0% when moving from 20-49 employees to 50-99 employees) and later 
reduced for higher values of firm size  (i.e.,  a reduction from -4.0% to -4.9% when moving from 100-
249 employees to 250+  employees). Note that the initial increase does not mean that the 
probability of using internal contraction is getting higher, but simply that the rate of reducing 
probability is slowing down. The primary coefficients associated with these dummies are negative 
and economically significant across 7 industrial sectors (the exception being high-tech manufacturing 
where none of the size dummies are statistically significant). The tables in appendix 4.7.2 (tables 
4.14 - 4.21) show little variation in the estimated coefficients. For instance, the largest firms are 
between 2.0% (in medium low-tech manufacturing sector) and 5.1% (in other low-tech KI service 
sector) less likely to use internal contraction, when compared to the smallest firms. Our finding that 
large firms are less likely to rely on internal contraction contrasts those of Hallock (1998) and Kang 
and Shivdasani (1997).   
Large firms, on the other hand, are more likely to rely on plant closure and plant sale – the 2 forms 
of external contraction. Table 4.5 shows that although, the probability of plant closure does not 
increase with firm size, the largest firms (i.e. those with 250 employees or more) are still the most 
likely to close plants. The same firms are also the most likely to sell plants with plant sale increasing 
in firm size. Most of the estimates associated with table 4.5 are statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) across sectors with the exception of high-tech manufacturing where none of the size dummies 
are statistically significant for plant closure and plant sale. In terms of magnitudes, table 4.5 also 
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shows that firms within the same size category are more likely to close plants than sell plants. For 
instance, the largest firms are 4.6% more likely to close plants while, the same firms are only 0.3% 
more likely to sell plants. It thus, seems that large firms are more like to rely on external forms of 
contraction, particularly, on plant closure. The gap in the probabilities is particularly large in the low-
tech KI service sector (where the largest firms are 5.3% more likely to close plants compared to 0.2% 
for plant sales), but quite small in the medium low-tech manufacturing sector (where the largest 
firms are 0.5% more likely to close plants compared to 0.4% for plant sales), as shown in tables 4.14 - 
4.21. Nevertheless, it remains evidently clear that large firms rely more on plant closure than plant 
sales across all sectors. 
In summary, our result shows that large firms are less (more) likely to rely on internal (external) 
forms of contraction. This is in line with the theoretical prediction and empirical findings of Breinlich 
and Niemann (2011a), who showed that large firms rely more on external contraction than small 
firms. Our result also indicates that large firms are more likely to close plants when choosing 
between the 2 forms of external contraction. This is at odds with the theoretical model of 
Warusawitharana (2008) which predicts that troubled large firms are more likely to sell plants. One 
explanation for such contrasting result is that additional factors may play a role in firms’ decision of 
contraction path, which is absent from Warusawitharana (2008) model. For instance, a firm may not 
be willing to sell some of its plants to actual or potential competitors but instead, choose to close 
those plants in order not to give competitive advantage to its competitors. In other words, large 
firms may only be willing to contemplate the plant sale option if there are active secondary markets 
for its plants that would have no adverse effect on future profit from selling those plants. 
4.5.2 Adjustment Size 
Regarding the adjustment size variable, table 4.5 shows that firms are more likely to rely on internal 
contraction when the desired size of contraction is large. Indeed, it shows that a one standard 
deviation increase in desired contraction increases the probability of using internal contraction by 
4.2%. The coefficients associated with this variable are positive and economically significant (at the 
1% level) in every sector. There is also little sectorial variation, as shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. The 
values of the marginal effects ranges from 3.2% in high-tech KI service sector to 6.7% in high-tech 
manufacturing sector. However, when the desired size of contraction is large, firms in the 
manufacturing sector tend to rely more on internal contraction (range from 4.6% to 6.7%) than firms 
in the service sector (range from 3.2% to 4.1%). 
By contrast, table 4.5 shows that there is a negative relationship between the size of a contraction 
and the probability of using plant closure. A 1 standard deviation increase in desired contraction 
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reduces the probability of choosing to close plant by 4%. The disaggregated coefficients in tables 
4.14 - 4.21 are negative and statistically significant across all industrial sectors. Tables 4.14 - 4.21 
also show that, when the desired size of contraction is large, firms in the manufacturing sector tend 
to rely less on plant closure (range from -4.3% to -6.2%) than firms in the service sector (range from -
3.2% to -4.0%). Lastly, we find that contraction size is negatively and significantly related to the 
probability of selling plants in all sectors; but these coefficients are quite small – ranging from -0.1% 
to -0.5%. Further, the probability of selling plants is lower in the manufacturing sectors (range from -
3.0% to -5.0%) than the probability of closing plants (range from -0.1% to -0.2%), when firms need to 
carry out a large contraction. 
Overall, our result shows that firms are less (more) likely to rely on external (internal) forms of 
contraction, when the desired size of contraction is large. One explanation, which is admittedly 
favourable to our result, is that an adverse shock on a firm is likely to affect all the plants under the 
control of that firm, particularly, if the plants are being operated at close to, if not the same 
efficiency level.  Assuming such firm receives a negative firm-level (and not plant-specific) shock, it is 
more likely to contract its operation at all existing plants i.e., internal contraction instead of closing 
the operation of a particular plant i.e., external contraction, even for large contractions. For 
instance, a firm that owns 10 plants with 10 employees in each plant wishing to downsize its 
workforce by 10% might find it optimal to reduce its workforce by one employee in each plant rather 
than closing the operation of a specific plant. Our result also shows that, when choosing between 
the 2 forms of external contraction, firms are more likely to carry out large contractions via plant 
closure. This is at odds with Breinlich and Niemann (2011a) result that found no relationship 
between contraction size and firms’ choice of external contraction. Our contrasting result might 
again be due to the different measure of contraction size used in this thesis.  
4.5.3 Firm-level Variables 
We now turn to the firm-level variables reviewed in section 2.3.1.3 of this thesis. The result obtained 
for the first of our firm-level variables shows that positive R&D has a minor impact on the probability 
of using internal contraction; vis-à-vis the baseline group (i.e., firms with no R&D expenditure), 
moving to R&D band 1 increase the probability of undertaking internal contraction by 0.1%, an 
increase in the probability by 0.9% in the R&D band 2 group, a reduction in the probability by 0.3% in 
the R&D band 3 group and a negligible increase for firms in the R&D band 4 group. However, the 
coefficients associated with these dummies are barely statistically significant across the industrial 
sectors. With regards to the effect of firm’s R&D on the probability of choosing external forms of 
contraction, table 4.5 shows that there is a positive relationship between firm’s R&D expenditure 
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and the probability of closing and selling plants (with the exception of firms in R&D band 3 category 
on plant closure). However, most of the coefficients associated with these dummies are close to zero 
and often statistically insignificant across sectors. Nonetheless, our finding that firms that engage in 
R&D activity are somewhat more likely to sell plant is similar to that of Phillips and Zhdanov (2013). 
As to the second firm-level variable – firm’s age - table 4.5 shows that older firms are more likely to 
rely on internal contraction than young firms. Specifically, table 4.4 shows that a one standard 
deviation increase in firm’s age increases the probability of using internal contraction by 1.2%. The 
underlying coefficients associated with this variable are positive and economically significant (at the 
1% level) in all industrial sectors, as shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. Tables 4.14 - 4.21 also show that 
there is little variation across sectors – the impact of age on the probability of using internal 
contraction ranges from 0.7% in the high-tech KI service sector to 1.3% in the medium high-tech 
manufacturing and other low-tech KI service sectors. Thus, our result suggests that old firms tend to 
rely more on internal contraction than young firms, which is unsurprising given that old firms are 
more likely to exhaust their internal growth opportunities faster than young firms, and would seek 
to contract internally to improve their profitability during a downturn. 
In contrast, table 4.5 shows that old firms are less likely to close plants than young firms. A one 
standard deviation increase in age reduces the probability that a firm closes plant by 1.2%. The 
effect of age on plant closure remains negative and statistically significant across all sectors, as 
shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. Tables 4.14 - 4.21 also show that there is little variation across the 8 
industrial sectors - the impact of age on the probability of plant closure ranges from -0.7% in the 
high-tech KI service sector to -1.3% in the medium high-tech manufacturing and other low-tech KI 
service sectors. This result is consistent with the argument that older firms are more likely to set 
their efficiency levels closer to the ‘true’ level of efficiency which should in turn lead to a negative 
relationship between a firm’s age and the probability of a plant closure, as argued, for example, by 
Jovanovic (1982). Finally, table 4.5 shows that firm’s age has no impact on the probability of selling 
plants. Indeed, tables 4.14 - 4.21 shows that these estimates are close to zero in all industrial 
sectors. Thus, we found no evidence to suggest that older firms with operational rigidities and 
therefore, higher cost of integration, have lower takeover hazard (e.g., Loderer and Waelchli, 2015); 
or in contrast, that older firm with operationally rigidities are more likely to sell plants to free up 
management time and focus on their core competences (e.g., Berchtold et al., 2014). Instead, our 
result suggests that these 2 effects offset one another so that all firms have similar probabilities of 
selling plants, irrespective of their age. 
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As regards to our third firm-level variable, table 4.5 shows that single-plant enterprises are more 
likely to contract internally. When compared to multi-unit firms, single-plant enterprises are 22.9% 
more likely to contract internally, as shown in table 4.5. The coefficients associated with this variable 
show that (in Tables 4.14 - 4.21) we obtained positive and statistically significant relationships across 
all the industrial sectors. However, we find some variation across sectors – single-plant enterprises 
in the manufacturing sectors tend to rely more on internal expansion (range from 29.4% to 34.6%) 
than the same firms in the service sectors (range from 18.4% to 22.5%). Nevertheless, our result 
shows ample evidence to suggest that single-plant enterprises are more likely to explore the option 
of contracting internally as they may find it harder to implement a plant closure or plant sale which 
would involve a complete withdrawal from manufacturing or service activities.  
In contrast, table 4.5 shows that single-plant enterprises are less likely to close plants. This table 
shows that single-plant enterprises are 21.8% less likely to close plants than multi-unit firms. The 
disaggregated coefficients associated with this variable are negative and statistically significant 
across all industrial sectors, as shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. Tables 4.14 - 4.21 also show that single-
plant enterprises in the manufacturing sectors tend to rely less on plant closure (range from -28.7% 
to 33.7%) than the same firms in the service sectors (range from -17.6% to -21.1%). This result is 
similar to that of Bernard and Jensen (2007) and Disney et al. (2003) that conclude that multi-unit 
firms are more likely to close plants, particularly if the plant has a relatively different cost structure 
to the rest of the firm. It also supports the argument that multi-unit firms are more likely to close 
plants because they can easily transfer production from one plant to another without ceasing 
operation or exiting the market. Lastly, table 4.5 shows that single-plant enterprises are 1.2% less 
likely to sell plant than multi-unit firms. These coefficients associated with this variable are negative, 
economically significant, and they range from -0.7% to -1.4% in all industrial sectors. This suggests 
that single-unit enterprises might have personal links with the plant and/or community in which they 
operate such that they are unwilling to sell their plants to another firm. 
With regards to our fourth firm-level variable - foreign ownership – table 4.5 shows that most 
foreign-owned firms (except for SE Asia-owned firms) are less likely to use internal contraction, vis-à-
vis the baseline group (i.e., UK firms without foreign investment). Results in table 4.5 show that 
foreign-owned firms are between 0.3% and 1.6% less likely to contract internally than UK-owned 
firms. The coefficients associated with these dummies are mostly negative and statistically 
significant across all sectors, as shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. In particular, each foreign ownership 
dummy is statistically significant in at least one sector (out of the possible 8) with UK multinational 
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dummy and EU-owned dummy statistically significant in 6 sectors. In general, our results in tables 
4.14 - 4.21 indicate that most foreign-owned firms are less likely to contract internally. 
On the other hand, foreign-owned enterprises are more likely to close plants (with the exception of 
SE Asia-owned firms), when compared to UK-owned firms. Table 4.5 shows that foreign-owned firms 
are between 0.2% and 1.6% more likely to close plants than their UK-owned counterpart. The 
coefficients associated with these dummies are largely positive and statistically significant across all 
sectors, as shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. Specifically, each foreign ownership dummy is statistically 
significant in at least one sector (out of the possible 8) with EU-owned dummy statistically significant 
in 6 sectors. Overall, our result is in line with that of Bernard and Jensen (2007), who found that US 
multinationals are more likely to close domestic plants. Lastly, we find a similar positive relationship 
between foreign ownership and the probability of plant sales, however these coefficients are close 
to zero; implying a negligible impact of foreign ownership on the probability of selling plants.  
4.5.4 Other Factors 
Like in expanding firms, we also consider the links between lagged contraction values, the 2008 
economy-wide shock, regional and city rankings and industry effect and, firms’ decision to contract 
in period t. The result in table 4.5 shows that previous internal contractors are more likely to use the 
same form of contraction in the next period - firms that used internal contraction in period, t-1, are 
0.3% more likely to use the same form of contraction in period t. These coefficients are statistically 
significant in 4 industrial sectors (medium high-tech manufacturing, low-tech manufacturing, high-
tech KI service and low-tech KI service) and they are positive in these sectors – ranging from 0.4% to 
0.8%, as shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. This result is unsurprising given that there are redundancies 
payment often associated with internal contraction such that a firm using this form of contraction 
for the first time would pay more than a firm that had previously contracted internally. 
Table 4.5 also shows that past participation in plant closure increases the probability that a firm will 
use the same form of contraction by 0.1%. The underlying coefficients associated with this variable 
are only statistically significant in 2 industrial sectors (low-tech manufacturing and high-tech KI 
service) and the signs are mixed. Firms that closed plants in period t-1 are 1.2% more likely to do the 
same in period t, in the low-tech manufacturing sector while the same firms are 1.1% less likely to 
close plants in period t, in the high-tech KI service sector. For plant sale, there is a similar positive 
relationship between plant sale in period t-1 and period t, shown on table 4.5. Indeed, table 4.5 
shows that firms that sold plants in period t-1 are 0.2% more likely to use the same form of 
contraction the following year. These coefficients are economically significant in 4 industrial sectors 
and positive in 3 out of these 4 sectors. Overall, our result suggests a similar sunk cost effect found 
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in expanding firms, however, this effect is not quite as pronounced for contracting firms, possibly 
due to the difference in the cost of external expansion and external contraction. For instance, the 
cost of building a plant could be much higher than the cost of closing one.  
The result obtained for the time dummy, 2008-2012, shows that firms are more likely to contract 
internally over this period. Indeed, table 4.5 shows that firms in the UK are some 3.3% more likely to 
lay off workers over the period 2008-2012. The underlying coefficients associated with this dummy 
variable are positive and economically significant (at the 1% level) in every sector, as shown in tables 
4.14 - 4.21. This implies that, between the period 2008 and 2012, firms were more likely to use 
internal contraction in every industrial sector. Tables 4.14 - 4.21 also show little industrial variation - 
the higher probability of using internal contraction ranges from 2.0% in the other low-tech KI service 
sector to 3.8% in the low-tech KI service sector. In sum, our result suggests that contracting firms 
tend to rely more on internal contraction post-2007 and this is consistent across all the 8 industrial 
sectors. 
In contrast, table 4.5 shows that contracting firms are less likely to rely on the 2 forms of external 
contraction – plant closure and plant sale – over the 2008-2012 period. Specifically, table 4.5 shows 
that, post-2007, firms in the UK are some 3.3% and 0.1% less likely to close and sell plants 
respectively. The coefficients obtained for this dummy variable are negative and economically 
significant in every industrial sector shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21 – implying that, since the 2008 
recession, contracting firms are less likely to rely on external forms of contraction in all sectors. 
There is also little industrial variation shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. The lower probability associated 
with plant closure ranges from -1.9% in the other low-tech Ki service sector to -3.8% in the low-tech 
KI service sector and; that of selling plants ranges from -0.1% to -0.4%. In general, this result 
provides support for Dixit (1989) model which shows that under considerable uncertainty about 
future market condition, firms may decide to keep plants even when output price is significantly 
lower than the average variable costs of running plants. In other words, a substantial fall in demand 
or rise in operation costs that occurred during the financial crisis of 2008 may not serve as enough 
reason for firms’ willingness to shed plant as any future improvements in market conditions will see 
them avoid the sunk costs of rebuilding and/or repurchasing plants (e.g., Harris and Moffat, 2016). 
Turning to regional rankings, table 4.5 shows that firms located in most government office region are 
more likely to contract internally, vis-à-vis the baseline group (i.e., firms located in the South-Eastern 
region of England). The impact of being located in a particular region on the likelihood of using 
internal contraction is economically significant in at least one industrial sector, as shown in tables 
4.14 - 4.21. In terms of industrial variation, firms located in Scotland (in the high-tech manufacturing 
134 
 
sector) are the most likely to use internal contraction while firms located in Northern Ireland (in the 
low-tech KI service sector) and the least likely to use the same form of contraction. By contrast, table 
4.5 shows that firms located in most government office region are less likely to close plants, vis-à-vis 
the baseline group (i.e., firms located in the South-Eastern region of England). Again, the underlying 
coefficients associated with these regional dummies are statistically significant in at least one 
industrial sector with the coefficient signs generally negative (shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21). Lastly, 
there are negligible impacts of being located in a particular region on the probability of selling 
plants. Overall, our result suggests that, while it may be expensive opening a new plant in South East 
of England, closing an existing plant may not be so expensive in the same region. 
As to differences based on cities, Table 4.5 shows that the parameter estimates on the city dummies 
are positively related to internal contraction, for all the major cities in Britain. These coefficients are 
statistically significant in at least one industrial sector, as shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. However, the 
signs on the statistically significant coefficients are mixed – negative for 8 coefficients and positive 
for 11 coefficients. There are similar mixed coefficient signs at industry level for plant closure and 
plant sale. In effect, it is difficult to conclude that firms operating in major cities outside the South-
Eastern region of England are more or less likely to use a particular path of contraction.   
Finally, as to industrial variation (not shown in table 4.5 but, available in the tables 4.14 - 4.21), our 
results shows that there is sectorial variation even within well-defined industrial sectors. We find 
that firms operating in high fixed cost sectors tend to rely less (more) on plant closure and plant 
sales (internal contraction), when compared to firms operating in low fixed cost sectors. The 
probability of choosing internal contraction is generally higher for firms operating in a higher fixed 
cost sectors when compared to the baseline group of firms operating in lower cost industries 
(Pharmaceutical for high-tech manufacturing; Chemicals for medium high-tech manufacturing; Coke 
and petroleum for medium low-tech manufacturing; Food and beverages for low-tech 
manufacturing; Telecoms for high-tech KI service; Water transport for KI service sector; Hotels and 
restaurants for low-tech KI service; and Postal services for other low-tech KI service). On the other 
hand, firms tend to rely less on plant closure and plant sale when they operate in a high fixed cost 
industry, as shown in tables 4.14 - 4.21. Our finding is similar to that of expanding firms and supports 
the “Q-theory of Mergers” (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). 
4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has sought out to examine the crucial factors that are likely to determine firms’ choice 
of expansion and contraction in the UK. Using a multinomial logit model, it considers the role of the 
following 4 determinants: firm size, adjustment size, firm-level variables (R&D, age, multi-plant and 
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foreign ownership) and other factors (persistence, time, geography and industrial effect). Our 
sample was disaggregated into manufacturing and services and by technology to avoid imposing 
common coefficients across industries operating with potentially distinct cost structure and 
technologies. This exercise was done separately for expanding and contracting firms. 
In terms of expanding firms, we find that large firms tend to rely on external forms of expansion, 
particularly, on greenfield investment than small firms. Expansion size is generally positively related 
to external expansion, implying that firms tend to rely more on external expansion when the desired 
size of expansion is large. The results obtained for our firm-level variables are mixed. The first of 
such result shows that undertaking R&D is negatively associated with external expansion in most 
sectors, implying that high-productivity (innovative) firms engage less in internal innovation, instead 
they use greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition to gain access to new technology. 
Second, firm age is generally positively related to greenfield investment but has a negligible impact 
(i.e., coefficients that are close to zero) on mergers and acquisition. Third, single-plant enterprises 
tend to rely less on external forms of expansion, particularly, on greenfield investment across most 
sectors, which implies that there may be economies of scale benefit associated with owning more 
than one plant. Fourth, foreign ownership is positively related to mergers and acquisition while 
there is no obvious relationship between the former and greenfield investment. Turning to the other 
determinants, our result shows that past participation in external expansion increases the 
probability of using the same form of expansion across most sectors. Our measure of the impact of 
2007 financial crisis shows that expanding firms tend to rely less on external forms of expansion 
post-2007. Lastly, we find that there are regional, city and sectorial differences in the use of 
expansion paths, particularly for external forms of expansion. 
Turning now to contracting firms, our result shows that large firms tend to rely more on external 
forms of contraction than small firms and this is consistent across all industrial sectors. Our measure 
of contraction size is negatively related to external forms of contraction, implying that firms rely less 
on these forms of contraction, when the desired size of contraction is large. Regarding our first firm-
level variables, we find that that undertaking R&D is positively related to external contraction. 
However, most of the coefficients associated with our R&D dummies are close to zero and often 
statistically insignificant across sectors. Our second firm-level variable shows that old firms are less 
likely to close plants than young firms, while firm age is unrelated to plant sales across all industrial 
sectors. The third firm-level variable indicates that there is a negative relationship between single-
plant enterprises and plant closure and plant sales. For the fourth firm-level variable, we find that 
foreign ownership is positively associated with plant closure while the impact of foreign ownership 
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on probability of plant sale is close to zero across all sectors. As regards to the other determinants, 
our result reveals that past participation in external contraction increases the probability of using 
the same form of contraction across most sectors, although this is less for pronounced for 
contracting firms. Across all sectors, contracting firms tend to rely less on external forms of 
contraction, post-2007. Finally, we also find that there are regional, city and sectorial differences in 
the use of contraction paths, particularly for external forms of contraction. 
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4.7 Appendix 
4.7.1 Net Expanding Firms 
Table 4-6: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in UK 
high-tech manufacturing, 1997-2012 
 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal expansiont-1 -0.025 -5.97 0.026 6.45 -0.001 -0.50 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.020 -3.09 0.019 3.13 0.001 0.31 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.073 -3.42 0.059 2.90 0.013 1.97 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.080 -14.76 0.062 13.02 0.018 5.52 
20 - 49 employees -0.110 -19.99 0.080 16.17 0.030 9.64 
50 - 99 employees -0.105 -15.48 0.073 11.69 0.032 9.32 
100 - 249 employees -0.120 -16.61 0.080 12.03 0.040 10.96 
250+ employees -0.144 -17.23 0.100 12.92 0.044 10.88 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.050 -23.03 0.037 18.73 0.013 14.61 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.013 6.44 -0.012 -6.15 -0.001 -1.57 
R&D band 2 0.017 0.90 -0.021 -1.33 0.004 0.37 
R&D band 3 0.021 1.50 -0.023 -1.95 0.002 0.21 
R&D band 4 0.015 1.94 -0.011 -1.48 -0.004 -1.25 
R&D band 5 0.006 1.36 -0.006 -1.41 0.000 -0.08 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.064 8.70 -0.056 -7.91 -0.007 -3.20 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.013 -2.04 0.008 1.41 0.004 1.77 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.032 3.17 -0.022 -2.29 -0.009 -3.35 
EU-owned firms -0.011 -1.31 0.007 0.91 0.004 1.08 
USA-owned firms -0.022 -2.68 0.013 1.64 0.010 2.58 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.041 -1.49 0.022 0.87 0.019 1.37 
Other Foreign-owned firms 0.001 0.04 -0.005 -0.28 0.004 0.45 
Region       
North-East 0.012 1.07 -0.014 -1.24 0.001 0.23 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.015 1.94 -0.013 -1.79 -0.002 -0.61 
North-West 0.004 0.54 -0.004 -0.67 0.001 0.18 
West Midlands -0.001 -0.16 -0.001 -0.12 0.002 0.59 
East Midlands 0.004 0.58 -0.004 -0.63 0.000 0.01 
South-West 0.013 2.12 -0.012 -2.07 -0.001 -0.41 
East  0.002 0.44 -0.004 -0.74 0.001 0.54 
Scotland -0.010 -1.40 0.012 1.91 -0.002 -0.71 
Wales 0.010 1.16 -0.009 -1.14 -0.001 -0.22 
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 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Northern Ireland 0.026 0.81 -0.008 -0.29 -0.019 -0.81 
Major UK Cities       
London -0.002 -0.26 -0.003 -0.43 0.004 1.40 
Manchester -0.022 -1.00 0.020 0.99 0.002 0.20 
Birmingham -0.008 -0.51 0.008 0.57 0.000 -0.05 
Glasgow  -0.017 -0.95 0.015 0.95 0.002 0.20 
Tyneside -0.021 -0.84 0.012 0.47 0.010 1.08 
Edinburgh -0.031 -1.57 0.030 1.79 0.001 0.06 
Bristol 0.013 0.51 -0.017 -0.68 0.004 0.39 
Cardiff 0.018 0.66 -0.026 -0.99 0.008 1.00 
Liverpool 0.053 1.02 -0.069 -1.31 0.016 1.48 
Nottingham 0.104 0.47 0.036 0.71 -0.140 -0.53 
Leicester -0.012 -0.49 0.012 0.51 0.000 0.04 
Coventry 0.051 0.63 0.017 0.68 -0.068 -0.73 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
office machinery and computers 0.005 0.83 -0.010 -1.73 0.004 1.07 
Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.005 0.78 -0.007 -1.35 0.002 0.78 
Medical and precision instruments 0.004 0.70 -0.010 -1.85 0.006 1.98 
Aircraft and spacecraft 0.012 1.74 -0.016 -2.77 0.004 1.04 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.029 8.79 -0.020 -6.40 -0.009 -6.67 
       
Number of observations 25,599      
Pseudo-R2 0.137      
Log-likelihood -6,447.59      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Table 4-7: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in UK 
medium high-tech manufacturing, 1997-2012 
 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal expansiont-1 -0.021 -7.59 0.023 8.57 -0.002 -1.57 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.027 -5.97 0.019 4.66 0.008 3.38 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.076 -5.45 0.059 4.43 0.017 3.96 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.076 -21.15 0.051 16.83 0.024 10.44 
20 - 49 employees -0.101 -27.23 0.066 20.62 0.035 14.89 
50 - 99 employees -0.095 -20.69 0.054 13.03 0.041 15.97 
100 - 249 employees -0.114 -23.26 0.065 14.91 0.048 17.73 
250+ employees -0.143 -24.73 0.087 16.36 0.057 18.77 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.055 -36.50 0.039 28.94 0.016 24.11 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.009 7.21 -0.010 -8.21 0.001 1.16 
R&D band 2 0.012 0.89 -0.003 -0.23 -0.009 -1.79 
R&D band 3 0.021 2.96 -0.025 -4.34 0.004 0.82 
R&D band 4 0.025 5.99 -0.019 -5.10 -0.005 -2.74 
R&D band 5 0.005 1.38 -0.006 -1.73 0.001 0.77 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.068 13.80 -0.063 -13.00 -0.005 -3.86 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.016 -3.23 0.011 2.25 0.005 2.94 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.012 1.35 -0.010 -1.22 -0.002 -0.50 
EU-owned firms -0.019 -3.52 0.013 2.50 0.006 2.98 
USA-owned firms -0.014 -2.59 0.011 2.00 0.004 1.89 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.008 -0.44 0.013 0.69 -0.004 -0.83 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.062 -2.38 0.059 2.31 0.004 0.46 
Region       
North-East 0.010 1.49 -0.007 -1.18 -0.003 -0.87 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.05 0.000 -0.12 
North-West 0.003 0.67 -0.003 -0.64 0.000 -0.16 
West Midlands 0.002 0.40 0.001 0.19 -0.002 -1.15 
East Midlands 0.005 1.02 -0.005 -1.13 0.000 0.06 
South-West 0.002 0.38 0.001 0.34 -0.003 -1.37 
East  -0.004 -0.90 -0.001 -0.13 0.004 2.23 
Scotland -0.020 -4.09 0.025 5.73 -0.005 -1.77 
Wales -0.015 -2.81 0.014 2.93 0.001 0.23 
Northern Ireland 0.003 0.19 0.019 1.46 -0.023 -1.47 
Major UK Cities       
London -0.002 -0.38 0.001 0.23 0.001 0.34 
Manchester -0.026 -1.92 0.026 2.10 0.000 0.07 
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 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.002 0.26 -0.012 -1.53 0.010 3.25 
Glasgow  -0.007 -0.53 0.006 0.49 0.001 0.17 
Tyneside 0.006 0.46 -0.006 -0.47 0.000 -0.03 
Edinburgh 0.022 0.79 -0.038 -1.45 0.017 1.79 
Bristol 0.001 0.09 0.007 0.58 -0.009 -0.82 
Cardiff -0.006 -0.37 0.007 0.45 0.000 -0.05 
Liverpool 0.011 0.54 -0.009 -0.51 -0.001 -0.13 
Nottingham -0.004 -0.25 0.002 0.14 0.002 0.29 
Leicester -0.021 -1.60 0.021 1.66 0.001 0.13 
Coventry 0.006 0.47 -0.009 -0.71 0.003 0.45 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Machinery and equipment 0.011 3.87 -0.010 -3.71 -0.001 -0.93 
Electrical machinery 0.012 3.92 -0.008 -2.99 -0.003 -2.65 
Motor Vehicles 0.016 4.84 -0.010 -3.43 -0.005 -4.04 
Other transport equipment -0.019 -2.52 0.019 2.67 0.000 0.00 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.031 14.42 -0.023 -11.50 -0.008 -8.43 
       
Number of observations 59,709      
Pseudo-R2 0.143      
Log-likelihood -15,058.4      
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Table 4-8: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in UK 
medium low-tech manufacturing, 1997-2012 
 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal expansiont-1 -0.025 -12.32 0.025 13.20 -0.001 -1.34 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.022 -7.13 0.019 6.30 0.004 2.96 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.067 -5.51 0.054 4.57 0.014 4.34 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.062 -28.41 0.047 23.98 0.015 12.58 
20 - 49 employees -0.081 -34.28 0.060 28.03 0.021 16.70 
50 - 99 employees -0.080 -25.67 0.051 17.69 0.029 19.96 
100 - 249 employees -0.084 -22.88 0.053 15.37 0.031 19.84 
250+ employees -0.119 -25.17 0.081 18.00 0.038 21.15 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.043 -41.32 0.033 34.37 0.010 25.61 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.008 8.99 -0.007 -7.88 -0.001 -4.06 
R&D band 2 0.018 2.49 -0.017 -2.47 -0.002 -0.47 
R&D band 3 0.015 2.88 -0.014 -2.84 -0.001 -0.50 
R&D band 4 0.002 0.58 -0.003 -0.79 0.001 0.60 
R&D band 5 0.002 0.37 -0.003 -0.66 0.001 1.05 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.055 13.52 -0.051 -12.64 -0.004 -4.49 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.020 -4.45 0.013 3.03 0.007 4.91 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.015 1.17 -0.015 -1.25 0.000 0.02 
EU-owned firms 0.003 0.65 -0.005 -1.23 0.002 1.57 
USA-owned firms -0.006 -1.03 0.002 0.40 0.004 2.10 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.005 -0.33 -0.006 -0.36 0.011 1.69 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.006 -0.41 0.008 0.57 -0.002 -0.62 
Region       
North-East 0.003 0.73 -0.001 -0.29 -0.002 -1.08 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.004 1.38 -0.002 -0.80 -0.002 -1.47 
North-West 0.003 0.97 -0.002 -0.78 -0.001 -0.55 
West Midlands 0.005 1.84 -0.006 -2.31 0.001 0.88 
East Midlands 0.005 1.68 -0.002 -0.76 -0.003 -2.20 
South-West 0.003 0.80 0.000 -0.03 -0.002 -1.69 
East  0.000 -0.09 0.001 0.45 -0.001 -0.75 
Scotland -0.021 -6.40 0.020 6.66 0.001 0.43 
Wales -0.008 -2.18 0.010 2.88 -0.002 -1.15 
Northern Ireland 0.001 0.16 0.008 1.07 -0.009 -1.89 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.008 1.95 -0.004 -1.07 -0.004 -1.99 
Manchester -0.001 -0.11 0.004 0.30 -0.002 -0.41 
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 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.005 0.86 -0.004 -0.83 0.000 -0.16 
Glasgow  0.008 0.94 -0.010 -1.23 0.002 0.53 
Tyneside 0.003 0.33 -0.005 -0.58 0.002 0.60 
Edinburgh 0.004 0.29 -0.003 -0.20 -0.002 -0.23 
Bristol -0.005 -0.50 0.006 0.70 -0.001 -0.28 
Cardiff 0.006 0.51 -0.004 -0.44 -0.001 -0.23 
Liverpool 0.001 0.06 0.001 0.10 -0.002 -0.30 
Nottingham 0.009 0.62 0.002 0.15 -0.010 -0.93 
Leicester 0.006 0.63 -0.009 -0.88 0.002 0.54 
Coventry 0.010 1.04 0.003 0.31 -0.013 -2.09 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Rubber and plastics 0.010 1.34 -0.010 -1.37 0.000 -0.15 
Other non-metallic 0.001 0.12 0.000 0.00 -0.001 -0.44 
Basic metals 0.000 -0.03 0.000 -0.01 0.000 0.15 
Fabricated metal 0.011 1.34 -0.011 -1.29 -0.001 -0.39 
Ships and boats 0.007 0.90 -0.005 -0.58 -0.003 -1.33 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.033 22.88 -0.027 -20.42 -0.005 -9.25 
       
Number of observations 106,690      
Pseudo-R2 0.129      
Log-likelihood -22,907.6      
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Table 4-9: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in UK 
low-tech manufacturing, 1997-2012 
 Internal expansion 
Greenfield 
investment 
Mergers and 
Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal expansiont-1 -0.024 -15.29 0.024 16.08 0.000 -0.88 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.017 -7.46 0.015 6.61 0.003 3.11 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.051 -5.33 0.044 4.69 0.007 3.64 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.068 -38.42 0.054 33.6 0.014 14.96 
20 - 49 employees -0.088 -45.14 0.066 36.8 0.022 22.64 
50 - 99 employees -0.081 -29.95 0.054 21.16 0.027 24.1 
100 - 249 employees -0.088 -29.41 0.058 20.18 0.031 25.93 
250+ employees -0.119 -33.57 0.082 24.14 0.037 28.09 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.042 -52.38 0.032 43.31 0.009 32.06 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.006 7.45 -0.005 -6.99 -0.001 -2.15 
R&D band 2 0.025 5.15 -0.023 -4.98 -0.003 -1.23 
R&D band 3 0.020 4.73 -0.017 -4.25 -0.003 -1.95 
R&D band 4 0.015 4.61 -0.016 -5.04 0.001 0.71 
R&D band 5 0.002 0.41 -0.003 -0.67 0.001 1.03 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.049 15.28 -0.045 -14.31 -0.004 -5.15 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.019 -4.52 0.015 3.69 0.004 3.78 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.018 1.66 -0.017 -1.56 -0.002 -0.51 
EU-owned firms -0.010 -2.06 0.007 1.42 0.003 2.54 
USA-owned firms -0.003 -0.49 0.003 0.56 0.000 -0.28 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.001 -0.1 -0.007 -0.61 0.008 2.21 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.001 -0.05 -0.003 -0.27 0.004 1.06 
Region       
North-East -0.002 -0.55 0.003 0.92 -0.001 -0.77 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.001 0.4 0.000 -0.02 -0.001 -0.96 
North-West 0.002 0.95 -0.002 -1.01 0.000 0.02 
West Midlands 0.001 0.54 -0.003 -1.3 0.002 1.76 
East Midlands 0.004 1.64 -0.004 -1.64 0.000 -0.22 
South-West 0.001 0.46 -0.001 -0.46 0.000 -0.06 
East  0.006 2.15 -0.005 -2.13 0.000 -0.32 
Scotland -0.025 -9.18 0.024 9.49 0.001 0.72 
Wales -0.013 -4.15 0.015 5.32 -0.002 -1.69 
Northern Ireland -0.020 -2.73 0.030 5.04 -0.010 -2.06 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.005 2.34 -0.007 -3 0.001 1.25 
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 Internal expansion 
Greenfield 
investment 
Mergers and 
Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Manchester -0.007 -1.07 0.006 0.99 0.001 0.33 
Birmingham -0.002 -0.34 0.001 0.25 0.001 0.25 
Glasgow  0.005 0.86 -0.003 -0.51 -0.002 -0.82 
Tyneside -0.003 -0.36 -0.003 -0.36 0.006 2.04 
Edinburgh -0.003 -0.39 0.003 0.44 0.000 -0.02 
Bristol -0.001 -0.13 0.003 0.4 -0.002 -0.56 
Cardiff 0.000 0.01 0.000 -0.05 0.000 0.08 
Liverpool -0.003 -0.39 0.002 0.24 0.001 0.44 
Nottingham 0.003 0.35 -0.003 -0.38 0.000 0.04 
Leicester 0.004 0.77 -0.002 -0.55 -0.001 -0.62 
Coventry 0.006 0.53 0.005 0.56 -0.011 -1.49 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Tobacco -0.072 -1.49 0.069 1.48 0.003 0.36 
Textiles 0.005 2.33 -0.007 -3.16 0.001 1.46 
Clothing 0.012 4.9 -0.011 -4.78 -0.001 -1.07 
Leather goods -0.001 -0.19 0.004 0.71 -0.003 -1.63 
Wood products 0.014 7.31 -0.013 -6.91 -0.002 -2.07 
Paper products 0.009 3.3 -0.013 -5.14 0.004 3.24 
Publishing and printing 0.009 5.27 -0.011 -6.79 0.002 2.68 
Furniture and other 
manufacturing 0.006 3.6 -0.005 -2.75 -0.002 -2.66 
Recycling 0.006 1.7 -0.004 -1.39 -0.001 -0.92 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.035 30.97 -0.031 -28.52 -0.005 -10.53 
       
Number of observations 175,645      
Pseudo-R2 0.124      
Log-likelihood -39,765.6      
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Table 4-10: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in 
UK high-tech knowledge-intensive (KI) service, 1997-2012 
 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal expansiont-1 -0.006 -4.91 0.008 6.84 -0.002 -7.79 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.001 -0.69 0.003 1.74 -0.002 -4.77 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.046 -4.35 0.043 4.12 0.003 2.54 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.061 -42.50 0.056 40.16 0.006 10.91 
20 - 49 employees -0.100 -62.63 0.090 58.18 0.010 19.42 
50 - 99 employees -0.095 -38.22 0.083 34.02 0.012 19.45 
100 - 249 employees -0.105 -35.35 0.091 31.36 0.014 19.71 
250+ employees -0.125 -35.39 0.108 31.34 0.016 21.46 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.025 -43.47 0.022 38.91 0.003 23.85 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.006 8.40 -0.005 -7.33 -0.001 -4.75 
R&D band 2 -0.010 -1.12 0.006 0.70 0.004 1.15 
R&D band 3 -0.012 -2.11 0.010 1.86 0.002 0.92 
R&D band 4 0.005 1.22 -0.006 -1.70 0.001 1.04 
R&D band 5 0.005 2.30 -0.007 -3.02 0.001 2.66 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.015 5.49 -0.011 -4.02 -0.004 -6.22 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) 0.006 2.83 -0.007 -3.51 0.001 2.28 
SE Asia-owned firms -0.001 -0.13 0.000 -0.01 0.001 0.59 
EU-owned firms 0.001 0.36 -0.003 -0.87 0.002 1.95 
USA-owned firms -0.003 -1.06 0.000 0.02 0.003 3.97 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.011 -1.26 0.004 0.49 0.007 2.51 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.001 -0.16 -0.004 -0.48 0.006 1.86 
Region       
North-East -0.005 -1.16 0.006 1.40 -0.001 -0.53 
Yorkshire-Humberside -0.006 -2.71 0.005 2.29 0.001 1.66 
North-West 0.001 0.25 -0.001 -0.49 0.000 0.72 
West Midlands -0.005 -2.45 0.004 2.03 0.001 1.57 
East Midlands 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.11 -0.001 -0.67 
South-West -0.003 -1.34 0.003 1.61 0.000 -0.64 
East  0.001 0.34 -0.001 -0.58 0.000 0.75 
Scotland -0.031 -13.72 0.030 13.86 0.001 1.31 
Wales -0.026 -9.03 0.026 9.45 0.000 0.20 
Northern Ireland -0.085 -1.64 0.116 9.73 -0.031 -0.50 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.004 3.25 -0.004 -3.32 0.000 -0.07 
Manchester -0.005 -1.03 0.004 0.93 0.001 0.46 
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 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.009 1.81 -0.007 -1.52 -0.002 -1.09 
Glasgow  0.009 1.99 -0.005 -1.23 -0.004 -1.97 
Tyneside 0.005 0.66 -0.006 -0.91 0.002 0.77 
Edinburgh 0.005 1.08 -0.003 -0.84 -0.001 -0.76 
Bristol 0.002 0.34 -0.002 -0.48 0.001 0.40 
Cardiff 0.006 1.02 -0.002 -0.34 -0.004 -1.41 
Liverpool 0.002 0.28 0.000 0.05 -0.002 -0.94 
Nottingham 0.004 0.63 -0.004 -0.55 -0.001 -0.31 
Leicester -0.004 -0.40 0.011 1.39 -0.007 -1.09 
Coventry -0.001 -0.18 0.002 0.31 -0.001 -0.36 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Computer and related 0.013 7.71 -0.014 -8.31 0.001 1.49 
Research and Development 0.014 6.11 -0.012 -5.57 -0.001 -3.06 
Photographic activities 0.011 4.93 -0.011 -5.08 0.000 -0.33 
Motion pictures 0.006 2.73 -0.007 -2.99 0.000 0.37 
Radio and TV activities 0.001 0.32 -0.003 -1.34 0.002 2.43 
Artistic and literary creation 0.006 3.40 -0.006 -3.53 0.000 -0.10 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.034 38.09 -0.031 -35.93 -0.003 -11.29 
       
Number of observations 242,875      
Pseudo-R2 0.119      
Log-likelihood -46,421.3      
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Table 4-11: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in 
UK knowledge-intensive (KI) service, 1997-2012 
 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal expansiont-1 -0.010 -10.83 0.012 13.15 -0.002 -8.29 
Greenfield investmentt-1 0.003 2.75 -0.001 -1.30 -0.002 -5.70 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.055 -6.53 0.053 6.38 0.002 1.76 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.055 -52.57 0.049 48.53 0.007 17.29 
20 - 49 employees -0.085 -70.23 0.075 64.40 0.010 24.79 
50 - 99 employees -0.089 -47.54 0.077 42.27 0.012 23.14 
100 - 249 employees -0.097 -44.37 0.083 39.05 0.014 24.16 
250+ employees -0.113 -42.98 0.095 37.34 0.017 27.34 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.028 -63.36 0.024 57.53 0.004 32.97 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.013 26.44 -0.012 -25.67 -0.001 -5.58 
R&D band 2 0.017 2.67 -0.016 -2.46 -0.002 -1.03 
R&D band 3 0.022 5.19 -0.020 -4.91 -0.002 -1.52 
R&D band 4 0.004 0.94 -0.006 -1.54 0.002 1.87 
R&D band 5 0.007 1.96 -0.008 -2.11 0.000 0.49 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.011 7.31 -0.008 -5.49 -0.003 -6.90 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.009 -3.09 0.006 2.25 0.003 3.65 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.002 0.24 -0.010 -1.24 0.008 1.98 
EU-owned firms -0.004 -0.98 0.001 0.40 0.002 2.18 
USA-owned firms -0.008 -2.04 0.006 1.60 0.002 2.05 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.008 -0.77 0.008 0.80 0.000 -0.03 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.010 -1.05 0.007 0.82 0.002 0.86 
Region       
North-East -0.006 -2.27 0.005 2.13 0.001 0.69 
Yorkshire-Humberside -0.001 -0.78 0.002 1.12 0.000 -0.85 
North-West -0.002 -1.49 0.002 1.62 0.000 -0.20 
West Midlands -0.002 -1.34 0.002 1.51 0.000 -0.30 
East Midlands -0.001 -0.50 0.001 0.63 0.000 -0.29 
South-West 0.000 -0.09 0.000 0.16 0.000 -0.19 
East  -0.002 -1.19 0.002 1.38 0.000 -0.39 
Scotland -0.026 -17.56 0.025 17.46 0.001 2.63 
Wales -0.021 -10.52 0.021 11.06 0.000 0.20 
Northern Ireland -0.043 -9.53 0.046 12.16 -0.003 -0.89 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.008 6.90 -0.007 -6.61 -0.001 -1.64 
Manchester 0.008 2.49 -0.009 -2.91 0.001 1.29 
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 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.003 0.80 -0.004 -1.33 0.002 1.66 
Glasgow  0.014 4.62 -0.012 -3.99 -0.003 -2.32 
Tyneside 0.007 1.57 -0.006 -1.27 -0.002 -1.06 
Edinburgh 0.010 3.37 -0.010 -3.28 -0.001 -0.67 
Bristol 0.000 -0.11 -0.001 -0.35 0.002 1.62 
Cardiff 0.005 1.11 -0.006 -1.41 0.001 0.68 
Liverpool 0.008 1.74 -0.008 -1.82 0.000 0.09 
Nottingham 0.003 0.55 -0.004 -0.74 0.001 0.60 
Leicester -0.004 -0.69 0.004 0.70 0.000 0.08 
Coventry 0.013 1.96 -0.014 -2.11 0.001 0.35 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Air transport 0.010 2.78 -0.008 -2.08 -0.003 -4.56 
Legal, accountancy and consultancy 0.021 6.19 -0.020 -6.12 -0.001 -0.95 
Architecture and engineering 0.013 4.92 -0.013 -5.10 0.000 -0.21 
Technical testing 0.010 3.43 -0.010 -3.70 0.000 0.09 
Advertising 0.013 5.30 -0.014 -6.03 0.001 0.56 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.028 42.05 -0.024 -38.14 -0.004 -17.34 
       
Number of observations 398,886      
Pseudo-R2 0.107      
Log-likelihood -73,512      
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Table 4-12: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in 
UK low-tech knowledge-intensive (KI) service, 1997-2012 
 
Internal 
expansion 
Greenfield 
investment 
Mergers and 
Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal expansiont-1 -0.002 -3.85 0.002 5.34 -0.001 -5.66 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.101 -111.26 0.108 113.85 -0.007 -27.88 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 0.015 5.92 -0.080 -34.15 0.065 27.79 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.051 -102.96 0.046 93.63 0.005 32.15 
20 - 49 employees -0.090 -153.08 0.083 142.59 0.007 40.74 
50 - 99 employees -0.112 -127.66 0.104 118.41 0.009 41.05 
100 - 249 employees -0.138 -135.62 0.128 126.69 0.010 43.56 
250+ employees -0.309 -461.09 0.296 453.77 0.012 67.98 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.032 -170.77 0.029 158.03 0.003 79.26 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age -0.001 -5.87 0.002 7.20 0.000 -4.64 
R&D band 2 0.016 4.23 -0.015 -4.15 0.000 -0.37 
R&D band 3 0.020 6.20 -0.021 -6.59 0.001 1.11 
R&D band 4 0.039 14.75 -0.039 -14.85 0.000 0.15 
R&D band 5 0.056 20.18 -0.057 -20.24 0.001 1.10 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm -0.024 -43.88 0.027 51.20 -0.003 -16.38 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) 0.038 36.18 -0.041 -39.11 0.002 7.77 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.033 12.11 -0.035 -12.69 0.001 1.63 
EU-owned firms 0.038 31.51 -0.039 -33.45 0.002 4.75 
USA-owned firms 0.038 21.58 -0.040 -23.26 0.002 4.17 
AUSCANSA-owned firms 0.037 8.18 -0.040 -8.97 0.003 1.91 
Other Foreign-owned firms 0.033 9.47 -0.036 -10.51 0.003 2.40 
Region       
North-East -0.003 -2.72 0.003 2.72 0.000 0.14 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.000 -0.67 0.001 1.41 0.000 -2.48 
North-West -0.001 -1.50 0.001 2.05 0.000 -1.81 
West Midlands -0.001 -1.61 0.001 1.95 0.000 -1.05 
East Midlands -0.001 -0.72 0.001 1.41 0.000 -2.29 
South-West 0.000 -0.69 0.001 1.05 0.000 -1.20 
East  0.000 -0.74 0.001 0.85 0.000 -0.33 
Scotland -0.021 -29.65 0.021 29.95 0.000 0.59 
Wales -0.015 -18.81 0.016 19.99 -0.001 -2.51 
Northern Ireland -0.007 -4.11 0.012 7.92 -0.005 -5.40 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.004 6.40 -0.003 -5.15 -0.001 -4.70 
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Internal 
expansion 
Greenfield 
investment 
Mergers and 
Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Manchester 0.008 4.54 -0.009 -4.83 0.000 0.81 
Birmingham 0.003 1.93 -0.003 -2.02 0.000 0.18 
Glasgow  0.009 5.80 -0.009 -5.69 0.000 -0.69 
Tyneside 0.010 4.60 -0.010 -4.56 0.000 -0.35 
Edinburgh 0.003 1.75 -0.003 -2.09 0.001 1.08 
Bristol 0.002 1.11 -0.002 -1.25 0.000 0.43 
Cardiff 0.007 3.08 -0.008 -3.47 0.001 1.15 
Liverpool 0.000 0.20 0.000 -0.24 0.000 0.12 
Nottingham 0.010 3.92 -0.011 -4.40 0.001 1.70 
Leicester 0.006 2.49 -0.005 -2.48 0.000 -0.21 
Coventry -0.003 -1.23 0.002 0.96 0.001 1.04 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Land transport 0.018 24.17 -0.017 -22.60 -0.001 -5.88 
Support for transport 0.007 7.09 -0.008 -7.78 0.001 2.43 
Real estate 0.003 3.74 -0.004 -5.16 0.001 4.41 
Renting machinery 0.004 3.30 -0.004 -3.49 0.000 0.70 
Maint. and rep.  of office 
machines 0.007 1.64 -0.006 -1.44 -0.001 -0.95 
Managm. activities of hold. Comp. -0.055 -18.48 0.038 13.28 0.017 14.81 
Labour recruitment 0.042 62.54 -0.040 -58.57 -0.003 -18.36 
Investigation services 0.027 20.49 -0.025 -19.09 -0.002 -5.99 
Industrial cleaning 0.025 26.81 -0.023 -24.53 -0.002 -10.45 
Packaging 0.017 5.89 -0.015 -5.46 -0.001 -1.75 
Secretarial services 0.016 3.28 -0.017 -3.55 0.001 0.99 
Other business services 0.011 11.16 -0.011 -11.46 0.000 0.93 
Sewage and refuse 0.001 0.56 -0.001 -0.48 0.000 -0.34 
Repair -0.021 -28.36 0.020 28.22 0.000 1.54 
Wholesale -0.026 -41.70 0.026 40.96 0.001 3.91 
Retail -0.040 -69.84 0.041 72.00 -0.001 -9.34 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.040 129.06 -0.037 -120.10 -0.003 -39.03 
       
Number of observations 
2,252,7
90      
Pseudo-R2 -0.687      
Log-likelihood 
-
462,89
8      
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Table 4-13: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in 
UK other low-tech knowledge-intensive (KI) service, 1997-2012 
 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal expansiont-1 -0.010 -9.25 0.011 10.61 -0.001 -5.75 
Greenfield investmentt-1 0.007 5.57 -0.007 -5.28 0.000 -1.78 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.045 -3.63 0.040 3.31 0.005 2.42 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.060 -50.69 0.056 48.87 0.004 10.44 
20 - 49 employees -0.087 -58.55 0.081 56.26 0.005 13.26 
50 - 99 employees -0.093 -38.08 0.085 35.47 0.008 14.95 
100 - 249 employees -0.102 -35.87 0.094 33.74 0.008 12.76 
250+ employees -0.123 -38.69 0.112 35.86 0.011 17.75 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) -0.032 -63.80 0.029 60.19 0.003 24.01 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.017 27.93 -0.016 -27.04 -0.001 -6.23 
R&D band 2 0.002 0.14 -0.005 -0.43 0.003 0.74 
R&D band 3 0.007 0.46 -0.004 -0.25 -0.003 -30.09 
R&D band 4 0.005 0.44 -0.010 -0.88 0.005 1.20 
R&D band 5 0.009 0.93 -0.012 -1.34 0.003 1.43 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.045 15.29 -0.042 -14.45 -0.003 -4.92 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) 0.042 46.43 -0.041 -47.36 -0.001 -4.55 
SE Asia-owned firms -0.026 -1.04 0.017 0.71 0.009 1.08 
EU-owned firms -0.011 -1.46 0.011 1.41 0.001 0.40 
USA-owned firms 0.006 0.85 -0.006 -0.85 0.000 -0.15 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.006 -0.30 0.002 0.13 0.003 0.72 
Other Foreign-owned firms 0.003 0.23 -0.011 -0.88 0.008 1.47 
Region       
North-East -0.002 -0.69 0.002 0.91 -0.001 -0.73 
Yorkshire-Humberside -0.001 -0.71 0.002 0.93 0.000 -0.75 
North-West -0.001 -0.35 0.001 0.59 0.000 -0.87 
West Midlands 0.000 -0.05 0.000 -0.04 0.000 0.40 
East Midlands -0.001 -0.40 0.001 0.72 -0.001 -1.10 
South-West -0.003 -1.73 0.003 1.95 0.000 -0.64 
East  -0.002 -0.94 0.001 0.90 0.000 0.23 
Scotland -0.025 -15.35 0.026 16.26 -0.001 -1.16 
Wales -0.020 -9.60 0.020 9.64 0.000 0.78 
Northern Ireland -0.073 -18.21 0.075 20.78 -0.002 -0.82 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.005 3.14 -0.005 -3.20 0.000 0.01 
Manchester -0.002 -0.50 0.001 0.24 0.001 1.19 
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 Internal expansion Greenfield investment Mergers and Acquisition 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.000 0.09 -0.001 -0.29 0.001 0.87 
Glasgow  0.005 1.42 -0.006 -1.65 0.001 0.62 
Tyneside -0.001 -0.22 0.000 0.09 0.001 0.54 
Edinburgh -0.001 -0.40 -0.001 -0.24 0.002 2.53 
Bristol 0.006 1.08 -0.006 -1.16 0.000 0.25 
Cardiff 0.006 1.14 -0.007 -1.34 0.001 0.75 
Liverpool -0.004 -0.69 0.005 0.97 -0.001 -0.76 
Nottingham 0.003 0.46 0.000 0.06 -0.004 -1.17 
Leicester 0.012 1.69 -0.010 -1.51 -0.002 -0.75 
Coventry -0.006 -0.98 0.006 0.90 0.001 0.43 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Membership organisations 0.010 5.82 -0.010 -5.58 -0.001 -1.47 
Other entertainment services 0.006 2.28 -0.006 -2.53 0.000 0.65 
News agency 0.001 0.15 -0.002 -0.38 0.001 0.81 
Sporting activities 0.013 7.42 -0.012 -7.43 0.000 -0.70 
Other recreational activities -0.014 -5.01 0.013 4.81 0.001 1.22 
Other services -0.005 -2.97 0.005 2.99 0.000 0.17 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.029 35.91 -0.027 -33.93 -0.002 -11.15 
       
Number of observations 293,972      
Pseudo-R2 0.125      
Log-likelihood -55,135.9      
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4.7.2 Net Contracting Firms 
Table 4-14: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK high-tech manufacturing, 1997-2012 
 
Internal 
contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
z-
value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
z-
value 
Persistence       
Internal contractiont-1 -0.003 -0.66 0.000 0.06 0.003 1.99 
Plant closuret-1 -0.020 -1.95 0.016 1.57 0.004 1.54 
Plant salet-1 -0.024 -1.00 0.015 0.63 0.009 1.65 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.069 -0.06 0.011 0.02 0.059 0.03 
20 - 49 employees -0.059 -0.05 -0.002 0.00 0.060 0.03 
50 - 99 employees -0.049 -0.04 -0.015 -0.02 0.063 0.03 
100 - 249 employees -0.041 -0.04 -0.023 -0.03 0.063 0.03 
250+ employees -0.060 -0.05 -0.005 -0.01 0.065 0.04 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.067 25.14 -0.062 -23.77 -0.005 -9.02 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.010 5.97 -0.011 -6.76 0.001 2.05 
R&D band 2 0.039 2.34 -0.039 -2.46 -0.001 -0.12 
R&D band 3 -0.012 -0.70 0.017 0.98 -0.005 -10.88 
R&D band 4 0.012 1.39 -0.010 -1.18 -0.002 -0.88 
R&D band 5 0.006 1.30 -0.006 -1.43 0.001 0.50 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.321 22.65 -0.312 -22.08 -0.008 -6.56 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.008 -1.31 0.004 0.75 0.003 2.16 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.032 3.82 -0.031 -3.67 -0.002 -0.75 
EU-owned firms -0.015 -1.98 0.014 1.87 0.001 0.55 
USA-owned firms -0.004 -0.58 0.003 0.40 0.001 0.72 
AUSCANSA-owned firms 0.016 0.91 -0.012 -0.64 -0.005 -10.87 
Other Foreign-owned firms 0.000 0.00 0.005 0.26 -0.005 -10.87 
Region       
North-East 0.014 1.22 -0.020 -1.78 0.006 2.53 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.009 1.18 -0.010 -1.36 0.001 0.49 
North-West 0.009 1.33 -0.009 -1.44 0.001 0.25 
West Midlands 0.004 0.60 -0.007 -0.94 0.002 0.98 
East Midlands 0.005 0.68 -0.004 -0.51 -0.001 -0.42 
South-West 0.017 2.63 -0.020 -3.05 0.003 1.43 
East  0.003 0.54 -0.006 -1.04 0.003 1.58 
Scotland 0.022 2.78 -0.020 -2.57 -0.002 -0.76 
Wales 0.011 1.38 -0.008 -1.05 -0.003 -0.84 
Northern Ireland 0.787 0.38 0.393 0.33 -1.180 -0.36 
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Internal 
contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
z-
value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
z-
value 
       
Major UK Cities       
London 0.013 1.99 -0.018 -2.77 0.005 2.40 
Manchester -0.021 -0.99 0.016 0.79 0.004 0.83 
Birmingham 0.021 1.31 -0.020 -1.30 0.000 -0.05 
Glasgow  -0.015 -0.58 0.021 0.95 -0.007 -0.30 
Tyneside 0.009 0.23 0.023 0.74 -0.032 -0.61 
Edinburgh 0.014 0.56 -0.007 -0.28 -0.007 -0.90 
Bristol 0.117 0.57 0.049 0.40 -0.166 -0.52 
Liverpool -0.009 -0.26 0.029 1.00 -0.020 -0.60 
Nottingham 0.046 0.38 0.024 0.33 -0.070 -0.38 
Leicester -0.016 -0.61 0.008 0.30 0.008 1.38 
Coventry -0.011 -0.53 0.008 0.39 0.003 0.59 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
office machinery and computers 0.006 0.92 -0.003 -0.49 -0.003 -2.42 
Radio, TV and communication 
equipment 0.007 1.12 -0.005 -0.86 -0.002 -1.17 
Medical and precision instruments 0.010 1.68 -0.010 -1.67 0.000 -0.15 
Aircraft and spacecraft 0.010 1.49 -0.011 -1.61 0.001 0.34 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.028 8.54 -0.024 -7.48 -0.004 -4.45 
       
Number of observations 22,232      
Pseudo-R2 0.284      
Log-likelihood -4,448.9      
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Table 4-15: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK medium high-tech manufacturing, 1997-2012 
 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal contractiont-1 0.006 2.36 -0.007 -2.84 0.001 1.54 
Plant closuret-1 -0.002 -0.44 -0.003 -0.47 0.005 2.89 
Plant salet-1 -0.003 -0.19 -0.004 -0.24 0.007 1.51 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.035 -10.28 0.032 9.60 0.004 1.54 
20 - 49 employees -0.018 -4.75 0.013 3.40 0.006 2.37 
50 - 99 employees -0.008 -1.92 0.003 0.78 0.005 2.15 
100 - 249 employees -0.008 -1.80 0.002 0.42 0.006 2.66 
250+ employees -0.028 -5.74 0.019 4.06 0.009 3.60 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.064 37.30 -0.059 -35.07 -0.005 -14.22 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.013 12.49 -0.013 -12.32 0.000 -1.09 
R&D band 2 0.014 1.14 -0.016 -1.31 0.002 0.31 
R&D band 3 0.011 1.31 -0.018 -2.33 0.007 1.54 
R&D band 4 0.013 2.87 -0.013 -2.85 0.000 -0.19 
R&D band 5 0.004 1.38 -0.005 -1.56 0.001 0.76 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.333 38.32 -0.320 -36.82 -0.014 -7.84 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.006 -1.40 0.003 0.80 0.002 2.33 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.018 2.52 -0.015 -2.02 -0.004 -3.65 
EU-owned firms -0.006 -1.54 0.006 1.46 0.000 0.36 
USA-owned firms -0.011 -2.42 0.010 2.40 0.000 0.11 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.016 -0.88 0.010 0.56 0.006 1.03 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.027 -1.70 0.030 1.91 -0.003 -2.29 
Region       
North-East 0.005 0.76 -0.004 -0.67 -0.001 -0.33 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.000 0.06 0.000 0.06 0.000 -0.38 
North-West 0.000 0.10 0.001 0.17 -0.001 -0.86 
West Midlands 0.009 2.25 -0.010 -2.42 0.001 0.52 
East Midlands 0.004 0.80 -0.003 -0.59 -0.001 -0.67 
South-West 0.003 0.62 -0.003 -0.69 0.000 0.20 
East  0.002 0.36 -0.001 -0.24 0.000 -0.36 
Scotland -0.006 -1.15 0.005 1.03 0.001 0.42 
Wales -0.004 -0.65 0.004 0.77 -0.001 -0.34 
Northern Ireland -0.002 -0.08 -0.008 -0.36 0.009 2.52 
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 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.013 2.49 -0.014 -2.66 0.001 0.47 
Manchester 0.012 0.68 -0.004 -0.24 -0.008 -0.80 
Birmingham -0.015 -2.11 0.014 2.00 0.001 0.54 
Glasgow  -0.001 -0.10 0.001 0.06 0.001 0.17 
Tyneside 0.000 -0.01 -0.002 -0.13 0.002 0.58 
Edinburgh 0.010 0.33 -0.003 -0.11 -0.006 -0.37 
Bristol 0.038 1.72 -0.009 -0.50 -0.028 -1.10 
Cardiff -0.001 -0.07 0.000 -0.02 0.002 0.35 
Liverpool 0.019 0.85 -0.016 -0.73 -0.003 -0.28 
Nottingham 0.065 0.71 0.039 0.62 -0.104 -0.69 
Leicester 0.000 0.03 0.002 0.16 -0.002 -0.51 
Coventry 0.010 0.78 -0.008 -0.61 -0.002 -0.72 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Machinery and equipment 0.004 1.61 -0.004 -1.50 0.000 -0.48 
Electrical machinery 0.011 3.52 -0.008 -2.66 -0.003 -4.01 
Motor Vehicles 0.006 1.83 -0.007 -1.99 0.000 0.51 
Other transport equipment -0.023 -2.99 0.025 3.23 -0.002 -1.19 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.025 11.95 -0.022 -10.30 -0.004 -7.03 
       
Number of observations 54,516      
Pseudo-R2 0.289      
Log-likelihood -10,769      
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Table 4-16: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK medium low-tech manufacturing, 1997-2012 
 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal contractiont-1 0.002 1.14 -0.003 -1.60 0.001 1.72 
Plant closuret-1 -0.003 -0.54 0.001 0.29 0.001 1.20 
Plant salet-1 -0.046 -2.47 0.044 2.37 0.002 1.04 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.032 -15.99 0.030 15.26 0.002 1.98 
20 - 49 employees -0.021 -9.04 0.018 7.81 0.003 2.87 
50 - 99 employees -0.009 -3.14 0.005 1.76 0.004 3.54 
100 - 249 employees -0.011 -3.50 0.007 2.35 0.004 3.12 
250+ employees -0.020 -5.54 0.014 3.74 0.007 5.49 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.049 41.92 -0.045 -39.41 -0.004 -15.88 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.011 16.14 -0.012 -16.60 0.000 0.88 
R&D band 2 0.009 1.09 -0.010 -1.18 0.001 0.18 
R&D band 3 0.006 1.15 -0.005 -1.02 -0.001 -0.70 
R&D band 4 0.010 3.00 -0.010 -3.15 0.000 0.58 
R&D band 5 0.004 1.39 -0.005 -1.57 0.001 1.03 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.346 43.09 -0.337 -41.97 -0.009 -7.42 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.009 -2.53 0.008 2.36 0.001 1.07 
SE Asia-owned firms -0.006 -0.46 0.008 0.58 -0.002 -1.24 
EU-owned firms -0.002 -0.61 0.004 0.96 -0.001 -2.69 
USA-owned firms -0.002 -0.46 0.003 0.57 0.000 -0.80 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.030 -2.25 0.030 2.23 0.000 0.14 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.013 -1.14 0.015 1.33 -0.002 -2.32 
Region       
North-East 0.011 2.43 -0.010 -2.35 0.000 -0.41 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.005 1.68 -0.005 -1.66 0.000 -0.14 
North-West 0.007 2.37 -0.006 -2.11 -0.001 -1.02 
West Midlands 0.004 1.63 -0.004 -1.50 0.000 -0.54 
East Midlands 0.009 2.91 -0.008 -2.75 -0.001 -0.67 
South-West 0.009 2.76 -0.006 -2.10 -0.002 -2.04 
East  -0.001 -0.18 0.001 0.22 0.000 -0.16 
Scotland 0.005 1.57 -0.004 -1.06 -0.002 -1.69 
Wales 0.008 2.13 -0.008 -2.11 0.000 -0.13 
Northern Ireland 0.007 0.65 -0.007 -0.62 -0.001 -0.16 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.008 2.14 -0.007 -1.92 -0.001 -0.81 
Manchester 0.005 0.41 -0.001 -0.11 -0.004 -1.09 
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 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.009 2.02 -0.010 -2.16 0.001 0.57 
Glasgow  0.012 1.03 -0.009 -0.80 -0.003 -0.49 
Tyneside -0.012 -1.42 0.011 1.34 0.001 0.46 
Edinburgh 0.025 1.33 -0.017 -0.97 -0.008 -0.50 
Bristol 0.014 1.30 -0.018 -1.63 0.004 1.56 
Cardiff 0.316 1.19 0.221 1.27 -0.537 -1.23 
Liverpool 0.016 1.26 -0.013 -1.10 -0.002 -0.42 
Nottingham 0.019 0.29 0.024 0.56 -0.042 -0.41 
Leicester 0.017 1.75 -0.018 -1.80 0.000 0.14 
Coventry 0.011 1.09 -0.011 -1.16 0.001 0.23 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Rubber and plastics 0.015 2.68 -0.014 -2.43 -0.002 -1.80 
Other non-metalic 0.011 1.93 -0.010 -1.63 -0.002 -2.66 
Basic metals 0.011 1.84 -0.009 -1.53 -0.002 -3.03 
Fabricated metal 0.016 2.36 -0.014 -2.03 -0.002 -2.32 
Ships and boats 0.008 1.14 -0.005 -0.75 -0.003 -6.36 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.023 16.30 -0.021 -15.28 -0.002 -4.62 
       
Number of observations 91,764      
Pseudo-R2 0.291      
Log-likelihood -14,805      
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Table 4-17: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK low-tech manufacturing, 1997-2012 
 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal contractiont-1 0.004 2.84 -0.004 -2.72 0.000 -0.61 
Plant closuret-1 -0.013 -3.16 0.012 2.88 0.001 1.93 
Plant salet-1 -0.048 -2.79 0.044 2.62 0.003 1.74 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.042 -26.83 0.040 25.93 0.002 3.16 
20 - 49 employees -0.027 -13.57 0.024 12.31 0.003 3.65 
50 - 99 employees -0.020 -8.09 0.017 6.75 0.004 4.30 
100 - 249 employees -0.018 -6.71 0.014 5.21 0.004 5.02 
250+ employees -0.038 -13.07 0.032 11.13 0.006 6.99 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.046 49.62 -0.043 -47.27 -0.003 -16.78 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.011 18.90 -0.011 -19.41 0.000 1.18 
R&D band 2 0.010 1.70 -0.009 -1.45 -0.002 -1.65 
R&D band 3 0.002 0.54 -0.003 -0.65 0.001 0.56 
R&D band 4 0.001 0.33 -0.002 -0.65 0.001 1.73 
R&D band 5 0.002 0.62 -0.003 -0.75 0.000 0.85 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.294 45.97 -0.287 -44.92 -0.007 -8.05 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.010 -3.20 0.010 3.19 0.000 0.16 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.014 1.77 -0.013 -1.61 -0.001 -1.25 
EU-owned firms -0.014 -3.34 0.014 3.37 0.000 -0.25 
USA-owned firms -0.009 -1.93 0.010 2.02 0.000 -0.84 
AUSCANSA-owned firms 0.011 1.31 -0.013 -1.47 0.001 0.85 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.005 -0.49 0.004 0.37 0.001 0.75 
Region       
North-East 0.005 1.37 -0.006 -1.49 0.000 0.56 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.004 1.73 -0.004 -1.79 0.000 0.22 
North-West 0.008 3.39 -0.007 -3.01 -0.001 -1.64 
West Midlands 0.005 1.81 -0.005 -1.89 0.000 0.27 
East Midlands 0.002 0.80 -0.001 -0.28 -0.001 -1.96 
South-West 0.006 2.22 -0.006 -2.22 0.000 -0.08 
East  0.002 1.00 -0.002 -1.02 0.000 0.07 
Scotland -0.001 -0.40 0.003 1.05 -0.002 -2.47 
Wales 0.001 0.34 -0.001 -0.18 -0.001 -0.63 
Northern Ireland 0.016 1.91 -0.015 -1.73 -0.002 -0.68 
Major UK Cities       
London 0.005 2.06 -0.004 -1.87 0.000 -0.78 
Manchester 0.008 1.18 -0.007 -1.08 -0.001 -0.34 
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 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.008 1.63 -0.009 -1.78 0.001 0.57 
Glasgow  0.005 0.71 -0.005 -0.74 0.000 0.08 
Tyneside -0.002 -0.25 0.001 0.18 0.001 0.41 
Edinburgh 0.000 0.06 -0.002 -0.32 0.002 1.17 
Bristol -0.005 -0.58 0.008 1.01 -0.003 -0.90 
Cardiff -0.004 -0.41 0.002 0.17 0.002 1.12 
Liverpool 0.000 -0.01 0.001 0.09 -0.001 -0.25 
Nottingham 0.000 -0.01 -0.001 -0.11 0.001 0.43 
Leicester 0.012 2.49 -0.013 -2.62 0.001 0.35 
Coventry 0.025 0.93 0.003 0.18 -0.028 -0.72 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Tobacco -0.010 -0.49 0.012 0.61 -0.002 -19.76 
Textiles 0.003 1.32 -0.002 -1.14 0.000 -1.09 
Clothing 0.010 4.36 -0.008 -3.72 -0.001 -4.31 
Leather goods 0.002 0.52 0.000 -0.11 -0.002 -4.22 
Wood products 0.004 1.80 -0.004 -1.65 0.000 -0.74 
Paper products -0.001 -0.21 0.000 0.17 0.000 0.26 
Publishing and printing -0.001 -0.43 0.001 0.54 0.000 -0.56 
Furniture and other manufacturing 0.002 1.00 -0.001 -0.35 -0.001 -3.91 
Recycling -0.002 -0.56 0.003 0.76 -0.001 -0.96 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.024 20.51 -0.022 -19.40 -0.001 -5.87 
       
Number of observations 148,279      
Pseudo-R2 0.240      
Log-likelihood -25,901      
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Table 4-18: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK high-tech knowledge-intensive (KI) service, 1997-2012 
 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal contractiont-1 0.008 5.60 -0.007 -5.54 0.000 -0.62 
Plant closuret-1 0.011 2.78 -0.011 -2.80 0.000 0.19 
Plant salet-1 -0.085 -1.81 0.084 1.79 0.001 0.56 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.048 -39.50 0.048 39.42 0.000 0.89 
20 - 49 employees -0.056 -31.92 0.055 31.72 0.000 1.67 
50 - 99 employees -0.040 -15.13 0.040 15.00 0.000 1.46 
100 - 249 employees -0.036 -12.24 0.036 12.06 0.001 2.00 
250+ employees -0.042 -12.80 0.041 12.61 0.001 2.34 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.032 43.91 -0.032 -43.24 -0.001 -9.15 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.007 13.00 -0.007 -13.08 0.000 0.42 
R&D band 2 -0.011 -1.00 0.012 1.06 -0.001 -11.17 
R&D band 3 -0.005 -0.85 0.005 0.78 0.000 0.58 
R&D band 4 -0.006 -1.31 0.005 1.13 0.001 1.16 
R&D band 5 0.002 0.72 -0.002 -0.81 0.000 1.08 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.215 26.82 -0.207 -26.31 -0.008 -3.61 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) 0.005 2.05 -0.005 -2.30 0.001 2.11 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.002 0.28 -0.002 -0.21 -0.001 -11.17 
EU-owned firms -0.009 -2.09 0.008 1.98 0.000 1.23 
USA-owned firms -0.004 -1.30 0.004 1.30 0.000 -0.03 
AUSCANSA-owned firms 0.007 0.91 -0.008 -1.07 0.001 1.15 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.003 -0.30 0.003 0.29 0.000 0.17 
Region       
North-East 0.011 2.05 -0.012 -2.12 0.000 0.69 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.000 -0.16 0.001 0.36 0.000 -1.02 
North-West 0.000 -0.11 0.000 0.17 0.000 -0.30 
West Midlands -0.001 -0.54 0.001 0.60 0.000 -0.33 
East Midlands 0.005 1.82 -0.005 -2.03 0.001 1.92 
South-West 0.001 0.47 -0.001 -0.59 0.000 0.90 
East  0.002 1.17 -0.002 -1.34 0.000 1.37 
Scotland -0.006 -1.92 0.006 1.93 0.000 -0.07 
Wales -0.012 -3.40 0.011 3.33 0.000 0.60 
Northern Ireland 0.948 0.01 0.807 0.02 -1.755 -0.01 
Major UK Cities       
London -0.002 -1.21 0.001 1.08 0.000 0.93 
Manchester 0.005 0.85 -0.005 -0.81 0.000 -0.25 
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 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.015 2.52 -0.012 -2.14 -0.003 -0.81 
Glasgow  -0.003 -0.56 0.004 0.79 -0.001 -0.79 
Tyneside -0.020 -2.47 0.021 2.63 -0.001 -0.90 
Edinburgh -0.013 -2.44 0.013 2.56 -0.001 -0.50 
Bristol 0.000 -0.08 0.003 0.48 -0.002 -1.01 
Cardiff 0.026 1.30 0.004 0.28 -0.030 -0.96 
Liverpool -0.001 -0.07 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.43 
Nottingham -0.017 -2.49 0.017 2.42 0.000 0.85 
Leicester 0.012 1.26 -0.012 -1.29 0.000 0.46 
Coventry 0.023 2.36 -0.024 -2.49 0.001 1.98 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Computer and related 0.005 2.57 -0.005 -2.48 0.000 -0.88 
Research and Development 0.006 1.99 -0.005 -1.95 0.000 -0.60 
Photographic activities 0.012 5.28 -0.011 -5.14 0.000 -1.54 
Motion pictures 0.005 2.23 -0.006 -2.46 0.001 1.28 
Radio and TV activities 0.001 0.28 -0.001 -0.45 0.000 1.14 
Artistic and literary creation 0.003 1.62 -0.003 -1.54 0.000 -0.73 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.034 36.86 -0.034 -36.54 0.000 -3.15 
       
Number of observations 181,065      
Pseudo-R2 0.179      
Log-likelihood -28,438      
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Table 4-19: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK knowledge-intensive (KI) service, 1997-2012 
 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal contractiont-1 -0.001 -0.49 0.001 0.54 0.000 -0.38 
Plant closuret-1 0.004 1.25 -0.004 -1.30 0.000 0.41 
Plant salet-1 -0.015 -0.83 0.013 0.76 0.001 0.87 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.041 -44.55 0.040 44.29 0.000 2.05 
20 - 49 employees -0.039 -30.27 0.038 29.87 0.001 2.91 
50 - 99 employees -0.037 -20.45 0.037 20.25 0.000 1.84 
100 - 249 employees -0.040 -19.15 0.039 19.06 0.000 1.08 
250+ employees -0.046 -18.61 0.045 18.38 0.001 2.57 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.041 70.00 -0.040 -68.75 -0.001 -14.36 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.011 28.65 -0.011 -28.96 0.000 1.30 
R&D band 2 -0.008 -0.82 0.009 0.91 -0.001 -16.30 
R&D band 3 0.004 0.59 -0.004 -0.69 0.001 0.69 
R&D band 4 -0.007 -1.36 0.005 1.07 0.001 1.90 
R&D band 5 -0.002 -0.38 0.002 0.35 0.000 0.40 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.184 40.72 -0.176 -39.85 -0.008 -5.97 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.011 -3.52 0.010 3.30 0.001 2.10 
SE Asia-owned firms -0.004 -0.37 0.002 0.23 0.001 0.91 
EU-owned firms -0.008 -2.06 0.008 2.07 0.000 -0.15 
USA-owned firms -0.014 -3.21 0.014 3.16 0.000 0.70 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.023 -1.89 0.024 1.96 -0.001 -16.33 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.006 -0.79 0.006 0.69 0.001 0.72 
Region       
North-East 0.010 3.21 -0.009 -3.16 0.000 -0.45 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.003 1.86 -0.003 -1.72 0.000 -0.98 
North-West 0.001 0.74 -0.001 -0.76 0.000 0.11 
West Midlands 0.005 2.59 -0.004 -2.35 0.000 -1.46 
East Midlands 0.007 3.52 -0.007 -3.42 0.000 -0.69 
South-West 0.000 -0.13 0.001 0.35 0.000 -1.29 
East  -0.001 -0.53 0.001 0.54 0.000 -0.05 
Scotland 0.003 1.55 -0.003 -1.38 0.000 -1.19 
Wales -0.004 -1.73 0.004 1.91 0.000 -1.09 
Northern Ireland -0.015 -2.62 0.014 2.40 0.001 2.51 
Major UK Cities       
London -0.001 -0.75 0.001 1.02 0.000 -1.63 
Manchester 0.000 0.13 0.000 -0.08 0.000 -0.30 
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 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham -0.005 -1.54 0.004 1.27 0.001 2.10 
Glasgow  0.001 0.36 -0.002 -0.51 0.001 1.34 
Tyneside -0.002 -0.29 0.004 0.82 -0.003 -1.21 
Edinburgh -0.004 -1.00 0.003 0.92 0.000 0.63 
Bristol 0.003 0.76 -0.003 -0.63 -0.001 -0.67 
Cardiff -0.011 -2.44 0.010 2.38 0.000 0.43 
Liverpool 0.007 1.46 -0.007 -1.49 0.000 0.21 
Nottingham 0.002 0.38 -0.002 -0.37 0.000 -0.09 
Leicester 0.005 0.81 -0.006 -0.83 0.000 0.13 
Coventry -0.002 -0.34 0.003 0.41 0.000 -0.30 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Air transport 0.021 7.53 -0.021 -7.33 -0.001 -3.43 
Legal, accountancy and consultancy 0.025 7.11 -0.024 -6.91 -0.001 -2.02 
Architecture and engineering 0.020 7.97 -0.019 -7.74 -0.001 -2.80 
Technical testing 0.014 4.98 -0.014 -4.86 0.000 -1.72 
Advertising 0.013 5.26 -0.013 -5.11 0.000 -2.06 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.031 43.77 -0.030 -43.10 -0.001 -5.55 
       
Number of observations 305,672      
Pseudo-R2 0.198      
Log-likelihood -45,986      
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Table 4-20: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK low-tech knowledge-intensive (KI) service, 1997-2012 
 
Internal 
contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
z-
value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
z-
value 
Persistence       
Internal contractiont-1 0.004 7.31 -0.004 -7.92 0.000 3.09 
Plant closuret-1 -0.002 -1.34 0.002 1.34 0.000 0.09 
Plant salet-1 -0.029 -3.65 0.025 3.27 0.003 3.42 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.047 -102.04 0.047 100.80 0.001 5.65 
20 - 49 employees -0.051 -81.27 0.050 79.62 0.001 8.16 
50 - 99 employees -0.046 -50.13 0.045 49.15 0.001 6.26 
100 - 249 employees -0.046 -44.18 0.045 43.11 0.001 7.26 
250+ employees -0.054 -47.42 0.053 46.01 0.002 10.11 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.042 140.11 -0.040 -135.9 -0.002 -37.87 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.012 61.61 -0.012 -62.60 0.000 3.76 
R&D band 2 0.007 1.57 -0.006 -1.50 0.000 -0.54 
R&D band 3 0.010 2.69 -0.010 -2.84 0.001 0.94 
R&D band 4 -0.005 -1.38 0.005 1.35 0.000 0.23 
R&D band 5 0.000 -0.03 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.06 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.225 110.64 -0.211 
-
107.64 -0.013 -17.11 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) -0.003 -1.94 0.002 1.54 0.001 2.94 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.000 0.04 0.000 -0.10 0.000 0.47 
EU-owned firms -0.005 -2.92 0.005 2.80 0.000 0.98 
USA-owned firms -0.004 -1.57 0.004 1.64 0.000 -0.67 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.013 -2.04 0.014 2.19 -0.001 -2.44 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.012 -2.46 0.012 2.45 0.000 0.12 
Region       
North-East 0.008 5.69 -0.007 -5.26 -0.001 -2.43 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.005 6.09 -0.005 -5.91 0.000 -1.16 
North-West 0.006 8.03 -0.006 -7.83 0.000 -1.28 
West Midlands 0.004 4.78 -0.004 -4.59 0.000 -1.15 
East Midlands 0.003 3.59 -0.003 -3.30 0.000 -1.58 
South-West 0.003 3.49 -0.003 -3.39 0.000 -0.66 
East  0.003 3.92 -0.003 -3.90 0.000 -0.21 
Scotland -0.001 -0.61 0.001 0.79 0.000 -1.08 
Wales -0.001 -1.38 0.002 1.72 0.000 -1.79 
Northern Ireland -0.029 -12.78 0.029 12.92 0.000 0.00 
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Internal 
contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
Variables 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
z-
value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  
z-
value 
Major UK Cities 
London 0.001 1.75 -0.001 -1.36 0.000 -2.01 
Manchester 0.004 1.92 -0.004 -1.79 0.000 -0.67 
Birmingham 0.000 -0.19 0.000 0.20 0.000 -0.03 
Glasgow  0.000 0.00 0.000 0.14 0.000 -0.70 
Tyneside 0.000 -0.07 0.000 -0.10 0.000 0.95 
Edinburgh -0.007 -3.58 0.008 3.88 -0.001 -1.38 
Bristol 0.002 0.94 -0.001 -0.59 -0.001 -1.55 
Cardiff -0.005 -1.99 0.005 1.81 0.000 1.05 
Liverpool 0.005 1.80 -0.004 -1.42 -0.001 -1.58 
Nottingham 0.000 0.16 0.000 -0.05 0.000 -0.48 
Leicester 0.009 3.15 -0.008 -2.77 -0.001 -1.38 
Coventry 0.001 0.22 -0.001 -0.33 0.000 0.61 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Land transport -0.001 -0.79 0.002 1.76 -0.001 -12.52 
Support for transport -0.017 -11.68 0.018 12.33 -0.001 -11.59 
Real estate -0.041 -39.92 0.041 40.70 -0.001 -10.71 
Renting machinery -0.015 -9.29 0.016 9.86 -0.001 -9.56 
Maintenance and repair of office 
machines -0.012 -2.31 0.013 2.58 -0.001 -11.37 
Management activities of holding 
companies -0.075 -18.86 0.075 18.98 0.000 -2.68 
Labour recruitment -0.027 -19.98 0.028 20.95 -0.001 -23.51 
Investigation services -0.011 -4.70 0.012 5.13 -0.001 -6.47 
Industrial cleaning -0.021 -13.06 0.022 13.86 -0.001 -20.13 
Packaging -0.010 -2.29 0.011 2.54 -0.001 -5.23 
Secretarial services -0.010 -1.36 0.010 1.48 -0.001 -2.08 
Other business services -0.021 -13.60 0.022 14.24 -0.001 -7.99 
Sewage and refuse -0.023 -7.00 0.024 7.30 -0.001 -6.92 
Repair -0.008 -9.58 0.009 10.02 0.000 -4.36 
Wholesale -0.015 -19.90 0.016 21.09 -0.001 -12.75 
Retail -0.017 -26.55 0.018 27.90 -0.001 -11.55 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.038 104.51 -0.038 
-
102.73 -0.001 -12.59 
       
Number of observations 1,344,132      
Pseudo-R2 0.2186      
Log-likelihood -235,023      
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Table 4-21: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK other low-tech knowledge-intensive (KI) service, 1997-2012 
 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Persistence       
Internal contractiont-1 0.001 0.75 -0.001 -0.92 0.000 0.95 
Plant closuret-1 -0.003 -0.66 0.001 0.32 0.001 2.41 
Plant salet-1 0.022 2.11 -0.021 -2.02 -0.001 -14.61 
Firm size       
10 -19 employees -0.045 -45.79 0.044 45.48 0.000 1.92 
20 - 49 employees -0.046 -34.52 0.046 34.04 0.001 2.88 
50 - 99 employees -0.041 -19.17 0.040 18.86 0.001 2.48 
100 - 249 employees -0.040 -15.90 0.040 15.64 0.001 2.17 
250+ employees -0.051 -19.75 0.051 19.44 0.001 2.77 
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 0.033 52.63 -0.032 -51.54 -0.001 -10.67 
Internal and external knowledge       
ln Age 0.013 29.75 -0.013 -29.76 0.000 -0.66 
R&D band 2 -0.030 -1.79 0.031 1.84 -0.001 -14.61 
R&D band 3 0.028 2.94 -0.032 -3.60 0.004 0.77 
R&D band 4 0.006 0.50 -0.005 -0.43 -0.001 -14.62 
R&D band 5 -0.001 -0.06 0.000 -0.04 0.001 0.95 
Multi-plant economies of scale       
Single-plant firm 0.208 37.80 -0.194 -37.12 -0.013 -5.68 
Ownership-type       
UK-owned firm (With FDI) 0.014 7.90 -0.014 -8.38 0.001 1.37 
SE Asia-owned firms 0.023 1.78 -0.022 -1.71 -0.001 -14.53 
EU-owned firms -0.018 -2.01 0.018 2.03 0.000 -0.19 
USA-owned firms -0.001 -0.17 0.002 0.29 -0.001 -14.61 
AUSCANSA-owned firms -0.050 -1.64 0.048 1.58 0.002 0.58 
Other Foreign-owned firms -0.009 -0.59 0.010 0.65 -0.001 -14.61 
Region       
North-East 0.010 3.68 -0.010 -3.67 0.000 -0.11 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.001 0.82 -0.001 -0.32 -0.001 -2.33 
North-West 0.003 1.83 -0.003 -1.93 0.000 0.67 
West Midlands 0.004 1.96 -0.004 -2.01 0.000 0.28 
East Midlands 0.003 1.54 -0.003 -1.65 0.000 0.74 
South-West 0.000 0.23 0.000 0.12 -0.001 -1.81 
East  0.001 0.49 0.000 -0.19 0.000 -1.73 
Scotland 0.000 0.08 0.000 0.13 0.000 -1.24 
Wales 0.000 0.18 0.001 0.30 -0.001 -2.23 
Northern Ireland -0.026 -5.78 0.025 5.73 0.000 0.66 
Major UK Cities       
London -0.001 -0.86 0.001 0.88 0.000 -0.11 
Manchester -0.002 -0.31 0.001 0.31 0.000 0.04 
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 Internal contraction Plant closure Plant sale 
 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  z-value 
Birmingham 0.000 -0.12 0.002 0.41 -0.001 -1.08 
Glasgow  0.000 0.01 0.001 0.17 -0.001 -0.71 
Tyneside -0.012 -2.27 0.013 2.45 -0.001 -0.74 
Edinburgh -0.004 -0.95 0.004 1.09 -0.001 -0.57 
Bristol 0.001 0.19 -0.003 -0.58 0.002 4.16 
Cardiff -0.001 -0.12 0.000 0.00 0.001 0.64 
Liverpool 0.009 1.65 -0.009 -1.60 0.000 -0.48 
Nottingham -0.009 -1.50 0.008 1.40 0.001 0.94 
Leicester 0.001 0.10 0.008 0.90 -0.010 -0.53 
Coventry 0.016 1.78 -0.011 -1.39 -0.005 -0.56 
Industry sector (SIC 1992 2-digit)       
Membership organisations 0.008 4.44 -0.008 -4.27 0.000 -1.35 
Other entertainment services -0.006 -1.81 0.005 1.74 0.000 0.45 
News agency -0.010 -1.78 0.010 1.85 0.000 -0.77 
Sporting activities 0.001 0.52 -0.001 -0.56 0.000 0.22 
Other recreational activities -0.008 -3.05 0.008 2.97 0.000 0.58 
Other services -0.007 -3.84 0.007 3.73 0.000 0.70 
Years       
2008 Onwards 0.020 25.00 -0.019 -24.53 0.000 -3.54 
       
Number of observations 229,915      
Pseudo-R2 0.207      
Log-likelihood -32,843.7      
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4.7.3 Robustness Check 
Table 4-22: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of expansion path in 
UK 
 
 Internal 
expansion 
Greenfield 
investment 
Mergers and 
Acquisition 
Expansion 
dominant 
 
Variables  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄   
Firm size     
  
10 -19 employees  -0.059 0.044 0.006 0.010  
20 - 49 employees  -0.094 0.073 0.008 0.013  
50 - 99 employees  -0.108 0.084 0.010 0.014  
100 - 249 employees  -0.129 0.102 0.011 0.015  
250+ employees  -0.253 0.222 0.015 0.016  
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 
 -0.034 0.027 0.004 0.003  
Firm-level variables       
R&D band 2  0.014 -0.014 0.000 0.000  
R&D band 3  0.017 -0.018 0.000 0.000  
R&D band 4  0.027 -0.028 0.001 0.000  
R&D band 5  0.038 -0.039 0.001 0.000  
ln Age  0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000  
Single-plant firm  0.007 0.006 -0.003 -0.009  
UK-owned firm (With FDI)  0.022 -0.025 0.003 0.000  
SE Asia-owned firms  0.020 -0.022 0.002 0.000  
EU-owned firms  0.020 -0.022 0.002 0.000  
USA-owned firms  0.020 -0.022 0.002 0.000  
AUSCANSA-owned firms  0.017 -0.021 0.003 0.001  
Other Foreign-owned firms  0.019 -0.022 0.003 0.000  
Region       
North-East  -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000  
Yorkshire-Humberside  -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  
North-West  -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  
West Midlands  -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  
East Midlands  0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000  
South-West  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000  
Eastern   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
London  0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000  
Scotland  -0.023 0.022 0.000 0.000  
Wales  -0.017 0.017 -0.001 0.001  
Tyneside  0.007 -0.008 0.000 0.001  
Northern Ireland  -0.024 0.029 -0.007 0.002  
Major UK Cities       
Manchester  0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.001  
Liverpool  0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000  
Birmingham  0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.001  
Coventry  0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000  
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 Internal 
expansion 
Greenfield 
investment 
Mergers and 
Acquisition 
Expansion 
dominant 
 
Variables  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄   
Leicester  0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001  
Nottingham  0.008 -0.007 -0.002 0.001  
Bristol  0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000  
Glasgow   0.008 -0.008 0.000 0.000  
Edinburgh  0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.000  
Cardiff  0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.000  
Persistence and crisis       
Internal expansiont-1  -0.006 0.008 -0.001 -0.001  
Greenfield investmentt-1  -0.065 0.071 -0.004 -0.002  
Mergers and acquisitiont-1  -0.015 -0.036 0.051 0.000  
Expansion dominantt-1  -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002  
2008 Onwards  0.038 -0.033 -0.003 -0.002  
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Table 4-23: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model of determinants of contraction path in 
UK 
 
 Internal 
contraction 
Plant  
Closure 
Plant  
Sale 
Contraction 
dominant 
 
Variables  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄   
Firm size     
  
10 -19 employees  -0.044 0.037 0.001 0.006  
20 - 49 employees  -0.066 0.057 0.002 0.008  
50 - 99 employees  -0.076 0.066 0.003 0.008  
100 - 249 employees  -0.091 0.080 0.003 0.009  
250+ employees  -0.197 0.183 0.005 0.010  
Adjustment size       
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1) 
 -0.046 0.007 0.039 -0.001  
Firm-level variables       
R&D band 2  0.011 -0.011 0.000 0.000  
R&D band 3  0.013 -0.014 0.000 0.000  
R&D band 4  0.022 -0.023 0.001 0.000  
R&D band 5  0.034 -0.034 0.001 0.000  
ln Age  0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000  
Single-plant firm  0.064 -0.038 -0.004 -0.022  
UK-owned firm (With FDI)  0.022 -0.024 0.002 0.000  
SE Asia-owned firms  0.016 -0.017 0.002 0.000  
EU-owned firms  -0.017 0.019 -0.001 -0.001  
USA-owned firms  -0.017 0.019 -0.001 0.000  
AUSCANSA-owned firms  -0.016 0.019 -0.002 0.001  
Other Foreign-owned firms  -0.017 0.019 -0.002 0.000  
Region       
North-East  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Yorkshire-Humberside  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000  
North-West  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
West Midlands  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
East Midlands  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  
South-West  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Eastern   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
London  0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000  
Scotland  -0.014 0.015 0.000 0.000  
Wales  -0.012 0.012 -0.001 0.001  
Tyneside  0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.000  
Northern Ireland  0.044 0.053 -0.108 0.011  
Major UK Cities       
Manchester  0.007 -0.005 -0.003 0.001  
Liverpool  0.661 0.365 -1.175 0.148  
Birmingham  0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  
Coventry  0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001  
Leicester  0.007 -0.006 0.000 0.000  
Nottingham  0.105 0.055 0.018 -0.179  
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 Internal 
contraction 
Plant  
Closure 
Plant  
Sale 
Contraction 
dominant 
 
Variables  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄  𝝏𝒑 𝝏𝒙⁄   
Bristol  0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.000  
Glasgow   0.008 -0.005 -0.004 0.001  
Edinburgh  0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
Cardiff  0.011 -0.002 -0.009 0.000  
Persistence and crisis       
Internal contractiont-1  0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.001  
Plant Closuret-1  -0.056 0.061 -0.003 -0.002  
Plant Salet-1  -0.002 -0.043 0.045 0.000  
Contraction dominantt-1  0.003 -0.007 0.002 0.002  
2008 Onwards  0.011 -0.010 -0.001 0.000  
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5 The impact of Firm Adjustment on Productivity 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine whether choosing alternative forms of adjustment has a causal impact on 
firm-level productivity. In order to tackle the dynamic nature of the adjustment-productivity 
relationship discussed below, system GMM estimator will be employed. This estimator also helps to 
control for other sources of endogeneity such as endogeneity of inputs and self-selection of firms in 
and out of an industry, in our model. To strengthen our empirical argument, we illustrate why 
commonly used techniques such as OLS, fixed-effects and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
semiparametric method may be biased and show the estimates obtained from these methods. 
As discussed extensively in chapter 2.2.2, theory suggests that choosing external forms of expansion 
should result in higher level of productivity than internal expansion. Central to this prediction is that 
external expansion such as mergers and acquisition can be used to avoid substantial hiring costs that 
are often associated with taking on new workers i.e., internal expansion. There are similar 
productivity impacts when firms choose external forms of contraction. Indeed, using theoretical 
ideas in chapter 2.2.3, we show that external expansion such as plant closure should result in higher 
level of productivity than internal expansion. This is because plant closure often removes any 
uncertainty that is associated with firms’ downsizing decisions therefore, creating an environment 
that allows employees to improve and innovate. However, theory is less clear in its prediction of 
whether choosing mergers and acquisition (plant sale) over greenfield investment (plant closure) 
lead to better ex-post productivity or vice versa.  
Firms’ decision to adjust via a particular path of adjustment may be taken on the basis of an 
assessment of the benefit that will accrue to the firm and this benefit will itself be a function of the 
characteristics of the firm. In other words, adjusting firms may possess certain characteristics such 
that they achieve better performance (in terms of higher productivity) vis-à-vis ‘no adjusters’ even 
when they do not adjust their productive capacity. These characteristics may include better 
managerial capabilities, organisational skills etc. that are associated with both productivity and the 
decision to choose a particular path of adjustment. Indeed, using theoretical literature, we show in 
chapter 2.2.1 that firms endogenously sort into different channels of adjustment i.e., more efficient 
firms are more likely to rely on external forms of adjustment – greenfield investment and mergers 
and acquisition for expansion and; plant closure and plant sale for contraction – than internal forms 
of adjustment.  
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Similarly, we found in our empirical analysis of chapter 4 that firm characteristics such as R&D, age, 
foreign-ownership, etc., are related to firms’ choice of adjustment. While these theoretical models 
are not explicitly dynamic, the implication we draw from them and our empirical evidence, suggest 
that any empirical estimation of the effect on productivity of alternative forms of adjustment that 
ignores the dynamic relation between current path of adjustment and past productivity (as do OLS 
and traditional fixed-effects estimators) will yield inconsistent estimates. As a result, this thesis 
applies the system GMM estimator to account for such simultaneity. By using some combination of 
variables from the firm’s history as valid instruments (and because it is difficult to find suitable 
‘external’ instruments for all endogenous variables), system GMM deals with the aforementioned 
problem of simultaneity and endogeneity of other explanatory variables in our model. 
There are 2 main measures of productivity upon which the impact of choosing alternative forms of 
adjustment could be measured: labour productivity or TFP. Labour productivity can be obtained by 
dividing output or gross value added by the number of employees in a firm. TFP (sometimes referred 
to as multi-factor productivity), on the other hand, is given by the ratio of output to all factor inputs 
adopted in the production process of a firm. TFP is our preferred measure of productivity in this 
thesis because, unlike labour productivity, it does not depend on factor substitution (Harris, 2005). 
To illustrate, consider 2 similar firms, A and B, adopting the same technology and the same 
production process. Firm A may report a different labour productivity if it uses its capital input more 
intensively. Therefore, an increase in labour productivity does not only depend on gains in efficiency 
and/or technological progress but also on the usage intensity of other factor inputs such as capital 
and intermediate inputs.  As firm adjustment is a reaction to changes in market environment and 
technological possibilities which has efficiency improvement as its main aim, any estimated impact 
of firm adjustment on labour productivity will be the sum of the impact of a firm adjustment on 
capital, employment and TFP. It will therefore be more difficult to interpret than when TFP is used as 
the measure of productivity.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section will set out the econometric model 
that will be estimated. The third section will lay out the theoretical basis for the biases in commonly 
used techniques for estimating TFP. Section three also describes our preferred approach, the system 
GMM estimator which is used to tackle the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Section four 
presents our empirical results and the fifth section concludes.  
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5.2 Econometric Model 
Assuming the production is Cobb-Douglas (1928). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝐾𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑀                                                                                                                             (5.1) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 ,  𝐾𝑖𝑡 ,,  𝐿𝑖𝑡 ,  𝑀𝑖𝑡  represent output, capital input, labour, and intermediate input 
respectively, in firm i at time t, and 𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents the Hicksian factor-neutral efficiency level (or TFP) 
of firm i at time t. 𝛽𝐾, 𝛽𝐿and 𝛽𝑀 represent the elasticity of output, labour and intermediate inputs, 
respectively. Taking the natural logarithm of equation (5.1) gives: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (5.2) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, and 𝑚𝑖𝑡 refer to the natural logarithms of output, capital, labour and 
intermediate inputs in firm i at time t (i =1,........, N; t = 1,........., T), respectively, and 𝑎𝑖𝑡 is the natural 
logarithm of TFP. It is postulated that the natural logarithm of TFP can be decomposed into: 
𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗𝐽𝑖𝑡 + (𝜈𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                     (5.3) 
Substituting (5.3) into (5.2) gives: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝐽𝑖𝑡 +  (𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                 (5.4) 
The error term in equation (5.4) comprises: 𝜈𝑖𝑡′ a TFP shock and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , a measurement error which is 
assumed to be serially uncorrelated.  
The TFP shock takes the form: 
𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝜈𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                       |𝛼 < 1|                                                                                                           (5.5) 
This is autoregressive if α ≠ 0.  
𝛽0 in equation (5.4) is the average firm efficiency level and 𝐽𝑖𝑡 is a vector of dummy variables taking 
the values of one if a firm uses any of the following 6 adjustment channel: internal expansion, 
greenfield investment, mergers and acquisition, internal contraction, plant closure and plant sale. 
These adjustment dummies are the key variables in our model thus, the vector of coefficients 𝛽𝑗 (𝛽1′ 
𝛽2,......., 𝛽𝐽) will provide the estimate of the impact of using a particular path of adjustment on TFP
37.  
𝑋𝑖𝑡 in (5.4) is a vector of observed (proxy) variables that literature has shown to determine TFP. They 
include the firm-level variables - R&D, age, multi-plant ownership and foreign ownership – reviewed 
in chapter 2.3.1.3. Further to these variables, we also include multi-region dummy variable in 𝑋𝑖𝑡, in 
an attempt to capture economies of scale. This variable is equal to one if a firm operates plants in 
more than one region and zero otherwise. If there are transport costs benefits from locating plants 
 
37 The benchmark group for our analysis are firms that do not adjust.  
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presumably closer to major suppliers and/or customers then there may be organizational efficiencies 
associated with multi-region firms (Harris and Moffat, 2011). New trade theory and economic 
geography models have suggested that there may be spatial productivity effects associated with 
locating firms in close proximity to markets and suppliers (e.g., Fujita et al., 1999). This would imply 
that the coefficient on the multi-region firm dummy should be positive.  
Another variable included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is Herfindahl index calculated by summing the squared share of 
industry output of each firm within an industry. This measures the concentration of output across 
firms and therefore, of market power with larger values indicating greater market power and less 
competition within the industry (Herfindahl, 1950). It also serves as a measure for competition 
under the assumption that the elasticity of demand does not vary considerably across firms within a 
particular industry (see, for instance, Cabral, 2000). The theoretical model of Meyers and Vickers 
(1995) motivates the inclusion of Herfindahl index as a proxy for competition. In their model, 
competition raises managerial efforts hence, firm productivity mainly because better performing 
managers are rewarded with higher earnings. Meyers and Vickers (1995) assumes that investors use 
the knowledge of observed managerial output which depends on unobserved managers’ ability, 
effort and productivity shocks to reward better performing managers. If unobserved productivity 
shocks are common across firms operating in the same industry, the existence of more firms in the 
industry should increase pressure for managers to perform better than their rivals. This generates 
the incentive for managers to increase efforts to improve efficiency. This implies that greater level of 
competition (involving lower Herfindahl index) requires that firms operate more efficiently. 
However, increased competition may also have a negative effect on productivity if monopoly rents 
are required for managers to invest in R&D which in turn leads to improvements in productivity 
(Aghion et al., 2001). Lastly, a time trend is also included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 to control for hicks-neutral (or 
exogeneous) technical improvements that are common to all firms. 
A time dummy that takes the value of one if the year is 2008 onwards, and zero otherwise, is also 
included in equation (5.4). This variable is included to capture the effect of uncertainty created by 
the 2008 financial crisis. The expectation is that the common (exogenous) improvement in 
technology (captured by time trend) has slowed down since 2007 – i.e., the UK productivity puzzle in 
Harris and Moffat (2016a). Regional and city dummies are also included in equation (5.4) to capture 
the TFP advantages and disadvantages of being located in different regions and cities. The dummies 
are equal to one when a firm is located within a particular government office region and a major 
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Great Britain city (defined by NUTS3 code)38. There are 4 main channels through which the location 
of a firm may have an impact on its TFP. The first of such locational impact is knowledge spillovers of 
locating a firm in a major region or city with higher population density. This arises due to large and 
common pool of labour that would facilitate the transfer of knowledge from locating firm in a major 
city or region. As Borowiecki (2003) argues, the cost of transmitting knowledge rises with distance. 
Another benefit of locating a firm in a major city with wider pool of labour is the availability of highly 
skilled workers that are likely to increase the TFP of a firm (e.g., Bacolod et al., 2009; Elvery, 2010). 
Thirdly, a firm located in a major city can obtain important insights from its customers that are in 
close proximity and adapt customers’ needs to its product. Finally, firms located in a major city might 
benefit from the high availability of business services such as financial services, accounting and legal 
service. 
Typically, earlier productivity studies estimate (5.4) without 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝐽𝑖𝑡 on the right-hand-side of the 
equation and obtain TFP as the residual. As part of a two-stage approach, TFP is then regressed on 
some variables in  𝑋𝑖𝑡 to examine its determinants. Clearly, this two-stage approach would lead to 
biased estimates of the elasticities of output (and TFP) because of an omitted variables problem 
(Harris et al., 2005). Thus, equation (5.4) is estimated directly with the variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝐽𝑖𝑡 to 
avoid biased estimates of TFP. Furthermore, equation (5.4) is estimated separately for 8 industrial 
sectors (defined in table 4.2 of chapter 4 by the sophistication of technology used; following Harris 
and Moffat, 2011, 2016a, 2016b) to avoid imposing common coefficients across industries operating 
with potentially distinct technologies39. 
5.3 Estimation Strategy 
There are several approaches that can be used and, indeed, have been used to estimate the 
unknown parameters in equation (5.4). This thesis uses the most commonly applied estimators in 
the productivity literature, allowing for comparison of estimates. In what follows, we show that 
using OLS to estimate parameters in (5.4) leads to biased estimates on the productivity impacts of 
adjustment paths, caused by endogeneity of firms’ input decisions and the self-selection of firms in 
and out of an industry. A potential solution is to assume that the TFP shock in equation (5.4) is firm-
specific but time-invariant, and remove this term by transforming equation (5.4) - a method referred 
to as fixed effects. However, this method requires that productivity is constant over time; an 
assumption that is likely to fail in practice. Another potential solution is to use a two-stage 
 
38 For firms operating plants at different cities/region, we select the region/city with the highest level of 
employment i.e., the dominant region/city. 
39 Each estimated equation includes a full set of 2-digit (SIC92) Industrial dummies to further capture 
technological difference even within a well-defined industry sub-groups. 
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procedure where TFP shock is proxied by other state variables such as firms’ investment decisions 
(Olley and Pakes, 1996) or firms’ intermediate input decisions (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). 
However, this approach relies on some strong assumptions (i.e., strict monotonicity between 
intermediate input demand and productivity shock) that are unlikely to hold in practice. Lastly, we 
show how instrumental variable (IV) and our preferred system GMM approach can be used to obtain 
unbiased and consistent estimates of the impacts of adjustment paths on productivity. 
To further illustrate the theoretical basis for the biases that may arise when we use traditional OLS, 
fixed-effect or semi-parametric methods to estimate the parameters in (5.4) the rest of this section 
is structured as follows. In section 5.3.1, we review earlier estimation methods used in productivity 
literature – OLS and fixed-effects approach - with specific attention to their drawbacks when used to 
estimate parameters in (5.4). Section 5.3.2 explains the increasingly popular semi-parametric 
methods of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003); accompanied by a discussion of 
the main methodological issues that arises when we use these methods to estimate parameters in 
(5.4). Although not used to estimate parameters in (5.4) due to the nature of identifying ‘external’ 
instruments, the instrumental variables (IV) approach is illustrated in 5.3.3. This is then followed 
with the description of our preferred approach of system GMM in the same section. 
5.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed-effects (FE) Method  
OLS can be used to estimate the unknown parameters in (5.4) because of its theoretical and practical 
advantage. However, simple OLS regression of (5.4) would produce biased and inconsistent 
estimates because it ignores endogeneity of input choices and firms’ selection in and out of an 
industry. To illustrate, an OLS regression of equation (5.4) gives: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?0 +  ?̂?𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  ?̂?𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  ?̂?𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  ?̂?𝑗𝐽𝑖𝑡 +  ?̂?𝑖𝑡 +  ?̂?𝑖𝑡                                             (5.6) 
The vector, ?̂?𝑗, can be interpreted as the TFP impact of the different paths of adjustment, but these 
estimates are unbiased and consistent only if the condition 𝐸(𝜈𝑖𝑡|𝑘𝑖𝑡,  𝑙𝑖𝑡 ,  𝑚𝑖𝑡) = 0 is met. For this 
condition to hold, inputs in (5.4) must be exogenously determined.  As first pointed out by Marschak 
and Andrews (1944), firms are likely to make input choices based on, their characteristics, including 
their productivity levels. If a firm has prior knowledge of its productivity at the time input choices are 
made, simultaneity issue arises because the level of input that will be used for production will be 
partially determined by firm’s productivity, which itself is also influenced by inputs choices. This 
would lead to a correlation between input choices and firms’ unobservable productivity i.e., 
𝐸(𝜈𝑖𝑡  |𝑘𝑖𝑡,  𝑙𝑖𝑡 ,  𝑚𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0. Ignoring this issue in the OLS estimation would lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates of output elasticities and TFP (e.g., De Loecker, 2007).  
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Another issue that arises from using OLS to estimate (5.4) is the self-selection of firms in and out of 
an industry. The theoretical models of Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992) predicts that firm-
level productivity play a major role in explaining firms’ entry, growth and exit decisions. Productivity 
is expected to have an impact on these strategic decisions through the capital channel. If a firm 
knows its productivity level prior to an exit decision, this would generate a correlation between 
unobservable productivity and capital stock i.e., 𝐸(𝜈𝑖𝑡  |𝑘𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, because firms with low productivity 
and low capital stock are more likely to exit relatively to firms with low productivity but, high capital 
stock (Ackerberg et al., 2007). Failure to take this into account would likely generate a negative 
correlation between (unobservable) firm-level productivity and their capital stock i.e., 𝐸(𝜈𝑖𝑡  |𝑘𝑖𝑡) <
0 thus, leading to a downward bias on the capital stock coefficient, 𝛽𝑘.  
A potential solution to the simultaneity and selection bias problem discussed above is to assume 
that unobservable firm productivity, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is firm-specific but time-invariant - a method referred to as 
fixed effects. This occurs when the productivity (unobservable to the researcher but known to the 
firm) that drives firms’ input choices varies across firms but is constant over time. The fixed-effects 
method then solves the simultaneity and selection bias problem by eliminating the firm-specific, 
time-invariant productivity that is correlated with input choices. To illustrate, consider the time 
index in 𝜈𝑖𝑡 removed so that equation (5.4) becomes: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝐽𝑖𝑡 +  (𝜈𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                             (5.7) 
Mean differencing (5.7) gives40: 
(𝑦𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖) = 𝛽𝑘(𝑘𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖)  +  𝛽𝑙(𝑙𝑖𝑡 −  𝑙?̅?)  +  𝛽𝑚(𝑚𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖)  +  𝛽𝑥(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)  + 𝛽𝑗(𝐽𝑖𝑡 −  𝐽?̅?)
+ (𝑢𝑖𝑡  − ?̅?𝑖)                                                                                                                        (5.8)  
𝜈𝑖 is eliminated in (5.8) because it does not vary over time i.e, 𝜈𝑖  =  ?̅?𝑖 therefore, 𝜈𝑖  − ?̅?𝑖 =  0. The 
resulting model (5.8) can be estimated using OLS. Provided that 𝜈𝑖 is indeed, time-invariant, OLS 
estimation of equation (5.8) would result in unbiased and consistent estimates of input coefficients. 
Van Beveren (2012) further noted that the fixed-effects method addresses the selection bias 
problem if firms’ entry and exit decision are determined by the time-invariant firm-specific 
productivity, 𝜈𝑖. Thus, an OLS estimation of equation (5.8) should produce unbiased coefficients on 
adjustment paths if indeed, 𝜈𝑖 is time-invariant and it is the only determinant of firm’s entry and exit 
in an industry. This method has a long tradition in the productivity literature since it was originally 
proposed by Mundlak (1961) and Hoch (1962). However, despite its usefulness in addressing the 
issue of simultaneity and selection bias, fixed effects method has been found to perform poorly in 
 
40 An alternative to the mean differencing transformation is the time differencing transformation. Both 
methods eliminate 𝜈𝑖since it does not vary over time.  
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practice. For instance, Griliches and Mairesse (1995) found that fixed effects estimator yields 
unreasonably low estimates of the capital coefficients as well as low estimates of returns to scale. 
Olley and Pakes (1996) also found that the fixed-effects method leads to widely different set of 
coefficients when applied to a balanced and unbalanced sample, suggesting the assumptions 
underlying the model are invalid. The first of such invalid assumptions is the constant productivity 
over time which Del Gatto et al. (2011) argues does not rest on strong theoretical grounds. Secondly, 
fixed-effects method as noted by Wooldridge (2009) rests on the assumption of strict exogeneity of 
inputs. This implies that current and future input choices are not affected by productivity, an 
assumption that is likely to fail in practice. 
Another issue that may be of concern when using fixed-effects (or even OLS) is when 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡  | 𝐽𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, which implies that the factors, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 that determine TFP also drive firms’ choice 
of adjustment. Indeed, when we empirically modelled the determinants of firms’ choice of 
adjustment in chapter 4, the variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 were included on the right-hand-side. This is because 
theory suggests that firms’ decision to choose a particular path of adjustment depend fundamentally 
on their prospects for profits, which in turn depends on their productivity levels and on the different 
costs and revenues associated with each path of adjustment. Therefore, fixed-effects regression of 
equation (5.4) would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates because, if as theory suggests, firms 
choose a particular path of adjustment in a given period based on their level of productivity, then 
while productivity may be affected by firms’ choice of adjustment, the reverse will also be true – 
adjustment choice will also be determined by productivity. We found in chapter 4 that most of the 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 variables that determine productivity also drive firms’ choice of adjustment, as predicted by 
theory. 
5.3.2 Semi-parametric Methods of Olley and Pakes and Levinsohn and Petrin 
An extensive discussion of this approach is provided in Van Beveren (2012) and Del Gatto et al. 
(2011). However, in this section we provide a brief explanation as to how the methods are set out to 
address the problem of simultaneity and selection bias. More importantly, we focus on the 
shortcomings of using these approaches and why they are not our preferred method of estimation. 
Olley and Pakes (1996) approach replaces equation (5.4) with: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡(𝑖𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡)  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                     (5.9) 
Where 𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡(𝑖𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) = 𝑖𝑖𝑡
−1(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝜈𝑖𝑡), which implies that unobserved productivity, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is proxied by 
𝜈𝑖𝑡(. ) and can be estimated using a higher-order polynomial in 𝑖𝑖𝑡 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡 to approximate for 𝜈𝑖𝑡. 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argue that because the monotonicity condition (i.e., firm’s investment is 
a strictly increasing function of productivity) in Olley and Pakes (1996) which implies that only non-
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negative values of investment can be used when estimating equation (5.9), this could lead to a 
significantly loss in efficiency, particularly in data that contains a significant number of firms that 
report zero investment. As a result, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose that intermediate inputs 
constitute a better proxy (since firms always report a positive value for intermediate inputs) to 
control for the simultaneity between input choice and productivity. Because this method is the most 
commonly used approach of the two and is one of the method used in this chapter, we focus more 
on this approach. Assuming demand for intermediate inputs depends on capital and productivity 
and it is strictly increasing in productivity, allowing (unobserved) productivity to be expressed as a 
function of observable intermediate inputs and capital; intermediate inputs and productivity can 
then be expressed as follows: 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝜈𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                                                          (5.10) 
𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) =  𝑚𝑖𝑡
−1(𝜈𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                             (5.11) 
Substituting equation (5.11) into (5.4) and excluding 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝐽𝑖𝑡 gives: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡)  +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                   (5.12) 
Equation (5.12) can be estimated using a higher-order polynomial in 𝑚𝑖𝑡 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡. The estimated 
equation results in consistent estimates of 𝛽𝑙 (the variable factor of production), although 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑚 
are not identified since capital and intermediate inputs enter the equation more than once. In the 
second stage the authors regressed output on capital and intermediate inputs. In other words, the 
following model is estimated: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =   𝑦𝑖𝑡 −  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                      (5.13) 
To estimate 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑚 Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that productivity follows a first-order 
markov process:  
𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[𝜈𝑖𝑡  | 𝜈𝑖𝑡−1 ] +  𝜉𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                               (5.14) 
Where 𝜉𝑖𝑡 represents the innovation component of 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 and is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
capital in period t. An estimate of 𝐸[𝜈𝑖𝑡  | 𝜈𝑖𝑡−1 ] can be derived from the estimates in equation 
(5.12). The second stage of the estimation algorithm can therefore, be derived as:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =   𝑦𝑖𝑡 −  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸[𝜈𝑖𝑡  | 𝜈𝑖𝑡−1 ] +  𝜉𝑖𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                      (5.15) 
Since the innovation component 𝜉𝑖𝑡 is uncorrelated with capital, the estimated equation results in 
consistent estimate of 𝛽𝑘. However, the same does not hold for intermediate inputs which may 
respond to 𝜉𝑖𝑡. In order to produce a consistent estimate of 𝛽𝑚, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) used 
moment condition implied by the fact that intermediate inputs in t -1 will be uncorrelated with 
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productivity innovation in period t. As such, all the coefficients required to compute TFP are 
identified.  
Despite representing a better method than Olley and Pakes (1996), this method suffers from several 
drawbacks. The first, as pointed out by Ackerberg et al. (2006) is that some unappealing assumptions 
must be made for 𝛽𝑙 to be identified in the first stage of the estimation algorithm. Ackerberg et al. 
(2006) argue that this approach suffers from serious collinearity problems arising from the fact that 
labour, like capital and intermediate inputs, needs to be allocated by the firm in some way and at a 
point in time. If, indeed, labour and intermediate inputs are chosen at the same time, one can 
assume that they are both chosen as a function of productivity and capital, so that labour can be 
written as: 
𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑖𝑡(𝜈𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                                                               (5.16) 
 Substituting equation (5.11) into equation (5.16) gives: 
𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑖𝑡(𝜈𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡), 𝑘𝑖𝑡) = ℎ(𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                   (5.17) 
Hence, labour is also a function of intermediate inputs and capital which implies perfect collinearity 
between labour and 𝜈𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡) in the first stage of the estimation algorithm and, therefore, 𝛽𝑙 is 
not identified in the first-stage. Secondly, this approach, together with Olley and Pakes (1996) 
method, only allows productivity shock and no other component of the error term that is constant 
but unobservable (i.e., managerial ability) to be correlated with factor inputs. As these fixed-effects 
are likely to be important determinants of output, omitting them presents a major drawback of the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach41. Finally, Ackerberg et al. (2006) noted that this method 
requires the assumption that there must be strict monotonicity between intermediate input demand 
and the productivity shock. If this assumption fails, then the intermediate input function cannot be 
inverted and used as a function for the productivity shock. 
5.3.3 Instrumental Variables (IV) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
Approach 
Another method for achieving unbiased and consistent estimates is by instrumenting the 
explanatory variables that are causing the endogeneity problems – a method referred to as 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation. This method assumes that each of the endogenous variables 
contain 2 distinct parts. The first part is correlated with the TFP term 𝜈𝑖𝑡  thus, causing the 
endogeneity problems, while the second part is uncorrelated with 𝜈𝑖𝑡 . IV method then uses 
 
41 Including extensions by Ackerberg et al. (2006); Wooldridge (2009); Van Biesebroeck (2005); De Loecker 
(2007) 
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instruments to simulate the variation in the endogenous variables that are uncorrelated with 𝜈𝑖𝑡 . 
However, for instruments to be valid in the IV method they must satisfy 3 main conditions (Greene, 
2008). The first is that instruments should not enter directly into equation (5.4). Secondly, 
instruments must be correlated with the endogenous variables – instrument relevance. In fact, the 
more the correlation that is explained by instruments, the more information provided to explain the 
endogenous variables. Thirdly, instruments must be uncorrelated with the error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 – 
instrument exogeneity condition. Formally, instruments vector, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, must be satisfy the following 
assumptions for them to be valid: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖𝑡 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡)  ≠ 0                                                                                                                                   (5.18) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡  | 𝐽𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡)  =  0                                                                                                                            (5.19) 
𝐷𝑖𝑡, represents a vector of the endogenous variables, 𝑘𝑖𝑡 ,  𝑙𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐽𝑖𝑡. When such instruments 
are available, unbiased and consistent estimates can be obtained by applying the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) approach. This is performed by first, regressing the endogenous variables on the 
instrumental variables to remove the parts of the former variables that are correlated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡. The 
second stage then involves substituting the endogenous variables in (5.4) with their fitted values 
(i.e., the parts that are uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡). Intuitively, IV estimation removes the part of the 
endogenous (vector) variables 𝐷𝑖𝑡 that are correlated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡, and uses the uncorrelated parts of 
the endogenous variables to estimate parameters in (5.4).   
However, the major challenge of the IV approach is finding instruments that satisfy the 3 conditions 
in Greene (2008). The natural choice of instruments for input quantities are input and output prices. 
Assuming firms operate in a perfectly competitive market, input prices can be used as an instrument 
for input quantities because firms have no power to set the prices of input. However, when a firm 
has market power, input prices are likely to be set according to their quantities and firm-level 
productivity (Van Beveren, 2012). When this happens, input prices, just like quantities would be 
correlated with TFP thus, rendering them endogenous and failing the assumption in (5.19). 
Moreover, input prices are often unreported or they are reported with less precision by firms. For 
instance, in the financial statements of firms, labour costs are often calculated as average wage per 
worker. If such variable reflects (exogenous) labour market conditions, then this is a suitable 
instrument for labour quantities. However, since wages are often determined by the employees’ 
quality and skills rather than (exogenous) labour market conditions, this would be transmitted to TFP 
(as labour quality), generating a correlation with wages and rendering it as an invalid instrument 
(Ackerberg et al., 2007). Using wages as instruments therefore result in biased and inconsistent 
estimates of parameters in (5.4). 
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Other instruments that have been suggested in literature include variables that shift demand for 
output or the supply of inputs. Such instruments include weather conditions or exogenous shocks on 
the labour markets that are likely to be more valid than input prices. However, such clear-cut 
instruments are relatively harder to come by in the productivity literature. Even in a case where a 
researcher finds such instruments, they are likely to only deal with the simultaneity bias and not 
selection bias or the endogeneity of adjustment choices. As a result, instrumental variables that can 
shift demand for output or shift the supply of inputs are rarely used in practice possibly, due to the 
difficulty in finding suitable ‘external’ instruments for all endogenous variables. Since, we face a 
similar difficulty in finding appropriate ‘external’ instruments; this thesis does not use this 2SLS 
approach. Instead, we use a different type of IV approach that relies on ‘internal’ instruments that is 
contained within the panel itself – the system GMM approach.  
The system GMM approach developed in a series of papers by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) accommodates (fixed) 
unobserved heterogeneity and tackles the problem of simultaneity and selection bias by using 
lagged values (in first different and levels) of the explanatory variables as instruments. The basic 
estimation procedure consists rewriting equation (5.4) in dynamic form – that is, with additional 
lagged value of output: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝐽𝑖𝑡 +  (𝜈𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)                             (5.20) 
In equation (5.20), the time-invariant term, 𝜈𝑖 is correlated with 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1and therefore, the equation 
cannot be estimated using OLS. Similarly, fixed effects method that involves eliminating 𝜈𝑖 via 
within-transformation cannot be used because a non-zero correlation exists between the 
transformed lagged value of output and the transformed error term i.e., 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 −  
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇
𝑡=1  share 
many elements with 𝑢𝑖𝑡 −  
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 . This is because 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 −  
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇
𝑡=1  depends on 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 −
 
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇
𝑡=1 . Alternatively, the time-invariant term, 𝜈𝑖 can be removed by first differencing. Thus, 
we can write the dynamic model of (5.20) in first-difference form: 
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑦𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑘𝛥𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑚𝛥𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑥𝛥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝛥𝐽𝑖𝑡 +  𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡                      (5.21) 
Despite the elimination of the time-invariant term, 𝜈𝑖 in equation (5.21), there exists a correlation 
between 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡 because they both contain the error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1. As a result, OLS cannot 
be used to estimate parameters in equation (5.21). However, if 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated in (5.20), then the values of the output lagged by 2 or more periods (data permitting) 
can be used as instruments for the endogenous regressor, 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1. In other words, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−3, . . . . 
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., 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝 can be used as instruments for 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 because 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑠 |𝑁𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐽𝑖𝑡]42 = 0  ⩝  𝑡 ≠ 𝑠, 
which implies that 𝐶𝑜𝑣{𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑘, 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡} = 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 2, 3, . . . . , 𝑝. Therefore, unbiased and consistent 
estimates of the parameters in equation (5.21) can be obtained by 2SLS. However, 2SLS does not 
exploit the complete set of moment conditions. Instead, the difference GMM estimator fully exploits 
all available moment condition and uses the following instrument matrix: 
𝑍𝑖 =  [
𝑦𝑖𝑡−4 0 … … 0 … 0
. . 𝑦𝑖𝑡−4 𝑦𝑖𝑡−3 . … .
0 0 0 … 𝑦𝑖𝑡−4 𝑦𝑖𝑡−3 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2
]                                                                       (5.22) 
Where the first row contains the instrument sets for 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−3, the second row the instrument set for 
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 and the final row the instrument set for 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1. To limit instruments proliferation, equation 
(5.22) can be collapsed into one column: 
𝑍𝑖 = [
𝑦𝑖𝑡−4
𝑦𝑖𝑡−3
𝑦𝑖𝑡−2
]                                                                                                                                                      (5.23) 
The moment conditions are given by: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑖
′ ,  𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡  ) = 0                                                                                                                                        (5.24) 
Where 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡−2 ,  𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 ,  𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡)
′. The difference GMM estimator minimizes the following 
criterion: 
𝐽𝑁 =  (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛥𝑢𝑖
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑍𝑖) 𝑊𝑁 (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑍𝑖
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝛥𝑢𝑖)                                                                                                 (5.25) 
Where the weighting matrix, 𝑊𝑁, is given by: 
𝑊𝑁 =  [
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑍𝑖
′𝛥?̂?𝑖𝛥?̂?𝑖
′𝑍𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
]                                                                                                                           (5.26) 
Where 𝛥?̂?𝑖 is a consistent estimate of the first-difference error taken from an initial consistent 
estimator. For simplicity, we have assumed so far that 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is the only endogenous regressor in 
(5.20). However, the difference GMM can easily accommodate other endogenous regressors. 
Indeed, under the additional assumption that the vectors, 𝛥𝑁𝑖𝑡43 and 𝛥𝐽𝑖𝑡  are endogenous and 
therefore, correlated with 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡, the vectors can be treated the same way as 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 whereby 
historical values of 𝑁𝑖𝑡  and 𝐽𝑖𝑡 i.e., 𝑁𝑖𝑡−2, 𝑁𝑖𝑡−3, . . . ., 𝑁𝑖𝑡−𝑝 and; 𝐽𝑖𝑡−2, 𝐽𝑖𝑡−3, . . . ., 𝐽𝑖𝑡−𝑝 can be used 
 
42 𝑁𝑖𝑡, represents a vector of factor inputs: 𝑘𝑖𝑡 ,  𝑙𝑖𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑡 
43 𝛥𝑁𝑖𝑡, represents a vector of first-difference factor inputs: 𝛥𝑘𝑖𝑡 ,  𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛥𝑚𝑖𝑡  
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as instruments for 𝛥𝑁𝑖𝑡  and 𝛥𝐽𝑖𝑡 respectively. Since, the vector, 𝛥𝑋𝑖𝑡44 is assumed to be exogenous, 
it can be used as its own instruments (also known as included instruments). 
An important feature of the difference GMM is its use of firm historical values as instruments for our 
regressors. That is, in estimating equation (5.20) or the first-difference transformation of equation 
(5.4) in dynamic form, our instruments will be drawn from the set of lagged dependent and 
explanatory variables i.e., 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−3, . . . . ., 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝;  𝑁𝑖𝑡−2, 𝑁𝑖𝑡−3, . . . ., 𝑁𝑖𝑡−𝑝; 𝐽𝑖𝑡−2, 𝐽𝑖𝑡−3, . . . ., 𝐽𝑖𝑡−𝑝 
and 𝑋𝑖𝑡−2, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−3, . . . ., 𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑝. For these instruments to be valid, they must meet 2 main criteria. First, 
the historical values of the dependent and explanatory variables must be uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡 in 
equation (5.20). This implies that the historical values must provide an exogenous source of variation 
for our endogenous regressors: lagged output, factor inputs and firm’s choice of adjustment.  As 
earlier discussed, under the assumption that 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is serially uncorrelated in (5.20), the values of the 
output lagged by 2 or more periods (data permitting) can be used as instruments for 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 in 
equation (5.21). This is because the 𝑢𝑖𝑡−2 in 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 for instance, is uncorrelated with 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖𝑡 −
 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1. Further, if factor inputs and firms’ choice of adjustment behave in the same way as lagged 
output, then their historical values, 2 years or longer, can also be used as valid instruments. Since, 
the vector, 𝛥𝑋𝑖𝑡  is assumed to be exogenous and thus, uncorrelated with 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡, it can be used as its 
own instruments. Assuming these exogeneity conditions are valid, then we can write the following 
orthogonality conditions: 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡] =  𝐸[𝑁𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡] =  𝐸[𝐽𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡] =  𝐸[𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡] = 0   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑠 = 2, 3, . . . . . , 𝑝        (5.27) 
The second criterion for the instruments to be valid is that the historical values of our instruments 
must be highly correlated with the endogenous regressors: lagged output, factor inputs and firms’ 
choice of adjustment. In other words, they must provide a source of variation for our endogenous 
regressors.  In our discussion on the determinants of firms’ choice of adjustment in chapter 2, we 
established a theoretical motivation for why productivity differences across firms should influence 
their choice of adjustment. In addition, we found in our empirical analysis of chapter 4 that firms, 
indeed, choose different paths of adjustment based on their lagged values and their characteristics 
i.e., 𝑋𝑖𝑡. As such, we expect past values of adjustment and firms’ characteristics in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 to be 
correlated with firm’s chosen path of adjustment.  
However, it has been found in the productivity literature that lagged values of input tend to be only 
weakly correlated with input changes because inputs tend to be highly persistent over time. 
Moreover, using lagged inputs to instrument for changes in input in empirical practice has often led 
 
44 R&D is treated as endogenous with its historical values serving as instruments for the variable. 
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to downward bias of the capital coefficient (e.g., Blundell and Bond, 1998). Arellano and Bover 
(1995) thus, suggested that variables in levels may be weak instruments for first difference 
equations such as equation (5.21). Another drawback of estimating (5.21) is that differencing may 
reduce the power of our test by reducing the variation in the explanatory variables, if the original 
model is theoretically in levels (Beck at al., 2000). Finally, first-differencing may intensify the impact 
of measurement errors on the dependent variable (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
To mitigate the aforementioned shortcoming of differenced GMM, Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed a system GMM estimator which includes the equation in levels 
in the estimation procedure. The authors proposed that the shortcomings of differenced GMM can 
be improved by using lagged first-difference variables as instruments for the equation in levels, in 
addition to using lagged level variables as instruments for the equation in first-difference. The 
procedure involves estimating the following system: 
[
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡
] = 𝛼 +  𝛱 [
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
] +  𝛽 [
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛥𝑁𝑖𝑡
] +  𝛾 [
𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝛥𝑋𝑖𝑡
] +  𝜅 [
𝐽𝑖𝑡
𝛥𝐽𝑖𝑡
] + [
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡
]                                            (5.28) 
Where 𝑁𝑖𝑡  represents factor inputs: capital, labour and intermediate inputs. Unfortunately, the 
levels equation in (5.28) includes the time-invariant term, 𝜈𝑖 which is correlated with 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and 
potentially, correlated with other explanatory variables.  To deal with this, we assume that while 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and other control variables may be correlated with 𝜈𝑖, this correlation is constant over time. 
This is a reasonable assumption over a relatively short period of time if 𝜈𝑖 proxy for factors such as 
unobserved managerial ability and productivity. This assumption leads to an additional set of 
orthogonality conditions: 
𝐸[𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜈𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)] =  𝐸[𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜈𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)] = 𝐸[𝛥𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜈𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡)] = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 > 0               (5.29)  
System GMM is used to estimate parameters in (5.28) using the orthogonality conditions of (5.27) 
and (5.29). These orthogonality conditions imply that we can use lagged level variables as 
instruments for the differenced equation and lagged first-difference variables as instruments for the 
level equation45.  As a result, the system GMM approach has an advantage over the 2SLS approach 
because it allows us to rely on ‘internal’ instruments that are contained within the panel itself. The 
system GMM approach also improves on OLS, fixed-effects and the semi-parametric method of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in at least 3 important ways. First, unlike OLS, system GMM allows us to 
tackle selection bias and endogeneity of factor inputs and firms’ choice of adjustment by using their 
lagged values (in levels and first-difference) as instruments. Second, unlike fixed effects, it does not 
 
45 We carry out tests of the validity of the orthogonality conditions in (5.28) and (5.29).  
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improve the endogeneity of inputs and selection bias problem at the expense of a strong exogeneity 
condition. Third, unlike the semi-parametric method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), it allows us to 
include fixed effects to account for (fixed) unobserved heterogeneity among firms. This estimator 
therefore, has advantage over the earlier discussed estimators because it allows the inclusion of 
fixed-effects and tackles endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables and selection bias by using 
their lagged values (in levels and first-difference) as instruments.  
As noted earlier, the validity of system GMM estimation hinges, at least in part, on the assumption 
of joint exogeneity of instruments. Because the system GMM uses multiple lags as instruments, our 
system is over-identified i.e., more instruments than endogenous variables, therefore, providing us 
with the opportunity to carry out the test of over-identification. We use the Hansen test of over-
identification to check whether our instruments are valid or not. The Hansen test produces a J-
statistics that tests the null hypothesis that instruments are distributed independently of the 
production function and are uncorrelated with the residuals. Thus, a rejection of the null hypothesis 
would imply that at least one of our instruments is not exogenous rendering our estimates in (5.28) 
invalid. However, as noted by Roodman (2009), the Hansen test is weak when there are many 
instruments. As a result, we carry out an additional test to check for the validity of instruments.  
Recall that, the use of lagged values (in levels and first-difference) of explanatory variables as 
instruments depend crucially on the absence of serial correlation in the error term of the equation in 
levels i.e., equation (5.20). If the errors in equation (5.20) are serially correlated, then the first-
difference errors i.e., the error term in equation (5.21) would be AR(2) or higher order. Therefore, by 
testing for serial correlation, one can ascertain the validity of instruments or otherwise. However, 
standard tests for serial correlation such as Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey are not appropriate 
for our dynamic model. Instead, we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. If the 
assumptions of our specification are valid, by construction, the residuals in first-difference (AR(1)) 
should be correlated while the residuals in second-difference (AR(2)) should not be correlated. This 
is because 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 is likely to be correlated with 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 =  𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−2, as the 2 share 
the same error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1. But, for the second-difference residual test, 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 in 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡 should not be 
correlated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡−2 in 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡−2. 
5.4 Firm-level Results 
As stated in the introduction, the focus of this chapter is to examine the effect of alternative forms 
of adjustment on TFP.  To highlight the potential problems associated with ignoring fixed-effects, 
selection bias due to firm entry and exit, endogeneity of input and the dynamic relationship between 
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firm adjustment and productivity, we estimate the equation (5.28) using the following models: OLS 
model, fixed-effects model and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) model. However, we start by using the 
system GMM approach to estimate equation (5.28) because of its theoretically appeal in dealing 
with the aforementioned endogeneity and simultaneity issues (explained in section 5.3.3)46.  
When using system GMM to estimate equation (5.28), several alternative specifications of 𝐽𝑖𝑡 were 
tested. In particular, we examine the question: to what extent do adjustment paths affect TFP (i.e., 
do adjustment paths have a short- or long-run effect on TFP, or both)? To answer this question, we 
start with the assumption that there is a long-run relationship between the different paths of 
adjustment and TFP47. In other words, as our baseline, we specify 𝐽𝑖𝑡 as equals one in the year a firm 
carries out an adjustment and remains one in subsequent years (zero otherwise). We then carry out 
a series of test by including single-year dummies to determine whether there are short-run effects 
on the path to the new long-run level of productivity. For instance, mergers and acquisition may 
have a (positive) long-run effect on productivity, but it may take a few years to reach the new long-
run level of productivity. Thus, short-run adjustment dummies are sequentially included into 𝐽𝑖𝑡, and 
using a F-test, we determine, each time, whether these short-run dummy variables are jointly equal 
to zero (i.e., whether they bring additional information into our model).  
The first of such tests was carried out on the immediate effect of adjustment on productivity. In 
other words, we include a set of adjustment dummies that are equal to one in the year of 
adjustment (zero otherwise), and using the F-test, we check if the coefficients on these dummies are 
jointly equal to zero. Our result (not presented in this thesis because of brevity) shows that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis (at the 90% level) that these dummy variables were jointly equal to 
zero. So, we exclude an immediate effect of adjustments on productivity and stopped the process of 
searching for short-run effects48.  Since, we find that there are no short-run effects of adjustments 
on TFP, we proceed to checking for lag effects (i.e., does a firm wishing to close a plant experience 
any performance decline in terms of TFP before it closes the plant). We found that only adjustments 
t-1 (which is set of dummy variables that is equals one in the year before the adjustment and, zero 
otherwise) have a joint effect on TFP. Hence, our statistical procedure leads to a model that captures 
the long-run and lag effects of using different forms of adjustments on TFP. However, we estimate 
 
46 This is carried out on STATA 14.2, using the xtabond command introduced by Roodman (2009)  
47 This is a reasonable assumption to make as one might expect adjustments such as greenfield investment and 
mergers and acquisition to have a long-run effect on firm’s productivity.  
48 This exercise was performed separately for the 8 industrial sectors (defined according to table 4.2) to avoid 
imposing common coefficients across industries operating with potentially distinct technologies and the F-test 
was statistically insignificant across all sectors. As a quick check, we also include short-run adjustment 
dummies that are equal to one in the year after the adjustment and found the coefficients to be jointly equal 
to zero in all sectors. 
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the same model using OLS, fixed-effects and Levinsohn-Petrin approach; allowing for comparison of 
estimates with the system GMM approach. 
Table 5-1: Returns-to-scale from system GMM, OLS, Fixed-effects and Levinsohn-Petrin estimators, 
Manufacturing 
System GMM 
Variables  
High-
tech 
z-value 
Med. 
high-
tech 
z-value 
Med. 
low-tech 
z-value 
Low-
tech 
z-value 
ln Intermediate 
inputs 
0.654 5.52 0.677 9.30 0.758 13.11 0.526 3.92 
ln Employment 0.243 1.91 0.206 1.95 0.114 1.27 0.298 2.74 
ln Capital 0.093 1.70 0.105 1.67 0.06 1.83 0.223 2.47 
Returns-to-scale 0.990  0.988  0.932  1.047  
OLS 
Variables 
High-
tech 
t-value 
Med. 
high-
tech 
t-value 
Med. 
low-tech 
t-value 
Low-
tech 
t-value 
ln Intermediate 
inputs 
0.21 8.32 0.182 11.65 0.201 10.37 0.190 9.27 
ln Employment 0.408 13.33 0.386 17.71 0.333 13.82 0.322 11.74 
ln Capital 0.004 1.08 0.011 2.95 0.006 2.36 0.011 4.09 
Returns-to-scale 0.622  0.579  0.540  0.523  
Fixed-effects 
Variables 
High-
tech 
t-value 
Med. 
high-
tech 
t-value 
Med. 
low-tech 
t-value 
Low-
tech 
t-value 
ln Intermediate 
inputs 
0.204 4.35 0.333 11.34 0.422 8.31 0.319 20.96 
ln Employment 0.438 8.93 0.416 11.93 0.403 10.83 0.355 30.31 
ln Capital 0.031 2.41 0.01 1.70 0.008 1.55 0.004 2.16 
Returns-to-scale 0.673  0.759  0.833  0.678  
Levinsohn-Petrin 
Variables 
High-
tech 
t-value 
Med. 
high-
tech 
t-value 
Med. 
low-tech 
t-value 
Low-
tech 
t-value 
ln Intermediate 
inputs 
1.14 5.79 0.699 3.28 0.717 6.06 1.078 7.14 
ln Employment 0.311 15.86 0.229 19.41 0.259 27.44 0.228 31.53 
ln Capital 0.000 0.00 0.073 1.87 0.047 2.93 0.029 1.28 
Returns-to-scale 1.451  1.001  1.023  1.335  
 
Comparing all estimates across the 4 estimators would lead to a tedious exercise; as a result, we 
focus on comparing estimates of elasticity of output with respect to intermediate inputs, labour and 
capital. This would be useful in illustrating the poor performance of the other estimators against the 
system GMM and to highlight their theoretical shortcomings (as explained in detail in section 5.3). 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report the returns-to-scale coefficients obtained for manufacturing and service 
sectors respectively. In the manufacturing sector, we generally find that our estimates are 
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statistically significant at the 90% level across different estimators. Our preferred system GMM 
estimator produces a sum of output elasticities that are close to one (i.e., 0.99 in high-tech and 
medium high-tech manufacturing; 0.93 in medium low-tech manufacturing and; 1.05 in low-tech 
manufacturing), with an average of 0.99. This suggests that firms in the manufacturing sector 
produce the same quantity of output from a given proportion of input utilized. In contrast, the 
average sum of elasticities estimates from OLS and fixed effects are 0.57 and 0.74 respectively, 
indicating a decreasing returns-to-scale. These estimators produce particularly, low capital 
coefficients, suggesting that, as expected, there is a downward bias on capital introduced by the 
different endogeneity issues explained in section 5.3. Levinsohn-Petrin approach also produces very 
low coefficients on capital, especially in the high-tech manufacturing sector. As shown in section 
5.3.2, a major shortcoming of the Levinsohn-Petrin approach is that it does not allow for unobserved 
time-invariant effects in the error term that is correlated with factor inputs. As these fixed-effects 
are likely to be important due to the existence of unobservable variables such as managerial ability 
that determine output levels, this a major drawback with the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach. 
Table 5-2: Returns-to-scale from system GMM, OLS, Fixed-effects and Levinsohn-Petrin estimators, 
Services 
System GMM 
Variables  High-
tech KI z-value KI z-value 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
Other 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
ln Intermediate 
inputs 
0.563 5.51 0.527 5.92 0.62 6.38 0.75 8.06 
ln Employment 0.402 2.52 0.463 3.71 0.219 1.83 0.223 1.65 
ln Capital 0.149 1.94 0.03 2.11 0.188 2.78 0.004 0.41 
Returns-to-scale 1.114  1.02  1.027  0.977  
OLS 
Variables  High-
tech KI t-value KI t-value 
Low-
tech KI t-value 
Other 
Low-
tech KI t-value 
ln Intermediate 
inputs 
0.085 6.52 0.081 6.52 0.082 10.56 0.111 6.71 
ln Employment 0.193 11.19 0.192 11.3 0.269 14.87 0.211 9.11 
ln Capital 0.003 0.92 0.003 0.95 -0.001 -0.54 -0.001 -0.49 
Returns-to-scale 0.281  0.276  0.35  0.321  
Fixed-effects 
Variables  High-
tech KI t-value KI t-value 
Low-
tech KI t-value 
Other 
Low-
tech KI t-value 
ln Intermediate 
inputs 
0.277 5.78 0.211 5.66 0.289 11.42 0.426 7.4 
ln Employment 0.238 7.06 0.25 9.46 0.385 20.2 0.234 5.28 
ln Capital 0.001 0.25 0.012 2.8 0.003 0.67 0.002 0.59 
Returns-to-scale 0.516  0.473  0.677  0.662  
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Levinsohn-Petrin 
Variables  High-
tech KI t-value KI t-value 
Low-
tech KI t-value 
Other 
Low-
tech KI t-value 
ln Intermediate 
inputs 
0.831 5.06 1.079 5.79 0.656 31.51 0.779 15.6 
ln Employment 0.281 7.15 0.262 9.5 0.253 33.89 0.304 6.25 
ln Capital 0.028 1.14 0.096 1.86 0.035 4.00 0.039 1.84 
Returns-to-scale 1.140  1.437  0.944  1.122  
 
A similar pattern appears in the service sector, as shown in table 5.2. The system GMM approach 
produces reasonable coefficients on intermediate inputs, labour and capital, while OLS and fixed-
effect yield very low coefficients on these variables. Levinsohn-Petrin approach, again, produces a 
low capital coefficient. This indicates that the endogeneity issues associated with OLS, fixed-effect 
and Levinsohn-Petrin are not limited to the manufacturing sector. Since the system GMM produces 
reasonable coefficients on the elasticity of output with respect to intermediate inputs, labour and 
capital, the rest of this section interprets results from our system GMM estimation.  
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 in appendix 5.6 present the entire results from our system GMM estimation 
across 8 industrial sectors49. The tables also report the results of the specification test associated 
with each estimated equation: the Hansen test of over-identifying restriction and two Arellano and 
Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in differenced residuals. The 
results of the Hansen tests reveal J-statistics with p-values between 0.20 and 0.99 which indicates 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid at the 10% level. With 
regards to the two Arellano and Bond (1991) tests, the AR(1) tests in Tables A5.1 and A5.2 produce 
p-values of 0.00, while the AR(2) tests yield p-values between 0.13 and 0.70 which means that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation (at the 10% level) for all the 8 
industrial sectors. These results provide the basis for treating our model as adequate. In what 
follows, we discuss the parameter estimates associated with 𝐽𝑖𝑡 and  𝑋𝑖𝑡  by grouping them into: 
expansion, contraction and Other TFP effects. 
As a robustness check, we recode each of the expansion and contraction category and re-estimate 
using the system GMM approach. Specifically, internal expansion was recoded from internal 
expansion ‘only’ + internal expansion ‘dominant’ to internal expansion ‘only’. The same recoding was 
done for greenfield investment, mergers and acquisition, internal contraction, plant closure and 
plant sale. Our recoding led to 2 further categories of firms using a combination of several paths of 
adjustment. In particular, we merged three category of expanding firms namely; internal expansion 
 
49 Appendix A5 also produces the entire results from our OLS, fixed-effects and Levinsohn-Petrin estimation.  
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‘dominant’, greenfield investment ‘dominant’ and mergers and acquisition ‘dominant’ and referred 
to them as expansion dominant. We also merge the three contraction ‘dominant’ categories and 
referred to those as contraction dominant. These new categories were re-estimated using the 
system GMM approach. The results presented in tables 5.15 and 5.16 (in appendix 5.7) are 
qualitatively similar to those presented in tables 5.3 and 5.4 (i.e., no statistically significant long-run 
adjustment effects and few statistical significant short-run adjustment effects).  
5.4.1 Expansion Effects on TFP 
Table 5-3: System GMM estimation of expansion effects on TFP, 1997-2012, Great Britaina 
Manufacturing 
Variables  High-
tech z-value 
Med. 
high-
tech z-value 
Medium 
low-tech z-value 
Low-
tech z-value 
Internal expansion (t-1) 0.024 0.26 0.089 1.51 0.020 0.70 0.103 2.31 
Greenfield investment (t-1) -0.334 -2.13 0.135 0.63 -0.065 -0.29 -0.079 -0.51 
Mergers and acquisition (t-1) -0.137 -0.27 -0.210 -1.04 0.235 1.54 0.098 0.32 
Internal expansion (Long-run) -0.080 -0.49 -0.032 -0.68 -0.048 -1.26 -0.277 -1.09 
Greenfield investment (Long-run) 0.048 0.40 0.009 0.18 -0.057 -1.01 -0.099 -1.22 
Mergers and acquisition (Long-run) 0.163 1.25 -0.007 -0.17 0.043 0.55 0.118 1.14 
Services 
Variables  High-
tech KI z-value KI z-value 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
Other 
Low -
tech KI z-value 
Internal expansion (t-1) 0.296 2.70 -0.046 -0.37 -0.004 -0.03 0.020 0.31 
Greenfield investment (t-1) 0.010 0.05 0.322 1.70 0.234 1.50 -0.084 -0.34 
Mergers and acquisition (t-1) -0.109 -0.36 -0.480 -0.73 0.092 0.18 -0.373 -0.52 
Internal expansion (Long-run) 0.111 0.41 0.292 1.05 0.181 1.15 -0.054 -0.24 
Greenfield investment (Long-run) 0.060 0.22 -0.021 -0.09 -0.185 -1.29 0.003 0.01 
Mergers and acquisition (Long-run) 0.046 0.22 -0.104 -0.64 -0.022 -0.20 -0.157 -0.47 
a Parameter values for dummy variables are converted using exp(β) - 1  
The result obtained for the expansion-paths variables in equation (5.28) are reported in table 5.3. 
We start by comparing the ex-ante TFP performance of expanding and non-adjusting firms. This tells 
us whether future expanding firms were more productive than their non-adjusting counterparts 
even before expansion. It therefore differs from the firm-level variables used to study the 
determinants of firms’ choice of adjustment in chapter four. Table 5.3 shows that firms that decide 
to expand internally generally enjoy better ex-ante TFP than non-adjusting firms, except for KI and 
low-KI service sectors. However, these coefficients are statistically insignificant in most industrial 
sectors apart from low-tech manufacturing and high-tech KI service; in these sectors, we find that 
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firms that use internal expansion had on average 11% and 34%50 higher ex-ante TFP than firms that 
did not adjust.  
With regards to greenfield investment, we find mixed results – the coefficients on the greenfield 
dummy is positive in medium high-tech manufacturing, high-tech KI service, KI service and low-tech 
KI service sectors and, it is negative in the other 4 industrial sectors. Most of these coefficients are 
however, statistically insignificant apart from those in the high-tech manufacturing and KI service 
sectors. When compared to non-adjusting firms, firms in high-tech manufacturing had on average 
28% lower ex-ante TFP, while firms in the KI service sector had on average 38% higher ex-ante TFP. 
There are similar mixed results for firms that use mergers and acquisition. However, none of the 
coefficients associated with the mergers and acquisition dummy is statistically significant. In sum, we 
find some evidence that internal expansion tends to occur in response to improvement in TFP, one 
period before the expansion. By contrast, firms that use external expansion, particularly mergers 
and acquisition display no improvement in productivity, prior to using this form of expansion. There 
are few studies against which to make any comparison, however, this result is partly at odds with 
our first hypothesis (in chapter two) that high-productivity firms are more likely to use external 
forms of expansion than low-productivity firms. 
Turning now to the ex-post productivity effect of alternative forms of expansion, table 5.3 reveals 
that internal expansion has a negative long-run effect on TFP in all the manufacturing sectors, while 
the same form of expansion has a positive long-run effect on TFP in all the service sectors (except for 
the other low-tech KI service sector). However, the coefficients associated with this dummy variable 
are statistically insignificant across all the 8 industrial sectors. Our result also indicates that none of 
the external forms of expansion – greenfield investment and mergers and acquisition - has an 
economically meaningful effect on TFP in the long-run. This suggests that all the 3 channels of 
expansion have no long-run effect on TFP, which is partly at odds with our third hypothesis (in 
chapter two) that states that external forms of expansion should lead to higher level of productivity 
than internal expansion. However, the theoretical ideas used to build our third hypothesis fail to 
consider long-run productivity effects of firm’s expansion and, instead focus mainly on the short-run 
effects.  
In comparison with previous empirical studies, most researchers have focused on a particular path of 
expansion (e.g., mergers and acquisition) without comparing this impact to the effect of other forms 
of adjustment (e.g., internal expansion and/or greenfield investment). Prior studies have also 
 
50 Parameter estimates for our dummy variables are converted using [exp(β)-1] *100 
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provided mixed evidence concerning the productivity impact of each channel of adjustment. For 
instance, Schoar (2002) observe that mergers and acquisition has both positive and negative effects 
on acquirer’s ‘purchased’ and ‘existing’ plants respectively. It is therefore difficult to compare our 
empirical evidence to prior studies. However, we view our finding of no long-run expansion effect as 
novel given our choice of appropriate control groups and the fact that we use the system GMM 
approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns regarding the relationship between firm expansion and 
their productivity levels. 
5.4.2 Contraction Effects on TFP 
Table 5-4: System GMM estimation of contraction effects on TFP, 1997-2012, Great Britaina 
Manufacturing 
Variables  High-
tech z-value 
Med. 
high-
tech z-value 
Med. 
low-tech z-value 
Low-
tech z-value 
Internal contraction (t-1) -0.015 -0.19 -0.023 -0.50 0.054 1.58 -0.019 -0.39 
Plant closure (t-1) -0.001 -0.03 0.124 1.11 0.118 1.55 0.166 1.06 
Plant sale (t-1) -0.449 -0.94 0.114 0.26 0.489 1.48 -0.257 -0.51 
Internal contraction (Long-run) 0.029 0.21 -0.048 -1.38 -0.056 -1.38 0.081 0.80 
Plant closure (Long-run) 0.014 0.12 0.021 0.45 0.016 0.44 0.005 0.05 
Plant sale (Long-run) 0.114 0.67 0.045 0.93 0.031 0.61 -0.090 -0.75 
Services 
Variables  High-
tech KI z-value KI z-value 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
Other 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
Internal contraction (t-1) -0.023 -0.22 -0.017 -0.16 -0.038 -0.22 -0.078 -0.80 
Plant closure (t-1) -0.364 -1.69 -0.173 -0.78 0.090 0.48 -0.080 -0.21 
Plant sale (t-1) -0.323 -0.58 1.058 0.69 0.193 0.20 0.122 0.18 
Internal contraction (Long-run) -0.129 -0.59 -0.134 -1.06 0.085 0.84 0.077 0.74 
Plant closure (Long-run) -0.436 -2.92 -0.075 -0.54 0.123 1.44 -0.460 -1.47 
Plant sale (Long-run) -0.218 -0.59 0.177 0.63 0.152 1.40 0.340 1.31 
a Parameter values for dummy variables are converted using exp(β) - 1  
In this section, we interpret results for contracting-path variables in equation (5.28). Similar to 
previous section, we start by comparing the ex-ante TFP performance of contracting and non-
adjusting firms to see whether future contracting firms were less productive than their non-adjusting 
counterparts even before contraction. It is evident from table 5.4 that there no clear ex-ante TFP 
disadvantage of future contracting firms as the coefficients associated with the contraction dummies 
are generally poorly determined. Most of the contraction-paths coefficients (except for plant closure 
in the high-tech KI service sector) are statistically insignificant; indicating that future contracting 
firms do not appear to be less productive, the year before contraction. This result partly contrasts 
with our second hypothesis which states that high-productivity firms are more likely to use external 
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forms of contraction than low-productivity firms. In terms of related empirical studies, our finding is 
similar to that of Hillier et al. (2006) and Yu and Park (2006) who report no significant relationship 
between firms’ operating efficiency (i.e., labour productivity) and their decision to lay off employees. 
This suggests that firms’ contraction decisions may be influenced by other factors such as their 
financial health and over-diversification, instead of being driven by their immediate efficiency level.  
With respect to the ex-post productivity effect of alternative forms of contraction, table 5.4 also 
shows that there are no economically meaningful effects of contraction paths on long-run TFP. This 
is evident from the statistical insignificant coefficients on all the contraction dummies (except for 
plant closure in the high-tech KI service sector). This result is also partly at odds with our fourth 
hypothesis which states that external contraction should result in higher level of productivity than 
internal contraction. However, the theoretical ideas used to formulate this hypothesis fail to 
consider long-run productivity effects of firm’s contraction. In relation to previous empirical studies, 
it is difficult to compare our empirical evidence because prior researchers have focused their 
attention on the productivity impact of a particular path of contraction (e.g., plant closure) without 
comparing this impact to the effect of other forms of contraction (e.g., internal contraction and/or 
plant sale). Previous empirical studies have also provided mixed evidence regarding the productivity 
impact of different channels of contraction. For instance, while Chen et al. (2001) reported that 
employee layoffs has a positive effect on ex-post firm-level productivity, Mishra and Mishra (1994) 
reported an opposite effect. However, given our choice of appropriate control groups and the fact 
that we use the system GMM approach to ease endogeneity concerns regarding the relationship 
between firm contraction and their productivity levels, our finding of no long-run contraction effect 
is also viewed as novel. 
5.4.3 Other Effects on TFP 
The results for the parameter estimates associated with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (5.28) will be discussed in 
this section. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present these results for manufacturing and service sector 
respectively. The result obtained for the first of our 𝑋𝑖𝑡  variables shows that the TFP impact of 
having a non-zero R&D spending is generally positive, except for firms with the lowest R&D 
expenditure (i.e., R&D band 1) where it is negative in 5 out of 8 industries. However, the coefficients 
associated with these dummies are poorly determined across sectors, suggesting no clear ex-post 
TFP improvements from undertaking R&D. Only 3 coefficients in the manufacturing sector are 
statistically significant and 2 out of the 3 indicate that R&D has a positive ex-post effect on TFP.  
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Table 5-5: System GMM estimation of other effects on TFP, 1997-2012, Manufacturing 
Variables 
High-
tech z-value 
Med 
High-
tech z-value 
Med 
Low-
tech z-value 
Low-
tech z-value 
R&D band 2 0.104 0.15 -0.503 -1.20 -0.107 -1.15 0.115 0.60 
R&D band 3 -0.165 -0.22 0.267 1.23 -0.146 -3.15 0.275 1.55 
R&D band 4 0.067 0.51 -0.097 -1.23 0.064 1.34 0.212 1.89 
R&D band 5 0.177 1.55 0.012 0.18 0.128 2.21 0.121 0.92 
ln Age -0.140 -1.79 -0.116 -1.73 -0.081 -1.85 -0.307 -2.62 
Single-plant firm 0.080 2.01 0.015 0.82 0.037 1.77 0.045 0.83 
Multi-region firm 0.057 1.12 0.008 0.34 0.045 1.81 0.031 0.72 
ln Herfindahl 0.007 0.30 0.001 0.13 -0.025 -2.68 -0.010 -0.69 
UK-Owned (with FDI) -0.027 -0.50 0.045 1.88 0.020 0.77 0.033 0.60 
SE Asia-Owned -0.061 -0.35 -0.025 -0.40 0.005 0.06 -0.107 -0.82 
EU-Owned -0.015 -0.18 0.050 1.23 -0.022 -0.56 0.048 0.57 
USA-Owned -0.015 -0.17 0.037 1.00 0.052 1.22 0.094 1.13 
AUSCANSA-Owned -0.005 -0.06 0.085 1.62 0.000 0.00 0.051 0.50 
Other Foreign-Owned -0.079 -0.93 -0.015 -0.26 -0.038 -0.79 -0.156 -1.17 
North-East -0.112 -0.72 -0.117 -1.84 -0.032 -0.62 -0.053 -0.66 
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.060 0.72 -0.042 -1.33 -0.053 -1.20 -0.038 -1.02 
North-West -0.013 -0.21 -0.083 -2.26 -0.066 -1.78 -0.123 -2.57 
West Midlands 0.065 0.49 -0.050 -1.43 -0.058 -1.62 -0.054 -0.86 
East Midlands -0.092 -1.76 -0.062 -1.94 -0.023 -0.59 -0.080 -1.65 
South-West -0.053 -0.88 -0.054 -1.71 -0.013 -0.31 -0.033 -0.75 
Eastern -0.047 -0.86 -0.047 -1.74 -0.020 -0.57 -0.052 -1.36 
London 0.125 1.45 -0.057 -1.60 -0.067 -0.89 0.194 2.17 
Scotland -0.043 -0.61 -0.041 -1.17 0.058 1.34 -0.099 -1.99 
Wales -0.084 -1.00 -0.069 -2.16 -0.053 -1.40 -0.048 -0.84 
Tyneside 0.094 0.59 0.111 1.46 0.002 0.02 -0.022 -0.18 
Northern Ireland -0.149 -0.90 -0.114 -1.43 -0.038 -0.60 -0.042 -0.48 
Manchester -0.017 -0.13 0.211 2.28 0.044 0.46 0.054 0.45 
Liverpool  -0.001 0.00 -0.057 -1.05 0.076 0.28 0.140 1.44 
Birmingham -0.194 -1.24 0.032 0.75 0.003 0.06 0.068 0.66 
Coventry -0.068 -0.41 -0.068 -0.92 -0.005 -0.10 -0.024 -0.20 
Leicester -0.012 -0.11 -0.042 -0.50 -0.098 -1.14 0.185 1.21 
Nottingham 0.273 1.38 -0.004 -0.06 0.130 1.04 0.055 0.31 
Bristol 0.284 1.61 0.105 1.36 -0.185 -3.02 0.017 0.21 
Glasgow -0.038 -0.33 0.147 1.52 -0.010 -0.08 0.070 1.11 
Edinburgh -0.049 -0.38 -0.164 -1.78 0.165 1.35 0.179 1.90 
Cardiff -0.043 -0.21 0.073 0.60 0.037 0.63 -0.166 -1.10 
Time trend 0.028 2.83 0.015 2.24 0.022 4.63 0.019 1.83 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.015 -0.34 0.010 0.39 -0.030 -1.26 0.001 0.04 
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Table 5-6: System GMM estimation of other effects on TFP, 1997-2012, Services 
Variables 
High-
tech KI z-value KI z-value 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
Other 
low-
tech KI z-value 
R&D band 2 0.150 0.21 -0.093 -0.09 -0.118 -0.23 -1.318 -0.88 
R&D band 3 -0.257 -0.94 0.036 0.06 0.103 0.43 0.406 0.84 
R&D band 4 0.047 0.33 0.005 0.03 0.029 0.12 0.260 0.85 
R&D band 5 -0.039 -0.20 -0.059 -0.39 0.155 0.63 0.070 0.26 
ln Age -0.252 -1.63 -0.064 -0.99 -0.393 -2.76 -0.047 -0.81 
Single-plant firm 0.119 1.59 0.021 0.32 -0.010 -0.32 0.086 1.17 
Multi-region firm 0.001 0.01 0.073 1.18 0.046 0.96 0.180 1.99 
ln Herfindahl -0.004 -0.17 0.017 1.00 0.012 0.85 0.010 0.56 
UK-Owned (with FDI) -0.080 -0.75 0.188 1.16 0.186 1.62 0.269 1.00 
SE Asia-Owned 0.168 0.79 1.569 1.82 0.361 2.29 -0.038 -0.15 
EU-Owned 0.024 0.21 0.185 0.94 0.164 1.91 0.152 0.67 
USA-Owned 0.066 0.56 0.282 1.50 0.172 2.01 -0.041 -0.08 
AUSCANSA-Owned 0.009 0.02 0.259 0.88 0.119 0.80 -0.077 -0.27 
Other Foreign-Owned -0.148 -0.32 0.336 1.59 0.118 0.90 -0.237 -1.08 
North-East -0.268 -1.22 0.049 0.53 -0.166 -3.22 0.109 0.95 
Yorkshire-Humberside -0.021 -0.17 -0.004 -0.05 -0.041 -0.91 -0.014 -0.15 
North-West -0.129 -0.67 -0.057 -0.94 -0.087 -2.54 -0.137 -1.50 
West Midlands -0.350 -2.70 -0.078 -0.83 -0.094 -2.29 0.054 0.47 
East Midlands 0.018 0.12 -0.094 -1.02 -0.107 -2.35 -0.128 -1.46 
South-West -0.221 -1.33 -0.095 -1.22 -0.065 -1.90 0.048 0.49 
Eastern -0.008 -0.07 0.060 0.92 -0.035 -1.04 0.125 1.42 
London 0.030 0.36 0.242 4.13 0.140 2.59 0.098 1.09 
Scotland -0.180 -1.04 0.023 0.30 -0.081 -2.65 -0.033 -0.44 
Wales -0.379 -2.32 -0.097 -1.08 -0.081 -1.73 -0.076 -0.78 
Tyneside -0.103 -0.20 -0.134 -0.97 0.129 1.42 -0.156 -0.90 
Northern Ireland 0.193 0.66 0.049 0.15 0.742 2.46 -0.052 -0.22 
Manchester 0.124 0.45 0.153 0.97 0.041 0.58 -0.430 -0.64 
Liverpool -0.242 -0.76 -0.029 -0.23 0.009 0.08 0.072 0.12 
Birmingham 0.560 2.22 -0.030 -0.23 -0.100 -1.34 -0.182 -1.54 
Coventry -0.060 -0.22 -0.025 -0.12 0.001 0.01 -0.154 -1.13 
Leicester -0.336 -0.93 0.215 1.33 0.112 0.80 -0.192 -0.50 
Nottingham -0.208 -1.03 -0.514 -1.02 -0.065 -0.46 -0.040 -0.15 
Bristol 0.272 1.39 0.268 1.93 0.153 1.66 0.207 0.56 
Glasgow 0.188 0.66 -0.112 -1.15 0.041 0.62 0.072 0.53 
Edinburgh 0.032 0.15 -0.081 -0.99 0.078 1.60 0.154 1.20 
Cardiff -0.200 -0.71 0.069 0.83 -0.003 -0.05 -0.046 -0.31 
Time trend 0.031 2.40 0.010 1.36 0.015 1.43 0.001 0.09 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.093 -1.07 -0.034 -0.52 -0.096 -2.00 0.033 0.48 
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The result obtained for the second of our 𝑋𝑖𝑡 variable shows that higher firm age is significantly 
related to lower TFP, especially in all the manufacturing and low-tech KI service sectors; in other 
service sectors, there is no significant relationship between age and TFP. A negative coefficient is 
precisely what would be expected if older firms are less likely to employ the latest technology. The 
coefficient obtained for the third variable in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 shows that single-plant dummy is positive and 
statistically significant for the high-tech manufacturing and medium low-tech manufacturing sectors, 
but not significant for the other 6 industries. This offers some evidence to suggest that single-plant 
enterprises derive greater efficiency benefits from “their leaner organizational structure that allows 
them to take strategic actions to exploit emerging market opportunities and to create a market 
niche position for themselves” (Dhawan, 2001:271). 
In terms of the fourth variable included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡, tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that we obtain the expected 
positive relationship between multi-region dummy and TFP. The coefficient on the multi-region 
dummy is statistically significant for the medium low-tech manufacturing and other low-tech KI 
service sectors, suggesting that there are positive productivity effects associated with locating firms 
near markets and suppliers in these sectors (e.g., Fujita et al., 1999). The coefficient obtained on the 
fifth 𝑋𝑖𝑡 variable - Herfindahl index - is only statistically significant in medium low-tech 
manufacturing where it is negative. This suggests that greater level of competition in the medium 
low-tech manufacturing industry requires that firms operate more efficiently. This result is in line 
with the view of Nickell (1996), who suggests that by facing an increasing number of competitors in 
their industries, firms might be more inclined to undertake measures aimed at improving their TFP. 
With regards to the sixth variable included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡, tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that most of the 
coefficients on our foreign-ownership dummies are generally positive except for high-tech 
manufacturing and other low-tech KI service sectors. However, most of these coefficients are poorly 
determined across sectors, apart from the low-tech KI service sector; thus, only in the latter sector is 
there any evidence that multinational enterprises operate with better management and/or 
marketing capabilities that make them more efficient than domestic firms. Turning to the regional 
dummies, our result shows that the impact on TFP of being in a government office region is generally 
negative (with South-East as the benchmark region). The coefficients associated with the regional 
dummies are economically significant in at least one industrial sector, except for firms located in the 
Tyneside region. Overall, and based on taking average ranking across the 8 industrial sectors in 
tables 5.5 and 5.6, firms located in Wales experienced the largest negative impact on TFP (e.g., 
around 5% and 32% lower in low -tech manufacturing and high-tech KI service sectors respectively). 
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In contrast, the parameter estimates on city dummies are generally positive, however these 
estimates are poorly determined. 
Lastly, tables 5.5 and 5.6 shows that UK firms experienced significant TFP boost from positive 
(exogeneous) technical improvements. This is indicated by the statistically significant and positive 
coefficients for the time trend variable in all the manufacturing and high-tech KI service sectors. The 
exogenous technical change was highest in high-tech KI service sector (at around a 3.1% per annum 
increase in TFP), while the manufacturing sectors also experienced significant boosts from the use of 
new technology (around 1.5% to 2.8% per annum). These results are broadly in line with those found 
in Harris and Moffat (2011). However, we find no evidence of a slowdown in TFP improvement since 
2007 – i.e., the UK productivity puzzle in Harris and Moffat (2016a). This is indicated by the 
statistically insignificant coefficients on the 2008-12 dummy variable in all sectors except for low-
tech KI service sector.  
5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to establish the existence of a causal impact of firm adjustment on TFP. In 
contrast to our hypotheses (hypotheses 3 and 4 in chapter two), no statistically significant long-run 
effect of adjustment paths on TFP was identified for any of the industries considered (except for 
plant closure in the high-tech KI service sector). However, the theoretical ideas that were used to 
construct hypotheses 3 and 4 fail to consider long-run productivity effects of firm’s expansion and 
contraction, focusing instead on short-run effects. 
In order to highlight the potential problem from ignoring the dynamic relation between firm 
adjustment and productivity (and ignoring fixed-effects, selection bias due to firm entry and exit 
and, endogeneity of factor inputs in a production function), we use the following estimators: OLS, 
fixed-effects, and Levinsohn-Petrin. The unreasonably low estimates of capital coefficients (and low 
factor elasticities produced by OLS and fixed-effects) suggests that there are methodological issues 
(explained in section 5.3) that arises from using these estimators. In light of the poor performance of 
these estimators, it would seem that the system GMM estimator is to be preferred because of its 
theoretical advantage. Under the assumption that ‘internal’ instruments are valid, the system GMM 
estimator should produce unbiased and consistent estimates. Indeed, the system GMM results 
indicate that the estimates obtained are economically sensible since they pass our specification tests 
– the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions and the AR(2) second-order serial correlation tests 
– pointing therefore, to the validity of instrument set adopted. The reasonable estimates of factor 
elasticities produced by system GMM is also indicative of its improvement on OLS, fixed-effects, and 
Levinsohn-Petrin.  
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Although the system GMM estimator is unlikely to solve all endogeneity problems, it remains the 
“gold standard” for consistently identifying the impact of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable, in the absence of natural experiments or ‘external’ instruments. Therefore, providing 
economic justification for the use of system GMM in corporate finance and industrial economic 
research is one of our major contribution to literature. Another novelty in this chapter is that we use 
appropriate control groups to study the impact of firm adjustment on productivity. Thus, we view 
our finding of no long-run adjustment effect as novel, given our choice of appropriate control groups 
and the fact that we use the system GMM approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns that may 
arise from studying the impact of firm adjustment on productivity.  
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5.6 Appendix 
Table 5-7: System GMM production function estimation 1997-2012, Manufacturing 
Variables High-tech z-value 
Med High-
tech z-value 
Med Low-
tech z-value Low-tech z-value 
ln Intermediate inputs 0.654 5.52 0.677 9.30 0.758 13.11 0.526 3.92 
ln Employment 0.243 1.91 0.206 1.95 0.114 1.27 0.298 2.74 
ln Capital 0.093 1.70 0.105 1.67 0.060 1.83 0.223 2.47 
Time trend 0.028 2.83 0.015 2.24 0.022 4.63 0.019 1.83 
R&D band 2 0.104 0.15 -0.503 -1.20 -0.107 -1.15 0.115 0.60 
R&D band 3 -0.165 -0.22 0.267 1.23 -0.146 -3.15 0.275 1.55 
R&D band 4 0.067 0.51 -0.097 -1.23 0.064 1.34 0.212 1.89 
R&D band 5 0.177 1.55 0.012 0.18 0.128 2.21 0.121 0.92 
ln Age -0.140 -1.79 -0.116 -1.73 -0.081 -1.85 -0.307 -2.62 
Single-plant firm 0.080 2.01 0.015 0.82 0.037 1.77 0.045 0.83 
Multi-region firm 0.057 1.12 0.008 0.34 0.045 1.81 0.031 0.72 
UK-Owned -0.027 -0.50 0.045 1.88 0.020 0.77 0.033 0.60 
SE Asia-Owned -0.061 -0.35 -0.025 -0.40 0.005 0.06 -0.107 -0.82 
EU-Owned -0.015 -0.18 0.050 1.23 -0.022 -0.56 0.048 0.57 
USA-Owned -0.015 -0.17 0.037 1.00 0.052 1.22 0.094 1.13 
AUSCANSA-Owned -0.005 -0.06 0.085 1.62 0.000 0.00 0.051 0.50 
Other Foreign-Owned -0.079 -0.93 -0.015 -0.26 -0.038 -0.79 -0.156 -1.17 
ln Herfindahl 0.007 0.30 0.001 0.13 -0.025 -2.68 -0.010 -0.69 
Manchester Dum -0.017 -0.13 0.211 2.28 0.044 0.46 0.054 0.45 
Birmingham Dum -0.194 -1.24 0.032 0.75 0.003 0.06 0.068 0.66 
Glasgow Dum -0.038 -0.33 0.147 1.52 -0.010 -0.08 0.070 1.11 
Tyneside Dum 0.094 0.59 0.111 1.46 0.002 0.02 -0.022 -0.18 
Edinburgh Dum -0.049 -0.38 -0.164 -1.78 0.165 1.35 0.179 1.90 
Bristol Dum 0.284 1.61 0.105 1.36 -0.185 -3.02 0.017 0.21 
Cardiff Dum -0.043 -0.21 0.073 0.60 0.037 0.63 -0.166 -1.10 
Liverpool Dum -0.001 0.00 -0.057 -1.05 0.076 0.28 0.140 1.44 
Nottingham Dum 0.273 1.38 -0.004 -0.06 0.130 1.04 0.055 0.31 
Leicester Dum -0.012 -0.11 -0.042 -0.50 -0.098 -1.14 0.185 1.21 
Coventry Dum -0.068 -0.41 -0.068 -0.92 -0.005 -0.10 -0.024 -0.20 
North East -0.112 -0.72 -0.117 -1.84 -0.032 -0.62 -0.053 -0.66 
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Variables High-tech z-value 
Med High-
tech z-value 
Med Low-
tech z-value Low-tech z-value 
Yorks-Humberside 0.060 0.72 -0.042 -1.33 -0.053 -1.20 -0.038 -1.02 
North West -0.013 -0.21 -0.083 -2.26 -0.066 -1.78 -0.123 -2.57 
West Midlands 0.065 0.49 -0.050 -1.43 -0.058 -1.62 -0.054 -0.86 
East Midlands -0.092 -1.76 -0.062 -1.94 -0.023 -0.59 -0.080 -1.65 
South West -0.053 -0.88 -0.054 -1.71 -0.013 -0.31 -0.033 -0.75 
Eastern -0.047 -0.86 -0.047 -1.74 -0.020 -0.57 -0.052 -1.36 
London 0.125 1.45 -0.057 -1.60 -0.067 -0.89 0.194 2.17 
Scotland -0.043 -0.61 -0.041 -1.17 0.058 1.34 -0.099 -1.99 
Wales -0.084 -1.00 -0.069 -2.16 -0.053 -1.40 -0.048 -0.84 
Northern Ireland -0.149 -0.90 -0.114 -1.43 -0.038 -0.60 -0.042 -0.48 
Internal expansionLR -0.080 -0.49 -0.032 -0.68 -0.048 -1.26 -0.277 -1.09 
Greenfield investmentLR 0.048 0.40 0.009 0.18 -0.057 -1.01 -0.099 -1.22 
Mergers and acquisitionLR 0.163 1.25 -0.007 -0.17 0.043 0.55 0.118 1.14 
Internal contractionLR 0.029 0.21 -0.048 -1.38 -0.056 -1.38 0.081 0.80 
Plant closureLR 0.014 0.12 0.021 0.45 0.016 0.44 0.005 0.05 
Plant saleLR 0.114 0.67 0.045 0.93 0.031 0.61 -0.090 -0.75 
Internal expansiont-1 0.024 0.26 0.089 1.51 0.020 0.70 0.103 2.31 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.334 -2.13 0.135 0.63 -0.065 -0.29 -0.079 -0.51 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.137 -0.27 -0.210 -1.04 0.235 1.54 0.098 0.32 
Internal contractiont-1 -0.015 -0.19 -0.023 -0.50 0.054 1.58 -0.019 -0.39 
Plant closuret-1 -0.001 -0.03 0.124 1.11 0.118 1.55 0.166 1.06 
Plant salet-1 -0.449 -0.94 0.114 0.26 0.489 1.48 -0.257 -0.51 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.015 -0.34 0.010 0.39 -0.030 -1.26 0.001 0.04 
Intercept 2.421 3.40 2.518 4.53 2.151 5.12 3.796 3.67 
Industry 2-digit SIC92 dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -3.68  -4.24  -4.96  -4.21  
AR(1) z-statistic p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
AR(2) z-statistic 0.75  -1.43  -0.57  0.61  
AR(2) z-statistic p-value 0.45  0.15  0.57  0.55  
Hansen test 108.70  85.22  214.70  94.00  
Hansen test p-value 0.20  0.32  0.80  0.65  
Number of observations 5,885  16,033  16,113  24,071  
Number of firms 2,111  5,614  6,751  9,024  
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Table 5-8: System GMM production function estimation 1997-2012, Services 
Variables High-tech KI z-value KI z-value Low-tech KI z-value 
Other low-
tech KI z-value 
Intermediate inputs 0.563 5.51 0.527 5.92 0.620 6.38 0.750 8.06 
Employment 0.402 2.52 0.463 3.71 0.219 1.83 0.223 1.65 
Capital 0.149 1.94 0.030 2.11 0.188 2.78 0.004 0.41 
Time trend 0.031 2.40 0.010 1.36 0.015 1.43 0.001 0.09 
randd2 0.150 0.21 -0.093 -0.09 -0.118 -0.23 -1.318 -0.88 
randd3 -0.257 -0.94 0.036 0.06 0.103 0.43 0.406 0.84 
randd4 0.047 0.33 0.005 0.03 0.029 0.12 0.260 0.85 
randd5 -0.039 -0.20 -0.059 -0.39 0.155 0.63 0.070 0.26 
Age -0.252 -1.63 -0.064 -0.99 -0.393 -2.76 -0.047 -0.81 
Single plant 0.119 1.59 0.021 0.32 -0.010 -0.32 0.086 1.17 
Multi-region firm 0.001 0.01 0.073 1.18 0.046 0.96 0.180 1.99 
UK-Owned -0.080 -0.75 0.188 1.16 0.186 1.62 0.269 1.00 
SE Asia-Owned 0.168 0.79 1.569 1.82 0.361 2.29 -0.038 -0.15 
EU-Owned 0.024 0.21 0.185 0.94 0.164 1.91 0.152 0.67 
USA-Owned 0.066 0.56 0.282 1.50 0.172 2.01 -0.041 -0.08 
AUSCANSA-Owned 0.009 0.02 0.259 0.88 0.119 0.80 -0.077 -0.27 
Other FO-Owned -0.148 -0.32 0.336 1.59 0.118 0.90 -0.237 -1.08 
Herfindahl -0.004 -0.17 0.017 1.00 0.012 0.85 0.010 0.56 
Manchester Dum 0.124 0.45 0.153 0.97 0.041 0.58 -0.430 -0.64 
Birmingham Dum 0.560 2.22 -0.030 -0.23 -0.100 -1.34 -0.182 -1.54 
Glasgow Dum 0.188 0.66 -0.112 -1.15 0.041 0.62 0.072 0.53 
Tyneside Dum -0.103 -0.20 -0.134 -0.97 0.129 1.42 -0.156 -0.90 
Edinburgh Dum 0.032 0.15 -0.081 -0.99 0.078 1.60 0.154 1.20 
Bristol Dum 0.272 1.39 0.268 1.93 0.153 1.66 0.207 0.56 
Cardiff Dum -0.200 -0.71 0.069 0.83 -0.003 -0.05 -0.046 -0.31 
Liverpool Dum -0.242 -0.76 -0.029 -0.23 0.009 0.08 0.072 0.12 
Nottingham Dum -0.208 -1.03 -0.514 -1.02 -0.065 -0.46 -0.040 -0.15 
Leicester Dum -0.336 -0.93 0.215 1.33 0.112 0.80 -0.192 -0.50 
Coventry Dum -0.060 -0.22 -0.025 -0.12 0.001 0.01 -0.154 -1.13 
North East -0.268 -1.22 0.049 0.53 -0.166 -3.22 0.109 0.95 
Yorks-Humberside -0.021 -0.17 -0.004 -0.05 -0.041 -0.91 -0.014 -0.15 
North West -0.129 -0.67 -0.057 -0.94 -0.087 -2.54 -0.137 -1.50 
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Variables High-tech KI z-value KI z-value Low-tech KI z-value 
Other low-
tech KI z-value 
West Midlands -0.350 -2.70 -0.078 -0.83 -0.094 -2.29 0.054 0.47 
East Midlands 0.018 0.12 -0.094 -1.02 -0.107 -2.35 -0.128 -1.46 
South West -0.221 -1.33 -0.095 -1.22 -0.065 -1.90 0.048 0.49 
Eastern -0.008 -0.07 0.060 0.92 -0.035 -1.04 0.125 1.42 
London 0.030 0.36 0.242 4.13 0.140 2.59 0.098 1.09 
Scotland -0.180 -1.04 0.023 0.30 -0.081 -2.65 -0.033 -0.44 
Wales -0.379 -2.32 -0.097 -1.08 -0.081 -1.73 -0.076 -0.78 
Northern Ireland 0.193 0.66 0.049 0.15 0.742 2.46 -0.052 -0.22 
Internal expansionLR 0.111 0.41 0.292 1.05 0.181 1.15 -0.054 -0.24 
Greenfield investmentLR 0.060 0.22 -0.021 -0.09 -0.185 -1.29 0.003 0.01 
Mergers and acquisitionLR 0.046 0.22 -0.104 -0.64 -0.022 -0.20 -0.157 -0.47 
Internal contractionLR -0.129 -0.59 -0.134 -1.06 0.085 0.84 0.077 0.74 
Plant closureLR -0.436 -2.92 -0.075 -0.54 0.123 1.44 -0.460 -1.47 
Plant saleLR -0.218 -0.59 0.177 0.63 0.152 1.40 0.340 1.31 
Internal expansiont-1 0.296 2.70 -0.046 -0.37 -0.004 -0.03 0.020 0.31 
Greenfield investmentt-1 0.010 0.05 0.322 1.70 0.234 1.50 -0.084 -0.34 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 -0.109 -0.36 -0.480 -0.73 0.092 0.18 -0.373 -0.52 
Internal contractiont-1 -0.023 -0.22 -0.017 -0.16 -0.038 -0.22 -0.078 -0.80 
Plant closuret-1 -0.364 -1.69 -0.173 -0.78 0.090 0.48 -0.080 -0.21 
Plant salet-1 -0.323 -0.58 1.058 0.69 0.193 0.20 0.122 0.18 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.093 -1.07 -0.034 -0.52 -0.096 -2.00 0.033 0.48 
Intercept 2.979 3.54 2.650 5.45 3.284 5.51 1.808 4.55 
Industry 2-digit SIC92 dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -3.59  -3.66  -3.41  -3.54  
AR(1) z-statistic p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
AR(2) z-statistic 1.50  0.65  0.63  -0.38  
AR(2) z-statistic p-value 0.13  0.52  0.53  0.70  
Hansen test 137.40  66.76  159.50  199.00  
Hansen test p-value 0.99  0.84  0.78  0.92  
Number of observations 6,584  12,219  74,293  8,121  
Number of firms 3,012  6,499  35,489  3,942  
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Table 5-9: OLS production function estimation 1997-2012, Manufacturing 
Variables High-tech t-value 
Med. high-
tech t-value 
Med. low-
tech t-value Low-tech t-value 
ln Intermediate inputs 0.210 8.32 0.182 11.65 0.201 10.37 0.190 9.27 
ln Employment 0.408 13.33 0.386 17.71 0.333 13.82 0.322 11.74 
ln Capital 0.004 1.08 0.011 2.95 0.006 2.36 0.011 4.09 
Time trend -0.022 -0.31 0.020 0.58 0.031 0.77 0.033 1.79 
R&D band 2 -0.046 -0.34 0.006 0.30 -0.014 -0.62 0.053 2.43 
R&D band 3 0.030 1.22 -0.010 -0.63 -0.009 -0.54 0.034 2.11 
R&D band 4 0.067 3.75 -0.002 -0.16 0.028 1.49 0.029 2.17 
R&D band 5 0.018 5.01 0.013 5.83 0.014 6.98 0.008 4.10 
ln Age -0.001 -0.10 -0.027 -3.19 -0.028 -4.14 -0.027 -3.87 
Single-plant firm -0.034 -1.58 0.032 2.50 0.006 0.33 0.030 1.73 
Multi-region firm -0.008 -0.24 0.008 0.42 0.043 1.12 0.006 0.27 
UK-Owned -0.058 -1.47 0.037 2.92 0.041 2.08 0.031 1.61 
SE Asia-Owned 0.021 0.84 0.028 2.27 0.066 2.62 0.042 1.99 
EU-Owned -0.075 -1.63 0.046 2.00 0.071 1.27 0.076 1.62 
USA-Owned -0.041 -0.94 -0.002 -0.04 0.056 2.28 -0.086 -1.35 
AUSCANSA-Owned 0.055 2.54 0.019 1.76 0.012 1.04 0.038 3.27 
Other Foreign-Owned 0.062 2.49 0.005 0.27 0.026 2.01 0.034 2.67 
ln Herfindahl 0.012 0.82 0.003 0.64 -0.016 -3.04 -0.005 -0.96 
Manchester Dum -0.051 -0.63 0.126 2.03 0.027 0.78 0.002 0.05 
Birmingham Dum -0.071 -1.58 0.018 0.75 -0.018 -0.69 0.056 1.45 
Glasgow Dum 0.036 0.82 0.073 2.09 0.030 0.76 0.031 0.72 
Tyneside Dum 0.151 2.09 0.067 1.25 0.041 1.27 -0.083 -1.70 
Edinburgh Dum -0.014 -0.23 -0.102 -1.60 0.094 1.69 0.113 2.45 
Bristol Dum 0.168 1.38 0.062 1.70 -0.083 -1.98 0.042 1.99 
Cardiff Dum 0.098 1.02 0.034 0.56 0.021 0.62 -0.049 -0.65 
Liverpool Dum -0.053 -0.63 -0.031 -0.88 0.085 0.84 0.021 0.59 
Nottingham Dum 0.449 1.53 0.004 0.11 0.058 0.82 -0.021 -0.62 
Leicester Dum 0.051 0.55 -0.050 -1.07 -0.163 -1.48 0.066 1.70 
Coventry Dum 0.072 1.61 -0.012 -0.23 0.009 0.38 0.003 0.08 
North East -0.153 -3.74 -0.082 -1.69 -0.035 -1.50 -0.029 -1.25 
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Variables High-tech t-value 
Med. high-
tech t-value 
Med. low-
tech t-value Low-tech t-value 
Yorks-Humberside -0.022 -0.52 -0.040 -2.12 -0.033 -1.31 -0.023 -1.30 
North West 0.010 0.32 -0.076 -3.10 -0.040 -1.90 -0.058 -1.73 
West Midlands -0.038 -1.30 -0.066 -3.48 -0.041 -2.30 -0.058 -2.56 
East Midlands -0.070 -2.42 -0.058 -3.23 -0.013 -0.60 -0.058 -2.39 
South West -0.033 -1.09 -0.058 -3.29 -0.025 -1.24 -0.034 -1.80 
Eastern -0.019 -0.72 -0.034 -1.90 -0.016 -0.84 -0.045 -2.12 
London 0.058 1.76 -0.061 -2.75 -0.084 -1.48 0.013 0.58 
Scotland -0.037 -1.37 -0.037 -2.05 0.015 0.69 -0.068 -3.92 
Wales -0.066 -2.06 -0.048 -2.97 -0.035 -1.91 -0.055 -3.07 
Northern Ireland -0.014 -0.20 -0.050 -1.29 -0.020 -0.63 -0.023 -0.83 
Internal expansionLR 0.010 0.56 -0.012 -1.13 0.002 0.24 0.011 1.08 
Greenfield investmentLR 0.036 1.72 0.017 1.10 0.003 0.23 -0.009 -0.45 
Mergers and acquisitionLR -0.014 -0.61 0.012 1.08 -0.002 -0.10 0.027 2.42 
Internal contractionLR -0.053 -3.49 -0.031 -2.79 -0.034 -3.47 -0.016 -1.53 
Plant closureLR -0.070 -2.06 -0.040 -3.32 -0.041 -3.02 -0.044 -2.38 
Plant saleLR 0.021 0.85 -0.045 -1.55 -0.166 -1.75 -0.069 -2.66 
Internal expansiont-1 0.067 3.96 0.072 8.48 0.061 6.63 0.054 5.12 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.092 -1.09 0.023 0.87 -0.047 -0.65 -0.186 -2.12 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 0.057 1.27 0.020 1.11 0.068 2.62 0.048 1.28 
Internal contractiont-1 -0.030 -1.46 -0.023 -2.77 -0.037 -4.07 -0.066 -2.69 
Plant closuret-1 -0.038 -1.54 -0.001 -0.05 -0.039 -1.38 -0.061 -1.74 
Plant salet-1 -0.011 -0.23 -0.013 -0.31 -0.063 -1.52 -0.063 -1.90 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.002 -0.08 -0.020 -1.02 -0.050 -2.50 0.001 0.07 
Intercept 1.016 9.51 1.052 14.02 1.106 9.98 0.956 9.43 
Industry 2-digit SIC92 dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 0.968  0.963  0.947  0.949  
Number of observations 5,885  16,033  16,113  24,071  
Number of firms 2,111  5,614  6,751  9,024  
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Table 5-10: OLS production function estimation 1997-2012, Services 
Variables High-tech KI t-value KI t-value Low-tech KI t-value 
Other low-
tech KI t-value 
ln Intermediate inputs 0.085 6.52 0.081 6.52 0.082 10.56 0.111 6.71 
ln Employment 0.193 11.19 0.192 11.30 0.269 14.87 0.211 9.11 
ln Capital 0.003 0.92 0.003 0.95 -0.001 -0.54 -0.001 -0.49 
Time trend -0.011 -0.11 -0.013 -0.43 0.051 2.01 0.283 0.74 
R&D band 2 -0.021 -0.30 0.026 0.81 0.022 0.98 0.147 1.22 
R&D band 3 0.009 0.23 0.034 0.84 -0.016 -0.63 0.132 2.26 
R&D band 4 0.038 1.66 -0.039 -1.02 0.071 2.52 0.069 0.58 
R&D band 5 0.008 2.00 0.006 2.01 -0.001 -1.14 -0.007 -1.72 
ln Age -0.015 -1.14 -0.009 -0.89 -0.015 -3.95 -0.026 -2.35 
Single-plant firm -0.077 -2.00 0.041 1.30 0.004 0.23 0.057 0.76 
Multi-region firm 0.106 0.97 0.508 1.86 0.049 2.14 -0.008 -0.17 
UK-Owned 0.036 0.75 -0.026 -0.35 0.019 1.69 0.108 1.62 
SE Asia-Owned -0.007 -0.17 -0.021 -0.44 0.040 2.36 0.378 0.77 
EU-Owned -0.138 -0.99 0.165 1.70 0.049 1.20 0.176 1.13 
USA-Owned -0.358 -1.57 0.090 1.18 -0.050 -0.87 -0.092 -2.09 
AUSCANSA-Owned 0.065 2.14 0.031 2.49 0.022 3.62 0.044 2.00 
Other Foreign-Owned 0.032 0.97 0.025 1.19 0.002 0.30 0.040 1.28 
ln Herfindahl 0.005 0.58 0.010 1.58 0.000 -0.16 0.018 2.28 
Manchester Dum 0.074 0.85 0.078 0.89 0.021 1.02 -0.256 -0.97 
Birmingham Dum 0.187 2.55 -0.069 -0.94 -0.056 -1.90 0.001 0.03 
Glasgow Dum 0.119 0.97 -0.078 -2.20 -0.021 -1.03 0.073 1.47 
Tyneside Dum 0.092 0.35 -0.094 -1.76 0.081 2.26 -0.056 -1.02 
Edinburgh Dum -0.018 -0.30 -0.044 -1.19 0.010 0.42 0.091 1.90 
Bristol Dum 0.116 1.84 0.068 1.78 0.045 1.47 -0.043 -0.33 
Cardiff Dum -0.071 -0.89 0.039 1.26 0.000 0.00 -0.004 -0.06 
Liverpool Dum -0.021 -0.12 -0.014 -0.20 0.027 0.72 -0.168 -0.39 
Nottingham Dum -0.015 -0.17 -0.332 -1.14 -0.037 -0.73 -0.018 -0.23 
Leicester Dum 0.027 0.19 0.026 0.33 0.086 1.12 -0.152 -0.54 
Coventry Dum 0.050 0.36 -0.081 -0.83 -0.030 -0.65 -0.033 -0.36 
North East -0.118 -0.55 0.057 1.63 -0.074 -3.88 0.080 1.93 
Yorks-Humberside -0.027 -0.64 -0.003 -0.16 -0.027 -2.16 0.037 1.17 
North West -0.021 -0.54 -0.018 -0.78 -0.027 -2.34 0.017 0.48 
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Variables High-tech KI t-value KI t-value Low-tech KI t-value 
Other low-
tech KI t-value 
West Midlands -0.152 -2.64 -0.020 -0.50 -0.042 -2.96 0.026 0.72 
East Midlands -0.027 -0.84 -0.017 -0.48 -0.058 -4.14 -0.026 -0.70 
South West -0.068 -1.51 -0.018 -0.68 -0.015 -1.33 0.052 1.47 
Eastern -0.032 -0.96 0.027 1.03 -0.018 -1.80 0.081 2.47 
London -0.028 -0.93 0.075 3.32 0.025 2.32 0.077 2.51 
Scotland -0.067 -1.43 0.034 1.50 -0.026 -2.54 0.022 0.58 
Wales -0.121 -3.00 0.005 0.21 -0.031 -2.98 -0.012 -0.34 
Northern Ireland 0.092 0.82 0.020 0.20 -0.007 -0.23 0.019 0.32 
Internal expansionLR 0.008 0.36 0.006 0.47 0.004 0.64 -0.013 -0.71 
Greenfield investmentLR -0.003 -0.10 0.029 1.42 0.010 1.16 -0.002 -0.08 
Mergers and acquisitionLR -0.002 -0.06 0.011 0.25 0.026 1.77 0.035 0.48 
Internal contractionLR -0.038 -1.93 -0.024 -2.04 -0.025 -4.92 -0.002 -0.10 
Plant closureLR -0.116 -3.48 -0.076 -3.13 -0.034 -3.41 -0.071 -2.22 
Plant saleLR 0.100 0.72 -0.059 -0.54 -0.091 -2.99 0.090 0.88 
Internal expansiont-1 0.104 3.77 0.063 2.59 0.055 7.43 0.046 1.68 
Greenfield investmentt-1 0.020 0.22 0.062 2.09 0.048 2.15 -0.015 -0.21 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 0.270 2.44 -0.146 -1.59 0.080 1.72 -0.024 -0.29 
Internal contractiont-1 -0.094 -2.77 -0.019 -1.03 0.001 0.05 -0.012 -0.56 
Plant closuret-1 -0.022 -0.39 -0.098 -2.02 -0.005 -0.29 -0.153 -1.40 
Plant salet-1 -0.005 -0.04 -0.672 -1.12 0.025 0.28 0.041 0.48 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.015 -0.43 -0.035 -1.41 0.007 0.70 0.041 1.18 
Intercept 0.433 4.22 0.547 5.96 0.429 9.63 0.546 4.77 
Industry 2-digit SIC92 dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 0.937  0.933  0.957  0.906  
Number of observations 6,584  12,219  74,293  8,121  
Number of firms 3,012  6,499  35,489  3,942  
 
 
 
210 
 
Table 5-11: Fixed-effects production function estimation 1997-2012, Manufacturing 
Variables High-tech t-value 
Med. high-
tech t-value 
Med. low-
tech t-value Low-tech t-value 
ln Intermediate inputs 0.204 4.35 0.333 11.34 0.422 8.31 0.319 20.96 
ln Employment 0.438 8.93 0.416 11.93 0.403 10.83 0.355 30.31 
ln Capital 0.031 2.41 0.010 1.70 0.008 1.55 0.004 2.16 
Time trend 0.098 1.17 0.101 2.34 -0.005 -0.17 0.029 1.32 
R&D band 2 0.038 0.91 0.069 2.28 0.015 0.71 0.023 1.62 
R&D band 3 -0.027 -0.68 0.033 2.16 0.013 0.71 0.016 1.60 
R&D band 4 0.008 0.34 0.025 2.13 0.037 2.33 0.033 3.53 
R&D band 5 0.029 4.98 0.013 5.09 0.008 1.98 0.002 1.32 
ln Age -0.050 -1.76 -0.024 -1.61 -0.059 -3.23 0.023 3.05 
Single-plant firm 0.000 0.00 -0.016 -1.36 0.001 0.10 0.000 -0.03 
Multi-region firm -0.126 -2.32 -0.031 -1.09 0.038 0.86 0.004 0.15 
UK-Owned 0.015 0.33 0.027 1.49 -0.009 -0.48 0.007 0.56 
SE Asia-Owned -0.039 -0.89 0.012 0.70 0.025 1.19 -0.010 -0.67 
EU-Owned -0.066 -0.80 -0.041 -0.79 0.018 0.50 -0.010 -0.34 
USA-Owned 0.011 0.13 0.040 0.64 0.008 0.26 0.004 0.17 
AUSCANSA-Owned 0.040 1.18 -0.002 -0.12 0.028 1.96 0.056 7.05 
Other Foreign-Owned 0.022 0.72 -0.002 -0.13 0.015 1.00 0.014 1.85 
ln Herfindahl 0.061 2.99 0.007 0.78 0.026 1.98 0.007 1.64 
Manchester Dum -0.621 -2.05 -0.344 -1.22 2.722 1.11 -0.079 -0.86 
Birmingham Dum -0.223 -0.57 0.371 1.37 -0.067 -0.62 -0.040 -0.50 
Glasgow Dum 0.129 0.48 -0.228 -0.87 0.061 0.55 0.060 0.55 
Tyneside Dum 0.582 0.69 0.015 0.08 -0.295 -0.97 -0.053 -0.53 
Edinburgh Dum 0.003 0.02 -0.393 -2.01 0.889 2.85 -0.008 -0.05 
Bristol Dum 0.060 0.61 0.686 2.55 -0.012 -0.06 -0.021 -0.37 
Cardiff Dum -0.154 -0.71 -0.002 -0.01 0.195 0.91 -0.039 -0.28 
Liverpool Dum -0.028 -0.08 0.171 0.90 -0.175 -1.97 0.059 0.55 
Nottingham Dum -0.053 -0.16 -0.138 -0.95 0.497 0.84 0.053 0.48 
Leicester Dum 0.376 0.69 0.059 0.28 0.309 2.36 -0.005 -0.04 
Coventry Dum 0.581 1.06 0.084 1.43 -0.039 -0.13 -0.132 -1.25 
North East -0.289 -1.51 -0.158 -1.24 0.042 0.46 0.034 0.64 
Yorks-Humberside -0.004 -0.02 -0.132 -1.14 0.188 1.20 0.071 1.32 
North West -0.106 -0.69 -0.176 -1.60 -0.265 -1.50 0.009 0.17 
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Variables High-tech t-value 
Med. high-
tech t-value 
Med. low-
tech t-value Low-tech t-value 
West Midlands -0.245 -1.40 -0.267 -2.27 0.053 1.12 -0.035 -0.73 
East Midlands -0.296 -1.57 -0.164 -1.53 0.064 0.73 0.060 1.16 
South West -0.122 -1.00 -0.164 -1.66 0.040 0.41 0.032 0.70 
Eastern -0.052 -0.58 -0.101 -1.03 0.060 0.68 0.048 1.02 
London 0.043 0.13 -0.021 -0.21 0.168 1.30 0.050 0.83 
Scotland 0.071 0.50 -0.040 -0.23 0.075 0.71 -0.048 -0.60 
Wales -0.078 -0.55 -0.071 -0.68 -0.033 -0.39 -0.033 -0.50 
Northern Ireland 0.127 0.39 -0.450 -1.72 -0.370 -0.71 -0.091 -0.63 
Internal expansionLR -0.019 -0.66 -0.029 -2.39 0.009 0.48 -0.028 -4.11 
Greenfield investmentLR -0.012 -0.36 -0.002 -0.06 0.019 0.84 0.010 0.87 
Mergers and acquisitionLR 0.053 1.22 0.024 1.12 0.040 1.33 0.050 4.01 
Internal contractionLR -0.030 -1.66 -0.020 -1.77 0.024 1.12 -0.008 -1.09 
Plant closureLR -0.118 -2.80 0.008 0.53 0.016 0.63 -0.002 -0.18 
Plant saleLR 0.024 0.43 -0.072 -1.84 -0.112 -1.06 -0.043 -1.90 
Internal expansiont-1 0.041 2.70 0.063 7.09 0.069 6.49 0.062 13.95 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.079 -1.88 0.033 1.82 0.037 1.81 0.048 4.97 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 0.004 0.10 0.001 0.04 0.029 1.23 0.058 3.93 
Internal contractiont-1 -0.015 -0.93 -0.020 -2.31 -0.012 -1.01 -0.027 -4.94 
Plant closuret-1 -0.057 -2.30 0.007 0.43 -0.010 -0.65 -0.016 -1.74 
Plant salet-1 -0.006 -0.13 0.026 0.67 -0.029 -0.58 -0.081 -2.25 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.056 -1.99 -0.011 -0.81 -0.040 -2.54 -0.022 -3.16 
Intercept 2.503 7.43 2.526 10.80 2.799 11.15 2.338 17.51 
Industry 2-digit SIC92 dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 0.645  0.638  0.559  0.486  
Number of observations 5,885  16,033  16,113  24,071  
Number of firms 2,111  5,614  6,751  9,024  
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Table 5-12: Fixed-effects production function estimation 1997-2012, Services 
Variables High-tech KI t-value KI t-value Low-tech KI t-value 
Other low-
tech KI t-value 
ln Intermediate inputs 0.277 5.78 0.211 5.66 0.289 11.42 0.426 7.40 
ln Employment 0.238 7.06 0.250 9.46 0.385 20.20 0.234 5.28 
ln Capital 0.001 0.25 0.012 2.80 0.003 0.67 0.002 0.59 
Time trend 0.127 0.71 0.048 0.71 0.055 1.90 -0.495 -2.01 
R&D band 2 -0.192 -2.84 0.051 0.57 0.001 0.04 0.111 1.11 
R&D band 3 -0.076 -0.91 0.017 0.40 0.020 0.77 -0.057 -0.93 
R&D band 4 0.005 0.13 0.026 0.58 0.020 0.91 -0.067 -1.32 
R&D band 5 -0.002 -0.23 0.009 1.85 -0.005 -2.65 0.001 0.19 
ln Age 0.056 1.67 0.035 1.11 0.028 2.16 0.046 1.43 
Single-plant firm -0.027 -0.70 0.054 1.94 -0.014 -0.66 0.255 1.68 
Multi-region firm 0.140 1.45 0.095 1.74 -0.017 -0.37 0.003 0.03 
UK-Owned -0.079 -1.92 0.011 0.16 0.014 0.68 0.070 1.19 
SE Asia-Owned -0.188 -2.11 -0.087 -1.63 0.009 0.28 -0.009 -0.16 
EU-Owned 0.078 0.81 -0.147 -1.58 0.028 1.20 0.234 0.87 
USA-Owned -0.031 -0.37 -0.022 -0.25 -0.011 -0.28 -0.073 -0.79 
AUSCANSA-Owned 0.000 0.01 0.071 2.24 0.051 3.98 0.134 2.87 
Other Foreign-Owned -0.016 -0.43 -0.016 -0.59 0.009 0.73 -0.066 -1.66 
ln Herfindahl 0.014 1.16 -0.010 -0.68 0.009 1.42 0.002 0.19 
Manchester Dum -0.585 -0.97 0.145 0.96 -0.269 -1.65 -0.417 -1.68 
Birmingham Dum 0.269 1.57 0.125 1.22 -0.132 -0.81 0.032 0.26 
Glasgow Dum 0.079 0.36 -0.309 -0.74 0.143 1.02 0.618 2.23 
Tyneside Dum -0.452 -1.41 -0.345 -1.43 0.105 0.69 -0.982 -1.98 
Edinburgh Dum 0.689 2.07 1.337 2.27 -0.214 -0.69 -0.015 -0.10 
Bristol Dum 0.112 0.31 0.281 0.73 -0.063 -0.71 -0.081 -3.41 
Cardiff Dum 1.491 2.88 -0.235 -1.10 -0.183 -1.77 2.204 9.55 
Liverpool Dum -1.453 -1.59 -0.035 -0.17 0.051 0.35 0.499 1.92 
Nottingham Dum 0.501 1.73 0.077 0.36 0.059 0.38 -0.121 -0.18 
Leicester Dum -2.694 -1.35 0.488 1.27 0.358 1.80 0.689 0.97 
Coventry Dum 0.382 0.78 -0.315 -0.65 -0.189 -1.11 1.342 1.00 
North East -0.050 -0.18 -0.240 -1.30 0.149 1.51 -0.527 -1.75 
213 
 
Variables High-tech KI t-value KI t-value Low-tech KI t-value 
Other low-
tech KI t-value 
Yorks-Humberside 0.209 0.89 -0.063 -0.25 0.034 0.57 -0.338 -1.26 
North West -0.040 -0.21 -0.118 -0.65 0.051 0.66 0.056 0.28 
West Midlands 0.005 0.03 -0.334 -1.67 -0.071 -1.06 -0.346 -1.94 
East Midlands -0.131 -0.49 -0.502 -1.77 0.142 2.32 -0.360 -0.89 
South West -0.365 -1.49 -0.015 -0.08 -0.008 -0.14 -0.004 -0.02 
Eastern -0.003 -0.02 -0.125 -0.61 0.009 0.16 0.018 0.10 
London 0.014 0.12 -0.311 -2.08 0.026 0.54 0.064 0.37 
Scotland -0.237 -1.12 -0.573 -2.04 0.069 0.56 -0.162 -0.61 
Wales -0.825 -3.21 0.003 0.02 -0.044 -0.36 -0.621 -1.42 
Northern Ireland 8.405 0.92 -0.267 -0.51 -0.137 -0.62 -0.976 -0.35 
Internal expansionLR 0.066 1.43 -0.049 -2.12 -0.037 -3.36 -0.105 -3.07 
Greenfield investmentLR 0.121 1.83 0.026 0.87 -0.009 -0.55 0.033 0.65 
Mergers and acquisitionLR 0.073 1.23 0.047 1.11 0.066 3.26 0.056 0.89 
Internal contractionLR -0.009 -0.23 -0.011 -0.49 -0.004 -0.40 -0.022 -0.80 
Plant closureLR -0.012 -0.20 -0.022 -0.53 0.008 0.58 0.082 1.42 
Plant saleLR 0.268 1.20 0.118 1.19 -0.057 -1.51 -0.076 -0.63 
Internal expansiont-1 0.085 3.40 0.036 2.38 0.055 7.58 0.077 3.16 
Greenfield investmentt-1 0.052 1.10 0.022 0.85 0.050 3.70 0.115 2.19 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 0.058 1.47 0.030 0.65 0.068 2.49 0.043 0.61 
Internal contractiont-1 -0.030 -0.87 -0.023 -1.29 -0.023 -2.45 -0.054 -2.17 
Plant closuret-1 -0.103 -1.18 -0.042 -1.24 -0.011 -0.75 -0.004 -0.08 
Plant salet-1 0.013 0.14 0.029 0.26 -0.187 -2.05 -0.178 -1.16 
Dummy 2008-12 0.035 0.83 -0.077 -2.83 -0.011 -1.00 -0.043 -1.23 
Intercept 3.244 9.23 2.728 9.03 2.321 16.39 2.084 6.36 
Industry 2-digit SIC92 dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 0.449  0.556  0.549  0.415  
Number of observations 6,584  12,219  74,293  8,121  
Number of firms 3,012  6,499  35,489  3,942  
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Table 5-13: Levinsohn-Petrin production function estimation 1997-2012, Manufacturing 
Variables High-tech t-value Med. high-tech t-value Med. low-tech t-value Low-tech t-value 
ln Intermediate inputs 1.140 5.79 0.699 3.28 0.717 6.06 1.078 7.14 
ln Employment 0.311 15.86 0.229 19.41 0.259 27.44 0.228 31.53 
ln Capital 0.000 0.00 0.073 1.87 0.047 2.93 0.029 1.28 
Time trend 0.030 7.65 0.018 13.78 0.015 9.91 0.011 6.67 
R&D band 2 -0.082 -1.20 -0.003 -0.07 0.013 0.35 0.041 1.88 
R&D band 3 -0.079 -0.63 -0.025 -1.01 -0.013 -0.54 0.036 2.36 
R&D band 4 0.033 1.19 0.006 0.43 0.005 0.39 0.014 1.46 
R&D band 5 0.075 5.83 0.015 1.87 0.008 0.61 -0.007 -0.61 
ln Age -0.030 -2.19 -0.050 -6.34 -0.055 -7.67 -0.059 -9.08 
Single-plant firm 0.042 1.76 0.008 0.77 0.024 2.41 0.038 3.17 
Multi-region firm 0.041 1.72 0.008 0.68 0.017 1.50 0.013 1.27 
UK-Owned -0.011 -0.58 0.037 2.96 0.011 0.76 0.022 1.55 
SE Asia-Owned -0.067 -1.63 -0.055 -2.91 -0.047 -0.95 -0.073 -2.07 
EU-Owned -0.051 -2.26 0.001 0.10 -0.002 -0.21 0.027 2.03 
USA-Owned 0.014 0.60 0.034 3.30 0.026 1.63 0.063 3.06 
AUSCANSA-Owned -0.043 -0.47 0.016 0.43 0.030 0.88 0.002 0.04 
Other Foreign-Owned -0.021 -0.40 -0.067 -1.80 0.018 0.47 -0.067 -1.53 
ln Herfindahl 0.033 2.21 -0.010 -1.65 -0.007 -1.39 0.009 1.90 
Manchester Dum 0.108 0.94 0.056 0.67 0.047 0.93 -0.036 -0.60 
Birmingham Dum -0.100 -1.50 -0.015 -0.74 -0.006 -0.23 0.101 2.53 
Glasgow Dum 0.038 0.51 0.070 1.32 0.045 0.91 0.065 1.86 
Tyneside Dum 0.160 1.24 0.002 0.04 0.087 2.47 -0.062 -1.07 
Edinburgh Dum 0.003 0.04 -0.166 -1.70 0.054 0.93 0.130 1.99 
Bristol Dum 0.151 1.59 0.082 1.14 -0.077 -2.17 0.076 1.38 
Cardiff Dum 0.085 0.80 -0.055 -1.02 0.031 0.63 -0.089 -1.01 
Liverpool Dum 0.176 0.94 -0.074 -1.56 0.064 0.57 0.038 0.79 
Nottingham Dum 0.524 1.57 0.035 0.40 0.043 0.54 0.001 0.03 
Leicester Dum 0.077 0.48 -0.068 -1.31 -0.187 -1.04 0.013 0.38 
Coventry Dum 0.042 0.39 -0.038 -0.39 0.007 0.15 0.070 1.10 
North East -0.182 -4.19 -0.057 -2.08 -0.087 -4.17 -0.053 -2.14 
Yorks-Humberside -0.042 -1.14 -0.077 -3.87 -0.054 -3.07 -0.045 -2.49 
North West -0.051 -1.50 -0.062 -3.21 -0.066 -3.30 -0.066 -3.43 
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Variables High-tech t-value Med. high-tech t-value Med. low-tech t-value Low-tech t-value 
West Midlands -0.051 -1.72 -0.081 -5.34 -0.082 -4.63 -0.090 -4.06 
East Midlands -0.113 -2.94 -0.054 -3.18 -0.042 -2.25 -0.069 -3.46 
South West -0.064 -2.33 -0.054 -2.79 -0.046 -2.64 -0.040 -2.02 
Eastern -0.026 -0.99 -0.017 -1.04 -0.023 -1.17 -0.048 -2.57 
London 0.125 2.55 -0.014 -0.60 -0.092 -2.45 0.023 0.78 
Scotland -0.052 -1.80 -0.042 -2.00 -0.010 -0.48 -0.069 -3.35 
Wales -0.064 -1.95 -0.067 -3.62 -0.057 -2.79 -0.083 -4.14 
Northern Ireland -0.033 -0.45 -0.059 -1.49 -0.051 -1.39 -0.009 -0.24 
Internal expansionLR 0.021 1.15 0.017 1.97 0.017 1.64 0.040 4.18 
Greenfield investmentLR 0.029 1.62 0.014 1.21 0.005 0.43 -0.004 -0.33 
Mergers and acquisitionLR -0.039 -1.65 0.006 0.49 -0.029 -1.82 -0.006 -0.43 
Internal contractionLR -0.076 -4.83 -0.041 -3.98 -0.032 -4.36 -0.030 -3.46 
Plant closureLR -0.039 -1.86 -0.034 -2.97 -0.021 -1.88 -0.030 -3.43 
Plant saleLR 0.032 0.71 -0.073 -2.33 -0.084 -1.77 -0.113 -4.28 
Internal expansiont-1 0.099 5.57 0.113 12.25 0.081 8.36 0.087 9.34 
Greenfield investmentt-1 -0.010 -0.16 0.066 4.10 0.009 0.34 0.006 0.26 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 0.099 1.46 0.036 1.57 0.031 1.24 0.041 1.58 
Internal contractiont-1 -0.056 -3.89 0.000 -0.06 -0.026 -3.30 -0.040 -5.83 
Plant closuret-1 -0.079 -2.47 0.014 0.76 -0.022 -1.38 -0.014 -0.80 
Plant salet-1 -0.055 -0.88 -0.013 -0.26 -0.136 -2.65 -0.064 -1.75 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.049 -1.74 -0.023 -1.91 -0.034 -2.50 0.012 0.86 
Industry 2-digit SIC92 dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
CRS Wald test chi-squared 3.93  6.06  0.9  0.72  
CRS Wald test P-value 0.048  0.014  0.343  0.397  
Number of observations 5,885  16,033  16,113  24,071  
Number of firms 2,111  5,614  6,751  9,024  
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Table 5-14: Levinsohn-Petrin production function estimation 1997-2012, Services 
Variables High-tech KI t-value KI t-value Low-tech KI t-value Other low-tech KI t-value 
ln Intermediate inputs 0.831 5.06 1.079 5.79 0.656 31.51 0.779 15.60 
ln Employment 0.281 7.15 0.262 9.50 0.253 33.89 0.304 6.25 
ln Capital 0.028 1.14 0.096 1.86 0.035 4.00 0.039 1.84 
Time trend 0.023 2.93 0.029 5.47 0.004 3.32 -0.008 -0.70 
R&D band 2 0.122 0.67 -0.024 -0.18 0.106 3.03 0.679 1.05 
R&D band 3 0.023 0.16 -0.025 -0.33 0.034 1.17 0.619 1.53 
R&D band 4 0.003 0.04 -0.019 -0.34 0.030 1.24 0.328 2.64 
R&D band 5 0.164 3.30 -0.016 -0.40 0.071 2.78 0.010 0.08 
ln Age -0.101 -2.55 -0.086 -3.57 -0.053 -8.25 -0.037 -1.01 
Single-plant firm 0.060 0.76 0.052 1.82 0.065 6.05 0.182 2.22 
Multi-region firm 0.115 1.56 0.015 0.54 0.010 0.86 0.138 1.73 
UK-Owned -0.066 -0.77 -0.031 -0.72 0.021 1.04 -0.223 -1.30 
SE Asia-Owned 0.136 1.09 0.167 0.47 0.025 1.05 0.030 0.30 
EU-Owned 0.082 0.99 -0.101 -1.03 0.020 1.27 -0.043 -0.33 
USA-Owned 0.158 2.05 -0.149 -2.53 0.045 1.97 -0.051 -0.22 
AUSCANSA-Owned -0.135 -0.88 0.100 0.67 0.013 0.25 0.009 0.03 
Other Foreign-Owned -0.030 -0.14 -0.150 -1.42 -0.057 -1.26 -0.473 -2.04 
ln Herfindahl 0.011 0.45 -0.043 -3.39 0.005 1.43 -0.041 -1.48 
Manchester Dum -0.024 -0.11 0.241 2.00 0.060 1.78 -0.131 -0.32 
Birmingham Dum 0.248 1.48 -0.035 -0.29 -0.077 -0.80 -0.144 -0.79 
Glasgow Dum 0.278 1.37 -0.048 -0.41 -0.095 -1.86 0.408 1.97 
Tyneside Dum -0.214 -0.51 -0.070 -0.49 0.099 1.93 -0.136 -0.63 
Edinburgh Dum 0.273 1.21 -0.157 -1.39 -0.011 -0.23 0.387 2.74 
Bristol Dum 0.190 1.30 0.300 3.39 0.100 1.45 -0.089 -0.59 
Cardiff Dum -0.262 -1.11 0.056 0.67 0.044 1.22 0.372 1.45 
Liverpool Dum -0.684 -1.02 0.106 0.83 0.059 1.15 0.075 0.13 
Nottingham Dum 0.278 1.65 -0.027 -0.13 -0.002 -0.04 0.015 0.06 
Leicester Dum 0.324 1.71 0.185 1.36 0.060 0.92 -0.007 -0.02 
Coventry Dum -0.330 -0.55 -0.016 -0.04 0.018 0.30 -0.087 -0.35 
North East 0.087 0.23 -0.011 -0.12 -0.085 -3.43 0.177 1.23 
Yorks-Humberside 0.086 0.86 -0.080 -1.38 -0.078 -5.38 -0.029 -0.29 
North West 0.048 0.51 -0.064 -0.88 -0.063 -4.43 0.092 0.89 
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Variables High-tech KI t-value KI t-value Low-tech KI t-value Other low-tech KI t-value 
West Midlands -0.148 -1.01 -0.102 -1.41 -0.062 -2.94 0.040 0.35 
East Midlands -0.077 -0.86 -0.164 -2.06 -0.078 -4.55 0.011 0.10 
South West -0.108 -1.23 -0.095 -1.82 -0.049 -2.72 0.136 1.15 
Eastern -0.100 -0.90 0.098 2.01 -0.028 -1.65 -0.006 -0.07 
London 0.105 1.42 0.196 3.94 0.082 3.77 0.205 2.23 
Scotland -0.340 -2.05 0.021 0.37 -0.044 -2.41 -0.066 -0.72 
Wales -0.301 -1.43 -0.056 -1.05 -0.098 -6.92 -0.344 -1.62 
Northern Ireland 0.336 1.34 0.192 0.82 0.072 1.32 -0.050 -0.11 
Internal expansionLR 0.007 0.16 0.050 1.69 0.043 5.14 -0.026 -0.59 
Greenfield investmentLR 0.039 0.64 0.011 0.37 0.018 2.07 0.005 0.06 
Mergers and acquisitionLR 0.208 2.60 -0.026 -0.70 0.045 3.18 0.113 1.30 
Internal contractionLR -0.189 -4.89 -0.075 -3.25 -0.071 -8.29 -0.091 -1.67 
Plant closureLR -0.298 -3.40 -0.129 -3.54 -0.077 -5.65 -0.208 -3.02 
Plant saleLR 0.061 0.28 -0.095 -1.00 -0.084 -2.54 -0.012 -0.06 
Internal expansiont-1 0.299 5.15 0.209 6.18 0.128 13.17 0.145 2.41 
Greenfield investmentt-1 0.144 1.46 0.049 0.78 0.108 5.93 0.071 0.53 
Mergers and acquisitiont-1 0.503 3.30 0.012 0.11 0.113 3.08 0.053 0.16 
Internal contractiont-1 -0.042 -0.83 -0.047 -1.51 -0.046 -4.14 -0.157 -2.14 
Plant closuret-1 0.014 0.09 0.092 1.11 -0.033 -1.54 -0.141 -1.07 
Plant salet-1 -0.138 -0.77 -0.349 -0.57 -0.179 -1.99 0.316 1.01 
Dummy 2008-12 -0.021 -0.35 -0.172 -3.82 -0.046 -3.07 0.018 0.20 
Industry 2-digit SIC92 dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
CRS Wald test chi-squared 0.06  0.04  93.48  0.86  
CRS Wald test P-value 0.814  0.844  0.000  0.354  
Number of observations 6,584  12,219  74,293  8,121  
Number of firms 3,012  6,499  35,489  3,942  
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5.7 Robustness Check 
Table 5-15: System GMM estimation of expansion effects on TFP, 1997-2012, Great Britain 
Manufacturing 
Variables  High-
tech z-value 
Med. 
high-
tech z-value 
Medium 
low-tech z-value 
Low-
tech z-value 
Internal expansion (t-1) 0.085 1.53 0.110 2.27 0.027 0.69 0.091 1.19 
Greenfield investment (t-1) -0.216 -1.19 0.021 0.11 -0.055 -0.41 -0.320 -1.21 
Mergers and acquisition (t-1) 0.126 0.28 -0.272 -1.05 0.084 0.41 0.202 0.53 
Expansion dominant (t-1) 0.149 0.49 -0.261 -1.16 -0.018 -0.08 0.019 0.05 
Internal expansion (Long-run) -0.003 -0.02 -0.033 -0.80 -0.067 -1.33 -0.190 -0.81 
Greenfield investment (Long-run) 0.026 0.28 0.029 0.61 -0.035 -0.63 -0.093 -1.31 
Mergers and acquisition (Long-run) 0.099 1.19 0.002 0.05 0.034 0.45 0.071 0.60 
Expansion dominant (Long-run) 0.031 0.33 0.006 0.11 0.006 0.07 0.013 0.14 
Services 
Variables  High-
tech KI z-value KI z-value 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
Other 
Low -
tech KI z-value 
Internal expansion (t-1) 0.242 1.96 0.038 0.30 -0.032 -0.47 -0.007 -0.08 
Greenfield investment (t-1) 0.188 0.74 0.495 1.16 0.266 1.05 0.120 0.37 
Mergers and acquisition (t-1) 0.064 0.35 -0.359 -0.95 -0.118 -0.29 -0.820 -1.01 
Expansion dominant (t-1) -0.135 -0.45 0.117 0.40 0.038 0.18 0.272 0.93 
Internal expansion (Long-run) 0.068 0.19 0.219 0.78 0.163 1.22 0.043 0.23 
Greenfield investment (Long-run) 0.014 0.04 0.099 0.43 -0.011 -0.10 0.004 0.02 
Mergers and acquisition (Long-run) -0.021 -0.10 -0.070 -0.42 -0.090 -0.99 -0.367 -1.43 
Expansion dominant (Long-run) 0.024 0.12 -0.037 -0.30 -0.024 -0.25 0.401 1.17 
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Table 5-16: System GMM estimation of Contraction effects on TFP, 1997-2012, Great Britain 
Manufacturing 
Variables  High-
tech z-value 
Med. 
high-
tech z-value 
Med. 
low-tech z-value 
Low-
tech z-value 
Internal contraction (t-1) 0.048 0.65 0.018 0.40 0.034 0.75 -0.103 -2.07 
Plant closure (t-1) 0.000 0.00 -0.003 -0.04 -0.025 -0.27 0.074 0.67 
Plant sale (t-1) -0.079 -0.22 -0.231 -1.01 -0.210 -1.08 -1.016 -2.05 
Contraction dominant (t-1) 0.132 0.69 -0.007 -0.04 0.095 0.84 0.054 0.19 
Internal contraction (Long-run) 0.051 0.48 -0.026 -0.70 -0.064 -1.65 0.051 0.44 
Plant closure (Long-run) 0.080 0.95 -0.003 -0.06 -0.006 -0.14 0.009 0.11 
Plant sale (Long-run) 0.049 0.31 0.033 0.57 0.039 0.59 -0.151 -1.22 
Contraction dominant (Long-run) 0.205 1.61 -0.004 -0.11 -0.056 -1.10 -0.072 -0.63 
Services 
Variables  High-
tech KI z-value KI z-value 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
Other 
Low-
tech KI z-value 
Internal contraction (t-1) -0.045 -0.33 -0.019 -0.21 0.036 0.30 -0.051 -0.58 
Plant closure (t-1) -0.102 -0.54 0.228 1.51 0.090 0.53 0.219 1.21 
Plant sale (t-1) -0.393 -0.91 -0.395 -0.60 0.015 0.03 -1.339 -1.34 
Contraction dominant (t-1) 0.716 1.55 -0.338 -0.91 -0.314 -0.60 -0.302 -0.82 
Internal contraction (Long-run) 0.052 0.27 -0.044 -0.48 0.075 0.73 0.152 1.49 
Plant closure (Long-run) -0.363 -1.46 -0.152 -1.21 0.069 0.68 -0.547 -1.64 
Plant sale (Long-run) -0.398 -0.90 0.175 0.91 0.175 1.38 0.386 1.00 
Contraction dominant (Long-run) -0.046 -0.30 0.012 0.09 0.171 1.21 0.220 1.20 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined the determinants of firms’ choice of adjustment and its effect on TFP. It has 
done so using a dataset that was created by merging Business Enterprise Research and Development 
(BERD) and Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) into Annual Respondents 
Database/Annual Business Survey (ARD/ABS). The first empirical chapter examined the major 
determinants of firms’ choice of adjustment in Great Britain. The second empirical chapter focused 
on analysing the impact of alternative forms of adjustment on TFP. 
The next section will describe the contribution made by this thesis to the literature. The third section 
will set out our main findings from the empirical analyses of chapters four and five. Section four 
provides some policy recommendations on the basis of these findings. Section five offers some 
suggestions for future research. The final section concludes.  
6.2 Contribution to the Literature 
The contribution of this thesis to the literature has been twofold. Firstly, the chapter that 
investigated the determinants of firms’ choice of expansion and contraction path used a 
comprehensive set of determinants to provide a better and broader understanding of the potential 
determinants of firms’ adjustment choice. Such determinants are included in the estimation of firms’ 
adjustment choice because their omission would lead to omitted variable(s) problem thus, 
producing biased estimates. The choice of determinants is also motivated by the theoretical and 
empirical literature and information available in the BERD, AFDI and ARD/ABS dataset. Thus, 
although previous studies have provided insights, this thesis has extended the set of adjustment 
determinants to include: firm size, adjustment size, firm-level variables (R&D, age, multi-plant and 
foreign ownership), industrial and geographical structure and, persistence and financial crisis. 
The second major contribution of this thesis is methodological. The chapter that examines the 
impact of alternative forms of adjustment on TFP used the appropriate method for dealing with both 
the simultaneity of adjustment paths-productivity relation and the endogeneity of factor inputs (and 
self-selection of firms in and out of an industry) in the production function. Most prior studies of the 
productivity effect of adjustment path have estimated models of the form: output = f(capital, labour, 
intermediate inputs), where TFP is obtained as the residual and, as part of a two-stage approach, TFP 
is then regressed on a particular path of adjustment (e.g., mergers and acquisition). Clearly, this two-
stage approach would lead to biased estimates of adjustment paths (and elasticities of factor inputs) 
because of an omitted variables problem (e.g., Harris et al., 2005). Thus, we estimated a more 
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appropriate empirical model of the form: output = f(capital, labour, intermediate inputs, adjustment 
paths, other productivity effects, fixed effects), Because of the potential simultaneity and 
endogeneity concerns with our empirical model, we apply the system GMM estimator. In addition to 
using the system GMM approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also use the appropriate 
control groups to study the impact of impact of firm adjustment on productivity. This is the first time 
the productivity impact of firm adjustment has been analysed using the appropriate control groups 
and a method that deals the consequences of a dynamic relationship between firm adjustment and 
productivity. 
6.3 Main Findings 
There are 2 main empirical findings in this thesis. The first is related to the determinants of firms’ 
choice adjustment in Great Britain (chapter four). This showed that when compared to small firms, 
large firms tend to rely more on external forms of adjustment, particularly on greenfield investment 
for expanding firms. Firms also rely more on external forms of expansion when the desired size of 
expansion is large, however, contracting firms rely less on external contraction as the size of a 
contraction increases. With regards to the firm-level variables considered, we found that older, 
multi-plant and foreign-owned firms are more likely to use external forms of expansion, whereas 
R&D expenditure is negatively related to the external forms of expansion. For contracting firms, we 
found that the probability of using external forms of contraction reduces with firm’s age and single-
plant ownership. Lastly, we found that foreign-owned firms are more likely to close plants. 
Our second empirical finding is that alternative forms of adjustment have no statistically significant 
impact on long-run TFP in all the industries considered. Although, the theoretical literature 
postulates that external forms of adjustment should result in higher level of productivity, our finding 
of no statistically significant long-run impact suggests that theories do not account for possible long-
run productivity effects of adjustment. Previous empirical studies also fail to provide guidance as to 
what may be expected when comparing the productivity impact of different forms of adjustment. 
However, our finding of no long-run adjustment effect is viewed as novel, given our choice of 
appropriate control groups and the fact that we use the system GMM approach to alleviate 
endogeneity problems that arises from estimating the impact of firm adjustment on productivity. 
6.4 Policy Recommendation 
In terms of the long-running debate of whether the government should aim its policies at creating 
favourable environments for businesses to grow, our results in chapter four provide evidence to 
support such approach. The positive impact of firm size on external forms of adjustment suggest 
support for corporate tax credits for large firms. Our finding that firms use greenfield investment 
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and mergers and acquisition to carry out large employment expansion suggest that anti-competitive 
laws that prevents firms from expanding externally may hamper expansion in employment. Also, the 
finding that firms use mergers and acquisition to outsource corporate R&D and strengthen firm 
innovation suggests that government should promote policies that can make innovation driven 
mergers and acquisition a success. In chapter five, we found little evidence for firm-level productivity 
effects from greenfield investment nor from other cited adjustment activities such as mergers and 
acquisition, plant closure and plant sale. This result is inconsistent with prior research and policy 
recommendations of many commentators. However, we illustrate why previous empirical papers 
that find a relationship between firm adjustment and productivity may be biased.  
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
Although this research attempts to provide comprehensive work regarding the determinants and 
effects of firms’ choice of adjustment on TFP, more work can still be done on this topic. The grouping 
process of firm adjustment in chapter three of this thesis (i.e., section 3.3) opens a wide variety of 
topics for future research. The 6 major paths of adjustment – internal expansion, greenfield 
investment, mergers and acquisition, internal contraction, plant closure and plant sale - are found to 
be the most frequently used by firms in the UK. However, there are 106 adjustment combinations 
that are rarely adopted by firms, but account for a third of the economy-wide employment 
expansion in the UK. This thesis collapsed the 106 adjustment combinations into the 6 major 
channels of adjustment to avoid complications when empirically modelling firms’ choice of 
adjustment.   
Future research might benefit from expanding on the ideas in this thesis to create further 
adjustment categories e.g., collapsing the 106 adjustment classification into 2 different 
combinations that reflects whether a firm is expanding or contracting, overall. In other words, future 
studies could address the determinants of 8 channels of adjustment, instead of the 6 considered in 
this thesis. Furthermore, while this thesis addresses the determinants and effects of firm 
adjustment, it does not consider how firms redraw their boundaries after an adjustment. It would be 
interesting for future researchers to test if there are extensive restructuring following a major 
adjustment such as mergers and acquisition and if such further restructuring are determined by the 
same factors considered in this thesis and/or have any effect on firm-level productivity.  
Although it is clear that productivity determines firms’ choice of adjustment (i.e., more productive 
firms are more likely to use external forms of adjustment), the empirical strategy taken in this thesis 
is a reduced-form approach. We used firm-level variable ((R&D, age, multi-plant and foreign 
ownership) to study the impact of productivity on firms’ choice of adjustment. Researchers could 
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carry out a similar study by using a two-stage approach where productivity (or TFP) is estimated in 
the first stage which is in turn, regressed on firms’ choice of adjustment.   
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It started by setting out the contribution made to the literature by 
this thesis. This was firstly in the use of a wider set of determinants to those which have been 
previously used to understand how firms choose between different channels of adjustment. The 
second contribution made by this thesis is the use of a superior econometric technique (and 
appropriate control groups) to deal with issues of simultaneity and endogeneity that arises when 
estimating the impact of firm’s adjustment on productivity.  
This chapter then describes the main findings from our empirical chapters. The determinants of 
firms’ choice of adjustment showed that large, older, multi-plant, foreign-owned firms and firms that 
wish to carry out large expansion are more likely to use external forms of expansion – greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisition. For contracting firms, we found that the likelihood of using 
external forms of contraction falls with firm’s age and single-plant ownership. Chapter five showed 
that different forms of adjustment have no statistically significant impact on TFP. On the basis of 
these findings, some policy recommendations were made. Finally, the chapter offered some 
suggestion for future research.  
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